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FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, DEMOCRATIC NORMS, 
 AND INTERNET GOVERNANCE 
 
52 EMORY L.J. 187 (2003) 
 





Within a decade, the Internet has transformed from an 
obscure medium for the exchange of military and scientific data to 
a global medium of mass communication and expression of all 
kinds.  As speech on the Internet has become increasingly 
important, a number of governments have made well-publicized 
and widely criticized attempts to control it.  Not as well-publicized 
or as well-analyzed are the speech-regarding policies of the 
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers or ICANN, 
the body that has been governing the Internet’s infrastructure for 
the last five years.  In the agreement under which it gained its 
current powers, ICANN assured the United States that it would 
govern the Internet’s infrastructure democratically and would 
implement governance structures to take into account the interests 
of affected Internet users around the world.  In particular, ICANN 
promised to conduct worldwide elections of representatives to its 
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decision-making bodies and to embody deliberative and 
representative democratic structures.  While ICANN has 
acknowledged the importance of implementing such procedural 
democratic norms, it has failed to acknowledge that the ideals of 
democratic governance encompass substantive norms, such as 
protection for freedom of expression.  Nor has ICANN 
acknowledged that any of its policies implicate free speech. 
In this Article, I challenge both components of the 
prevailing ideology -- that ICANN’s governance of the Internet’s 
infrastructure does not threaten free speech and (relatedly) that 
ICANN’s governance of the Internet need not embody special 
protections for free speech.   I argue that ICANN’s decision-
making authority over the Internet’s infrastructure indeed 
encompasses the power to enact regulations affecting speech 
within the most powerful forum for expression ever developed.  
Specifically, current ICANN policies restrict the ability to engage 
in anonymous speech and critical speech on the Internet.  I claim 
that ICANN cannot remain true to the democratic norms it was  
designed to embody unless it adopts policies to protect substantive 
values integral to democracy – including protections for freedom 
of expression. 
This inquiry into ICANN’s governance structure, and the 
values such structure should embody, is particularly timely. The 
United States government is in the midst of evaluating how well 
ICANN has lived up to its initial commitments to embody 
democratic decision-making structures as it considers whether to 
renew its agreement with ICANN to permit ICANN to continue its 
role in governing the Internet’s infrastructure.  At the same time, 
ICANN has been engaged in a process of internal scrutiny and 
self-evaluation and has proposed to reform its governance 
structure as it attempts to learn from its experience in developing a 
global representative decision-making body responsible for 
governing the Internet’s infrastructure.  Although ICANN’s 
impetus for self-evaluation and reform is commendable, after 
analyzing these proposed reforms, I conclude that the reforms of 
its governance structure proposed by ICANN will render it less 
able to embody the norms of liberal democracy and less capable of 
protecting individuals’ fundamental rights.  I contend that unless 
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ICANN reforms its governance structure to render it consistent 
with the procedural and substantive norms of democracy 
articulated herein, ICANN should be stripped of its decision-
making authority over the Internet’s infrastructure.   
It is now well understood that the Internet constitutes a 
forum for free expression of unprecedented scope and breadth.  As 
I briefly set forth in Part II(A), the low barriers to this market for 
speech and its global reach render the Internet the most powerful 
vehicle for expression ever developed.  When governments seek to 
control speech within this forum, the global Internet community 
has viewed such attempts with justified suspicion and scrutiny.  
Less well-understood and less carefully scrutinized are the 
measures that ICANN has undertaken that implicate expression on 
the Internet.  Because ICANN’s policy-making, both actual and 
potential, implicating the right to free speech on the Internet is not 
readily apparent, in Part II(B) I review ICANN’s control over the 
Internet’s infrastructure and explore two significant ways in which 
ICANN is responsible for developing speech-regarding policies for 
the Internet.  First, ICANN has exercised its authority over the 
Internet’s infrastructure to establish a (mandatory) policy that 
essentially prohibits websites from being maintained 
anonymously.  This policy erects substantial barriers to 
individuals’ ability to engage in anonymous speech on the Internet, 
which is a significant component of the right to freedom of 
expression.  Second, ICANN has established a (mandatory) policy 
for adjudicating disputes between intellectual property owners and 
domain name holders that restricts Internet users’ ability to engage 
in critical speech on the Internet.  Each of these policies impacts 
Internet users’ right to free speech in subtle but significant ways.  
In so regulating speech within this important expressive forum, 
ICANN serves a significant public ordering function with respect 
to speech on the Internet.  As the functional equivalent of a public 
actor, ICANN should be held to the normative ideals of democracy 
– both procedural and substantive -- that we generally require only 
of governments.  
In Part III, I set forth my conception of the normative 
ideals of liberal democracy with an eye toward how these ideals 
should be implemented in the context of Internet governance.  
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While democracy simpliciter requires political equality among 
citizens (generally implemented in large-scale democracies 
through the device of representation), liberal democracy requires 
in addition that certain substantive protections be implemented 
within the government’s structure to protect individuals’ 
fundamental rights. Such substantive protections are typically 
enshrined through mechanisms of higher-order law-making like 
constitutions, along with their requisite enforcement mechanisms, 
like independent judicial review.  Thus, while liberal democracies 
incorporate processes to reflect the will of the people and to render 
them accountable to the people, they also implement meaningful 
protections for certain substantive rights.  As I explain in Part 
III(B), procedural democratic theorists are generally loathe to 
enshrine protections for substantive rights or to prescribe the 
outcomes of well-designed democratic processes.  Yet, even 
procedurally-inclined theorists acknowledge that certain 
substantive rights – including the right to freedom of expression – 
must be accorded special protections within democratic societies 
because such rights are integral to the process of self-government 
itself.   
In Part IV, I examine the essential features of ICANN’s 
(initial and revised) governance structure in order to assess the 
extent to which this structure embodies the normative ideals of 
liberal democracy.  I contend that while ICANN’s framers initially 
(dimly) appreciated the important public ordering role it would 
come to serve in regulating certain Internet conduct, they went 
only part of the way toward embodying the requisite normative 
ideals of liberal democracy within ICANN’s governance structure.  
Although ICANN’s framers committed ICANN to procedural 
democratic norms by essentially designing ICANN as a 
representative democratic institution, they failed to understand or 
predict the significant public ordering role ICANN would serve in 
regulating speech on the Internet.  As a result, they failed to 
commit ICANN to substantive normative ideals integral to liberal 
democracy -- most importantly, the protection of freedom of 
expression.  ICANN has recently undertaken the revision of its 
initial governance structure in an attempt to learn from its 
experience over the past five years.  These revisions, however, 
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mark a retreat from its initial commitment to embody the 
procedural ideals of liberal democracy.   In particular, these 
proposed revisions to ICANN’s governance structure (1) abandon 
ICANN’s earlier commitment to direct elections by Internet users 
of ICANN’s governing body, and (2) render essentially 
meaningless ICANN’s earlier commitment to independent review 
of its decision-making.  Furthermore, such revisions in no way 
incorporate substantive ideals of liberal democracy – such as 
special protection for freedom of expression -- within ICANN’s 
governance structure.   As such, ICANN’s proposed reforms of its 
governance structure represent a step in the wrong direction. 
In Part V, I provide concrete recommendations for ICANN 
to implement meaningful protections for freedom of expression.  
In so doing, I look for guidance to the general themes and 
principles embodied within the United States’ First Amendment 
jurisprudence.  Although I do not claim that ICANN is technically 
a “state actor” for purposes of First Amendment jurisprudence, nor 
that ICANN should necessarily embody the substantive 
democratic norm of freedom of expression in the same fashion as 
the United States does, I do claim that important themes can be 
elicited from the United States’ experience of protecting freedom 
of expression within a liberal democracy.    
First, the United States’ experience teaches that special 
protections for free speech beyond those embodied within 
procedural democratic norms themselves are necessary, and that 
merely embodying procedural democratic norms of ensuring 
political equality will not necessarily suffice to secure this 
fundamental right.  Second, the United States experience teaches 
that, in order to be meaningful, protection for free speech must 
ultimately be reposited in an independent judicial body.  Third, 
First Amendment jurisprudence teaches that governments must 
ensure that any policies restricting speech advance important, 
articulated purposes in the least speech-restrictive manner 
possible.  Finally, First Amendment jurisprudence accords special 
protections for certain types of speech that are particularly 
vulnerable within democracies – namely countermajoritarian 
speech or speech embodying characteristics that render it 
otherwise vulnerable within a democracy that merely reflects the 
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will of the majority.  The United States protects 
countermajoritarian speech in two ways that are relevant for 
ICANN.  First Amendment jurisprudence grants special 
protections for anonymous speech and critical speech, each of 
which serves as an important vehicle for the expression of 
unpopular or dissident ideas and viewpoints.  The First 
Amendment extends protections for such speech even within the 
context of competing claims by intellectual property holders that 
such speech infringes their intellectual property rights.  An 
important function of intellectual property law within liberal 
democracies is to prevent intellectual property owners from 
exercising unlimited monopoly control over components of the 
common language or culture.  Accordingly, U.S. intellectual 
property law reflects a nuanced working out of the ways in which 
to protect free speech values against overreaching by intellectual 
property owners.   Although I do not claim that free speech values 
must be protected on the Internet by ICANN in precisely the same 
way that they are protected by United States courts, I contend that 
these First Amendment themes and principles are illuminative for 
ICANN as it goes about revising its policies to incorporate the 
liberal democratic norm of freedom of expression.    
Toward this end, I propose several ways in which ICANN 
should revise its policies to accord meaningful protection for 
freedom of expression.  First, ICANN should revise its policies 
requiring the disclosure and publication of Internet users’ personal 
information, including name and address, as a prerequisite for 
maintaining a website.  Second, ICANN should revise its policy 
applying to the resolution of disputes between trademark owners 
and domain name holders to incorporate meaningful protections 
for the right to engage in critical speech.  Finally, in order to hold 
in check ICANN’s power to enact policies that are insufficiently 
protective of free speech, ICANN should render meaningful its 
initial promise to constitute an Independent Review Panel 
responsible for evaluating ICANN policy-making for adherence to 
the procedural and substantive commitments articulated in its 
foundational documents.  
 
II. THE INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED 
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NAMES AND NUMBERS (ICANN) AND ITS DECISION-
MAKING AFFECTING FREE SPEECH 
 
Five years ago, the United States ceded responsibility for 
regulating key elements of the Internet’s infrastructure to ICANN 
– a private entity essentially unaffiliated1 with any pre-existing 
territorial government or international governance entity, yet one 
essentially designed to perform certain of the functions of 
(democratic) government.  In particular, ICANN’s governance 
structure was designed to reflect and account for the preferences 
of Internet users throughout the world in developing policies that 
would affect the interests of Internet users worldwide.2  When 
ceding this control, the United States and other framers of ICANN 
did not realize (or acknowledge) that ICANN’s control over the 
Internet’s infrastructure would extend to controlling speech on the 
Internet.  Accordingly, they did not require special protections for 
freedom of expression as a condition for transferring control over 
the Internet’s infrastructure to ICANN.  Today, however, it is 
becoming increasingly apparent that ICANN’s control over the 
                                                          
1 Of course, as discussed infra, ICANN was summoned into being by and 
received its authority from the United States government.  Further, its 
continued exercise of this authority is subject to the approval of the U.S. 
government.  See A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: 
Using ICANN to Route Around the APA 
and the Constitution, 50 DUKE L.J. 17, 20 (2000).  And, ICANN was 
technically formed as a non-profit corporation under the laws of the State 
of California and is therefore subject to this state’s laws. Id. Despite 
these formal affiliations, ICANN was fundamentally designed to be a 
global decision-making entity operating independently of existing 
territorial sovereigns, as I explain infra.  See text accompanying notes 
178-219.   
2 See, e.g., Jonathan Weinberg, ICANN and The Problem of Legitimacy, 
50 DUKE L. J. 187, 215-16 (2000) (describing ICANN as a “private 
entity seeking to play the sort of role more commonly played in our 
society by public entities, [i.e.,] setting rules for an international 
communications medium of surpassing importance, [which] has 
historically been performed at the behest of the U.S. government and had 
been conducted in an explicitly public-regarding manner.”) 
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Internet’s infrastructure encompasses the power to enact policies 
affecting speech.   
Within the past decade, speakers and listeners throughout 
the world have begun to appreciate the value of the Internet as a 
forum for free expression.  Once the limitations on the permissible 
uses of the Internet were lifted and the Internet was opened up as a 
forum for expression of all kinds,3 speakers and publishers from 
all walks of life from every corner of the world flocked to the 
Internet.4  Governments, recognizing the Internet’s potential as a 
lens through which putative speech harms could be magnified, 
have undertaken extensive measures to censor and control speech 
over the Internet.5  While such governmental attempts to restrict 
the free flow of expression have been roundly criticized,6 the 
speech-restrictive policies of ICANN have largely escaped notice 
and criticism. 
ICANN regulates speech on the Internet in two subtle but 
significant ways.  First, ICANN enjoys the power to establish 
rules governing the registration of domain names -- the names 
assigned to computers that form part of the Internet, such as 
AMAZON.COM,7 FUCKGENERALMOTORS.COM,8 
ABORTIONISMURDER.COM,9 and HATEISNOTAFAMILYVALUE.COM.10 
This power to establish prerequisites for the registration of domain 
names translates into the power to establish prerequisites for 
maintaining websites.  ICANN has exercised this power in such a 
way as to prohibit Internet users from maintaining websites 
                                                          
3 See MANAGEMENT OF INTERNET NAMES AND ADDRESSES, 63 Fed. 
Reg. 31,741 n.5 (1998), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/ 
domainname/6_5_98dns.htm (explaining that in 1992, the United States 
Congress granted the National Science Foundation the statutory authority 
to allow commercial activity on what was to become the Internet). 
4 See, e.g., American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 
831 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff’d, 117 S.Ct. 2329 (1997). 
5 See text accompanying notes 18-21. 
6 See text accompanying notes 22-23. 
7 See http://www.amazon.com. 
8 See http://www.fuckgeneralmotors.com. 
9 See http:/www.abortionismurder.com. 
10 See http://www.hateisnotafamilyvalue.com. 
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anonymously or pseudonymously.  According to ICANN policy, 
in order to register a domain name and maintain a website, 
individuals must reveal their name, address, and other personal 
contact information to their domain name registrar.11  ICANN 
further requires that domain name registrars make such 
information about the identity of domain name holders publicly 
available, thereby restricting the opportunity to engage in 
anonymous speech on the Internet.  Second, ICANN has enacted a 
mandatory policy – the Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy – that 
enables trademark owners to compel domain name holders to 
surrender domain names critical of trademark owners.  This policy 
takes into account both the expressive content embodied within 
the domain name itself (such as GWBUSHSUCKS.COM and 
TOYOTASUCKS.COM) and the content made available on the 
website maintained under that domain name.  In this Part, I first 
briefly review the Internet’s development into an important forum 
for free expression.  I then set forth the basis and scope of 
ICANN’s power to regulate speech on the Internet.  Finally, I 
explore how ICANN has exercised this power in ways that 
implicate free speech on the Internet. 
 
A. Free Speech as a Constitutive Good of the Internet 
 It is now widely recognized that the Internet constitutes a 
uniquely valuable forum for individuals to express themselves and 
communicate with one another on a global scale.  As one court 
explained, “It is no exaggeration to conclude that the Internet has 
achieved, and continues to achieve, the most participatory 
marketplace of mass speech that this country – and indeed the 
world – has yet seen.”12  Several features constitutive of today’s 
Internet13 render it a uniquely powerful vehicle for speakers and 
                                                          
11 See text accompanying notes 49-60. 
12 See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 844 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff’d, 117 
S.Ct. 2329 (1997). 
13 This is not to say that the inherent nature of the Internet presumes such 
features.  See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF 
CYBERSPACE (1999) (arguing against an essentialist conception of the 
Internet’s “nature”). 
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publishers to express themselves to worldwide audiences at very 
low cost.14  For the (very low) cost of establishing a website, an 
individual can express herself in the context of a whole host of 
mediums -- text, images, audio, video – to a virtually unlimited 
array of listeners.  The barriers to entry that exist in other media, 
such as traditional print publication and broadcast media, are 
drastically reduced in the context of the Internet.  The ability to 
speak or publish via the Internet is not accompanied by enormous 
barriers to entry that are present in connection with expressing 
oneself via traditional print media, such as newspapers or 
periodicals.15  In contrast to traditional broadcast media, where the 
ability to express oneself widely is constrained by substantial 
licensing requirements and associated fees, the Internet is not 
shackled by spectrum scarcity, by the onerous licensing 
requirements or fees necessitated by a limited broadcast spectrum, 
nor by the high cost of entry into this marketplace for expression.  
As a result, the Internet – to a much greater extent than traditional 
mediums of expression – facilitates a true marketplace of ideas, 
one that is not dominated by the few wealthy voices who are able 
to express themselves effectively via traditional print or broadcast 
media.16  Because of the Internet’s combination of such speech-
friendly features: 
 
Individual citizens of limited means can speak to a 
worldwide audience on issues of concern to them.  
Federalists and Anti-Federalists may debate the structure 
of their government nightly, but these debates occur in 
newsgroups or chat rooms rather than in pamphlets. 
Modern-day Luthers still post their theses, but to electronic 
bulletin boards rather than the door of the Wittenberg 
Schlosskirche. More mundane (but from a constitutional 
                                                          
14 See 929 F. Supp. at 877 (explaining that as a result of the Internet’s 
“very low barriers to entry,” “astoundingly diverse content is available 
on the Internet,” which now constitutes “a unique and wholly new 
medium of worldwide human communication.”)    
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 880. 
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perspective, equally important) dialogue occurs between 
aspiring artists, or French cooks, or dog lovers, or fly 
fishermen.17 
 
Recognizing the Internet’s unprecedented capacity as a 
forum for expression, many entities have attempted to censor 
Internet speech that they view as dangerous.  Governments 
throughout the world have sought to control speech on the Internet 
that they believe may harm their citizens.  Liberal Western 
democracies have attempted, with limited success,18 to censor 
speech that they believe to be harmful to children,19 obscene as to 
minors, or hateful to particular groups.20  Eastern regimes have 
attempted to restrict the flow of expression that challenges their 
way of governing or their way of life.21  These governmental 
                                                          
17 Id. at 881. 
18 See Global Internet Liberty Campaign, Protecting the Human Right to 
Freedom of Expression on the Global Internet, at http://www.gilc.org 
(detailing means by which Western democracies have attempted to 
censor speech on the Internet, including by criminalizing certain types of 
speech on the Internet, imposing content-based licensing restrictions on 
Internet Service Providers, and compelling the use of filtering, rating, or 
content labeling tools).   
19 The United States, for example, has repeatedly sought to regulate 
pornographic and child pornographic content on the Internet, with little 
success.  See, e.g., Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 117 S.Ct. 
2329 (1997) (striking down portions of Communications Decency Act of 
1995); Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, ___ U.S. ___ (2002) (striking 
down Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996). 
20 France, for example, has attempted to regulate the display of Nazi 
memorabilia on the Internet, including in cases where such content is 
hosted by servers located outside of France.  See Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue 
Contre Le Racisme Et L’Antisemitisme, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1168 (N. D. 
Cal. 2001). 
21 China, for example, blocks access to foreign sites (such as The 
Washington Post and The New York Times) that it believes threaten its 
way of life, and has recently begun blocking access to certain popular 
search engines (such as Google and Altavista).  See Peter S. Goodman & 
Mike Musgrove, China Blocks Web Search Engines, The Washington 
Post, September 12, 2002, at E1. 
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attempts to control and censor Internet expression have been the 
subject of widespread global criticism and rebuke.22  Emerging 
from our collective experience with confronting attempts at 
Internet censorship is the widely-shared democratic value that 
expression on the Internet should be “uninhibited, robust, and 
wide-open”23 and that protecting freedom of expression on the 
Internet is of pre-eminent importance.   
While governmental attempts to restrict Internet expression 
have properly been subject to intense scrutiny by the Internet 
community at large,24 similar efforts by non-governmental actors 
or non-traditional government actors – such as ICANN’s subtler 
efforts to restrict Internet expression – have received little 
attention or scrutiny.  In Parts II(C) and (D), I articulate the ways 
in which ICANN’s policies restrict expression on the Internet.  In 
Part II(B), I examine ICANN’s power over the Internet’s 
infrastructure and how such power has translated into the limited 
power to control expression on the Internet.   
 
B.  The Basis and Scope of ICANN’s Power to Regulate Speech on 
the Internet 
 ICANN’s power to enact policies affecting speech on the 
                                                          
22 See Global Internet Liberty Campaign, Protecting the Human Right to 
Freedom of Expression on the Global Internet, at http://www.gilc.org 
(contending that “attempts to suppress information and communication 
on the Internet violate various international human rights laws,” 
including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; European Convention of Human 
Rights; Declaration on the Freedom of Expression and Information; 
Charter of Paris for a New Europe; American Declaration of the Rights 
and Duties of Man & the American Convention on Human Rights; and 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights.)  
23 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
24 See, e.g., Global Internet Liberty Campaign, Protecting the Human 
Right to Freedom of Expression on the Global Internet, at 
http://www.gilc.org (documenting widespread international criticism of 
governmental attempts to suppress expression on the Internet). 
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Internet is grounded in its power over the Domain Name System.  
Domain names are the familiar and easily-remembered addresses 
for computers that form part of the Internet (such as 
TRAVELOCITY.COM,25 BOBDYLAN.COM,26 and PROCHOICE.COM27).  
Domain names, in turn, map to Internet Protocol (IP) numbers, 
which serve as routing addresses for computers on the Internet.  
The Domain Name System is the system that manages the 
allocation of domain names and that translates domain names into 
IP numbers so as to make possible the transmission of information 
across the Internet.28  
When the United States ceded control over the Internet’s 
infrastructure to ICANN,29 one of the most important functions it 
transferred was control over the Domain Name System.  ICANN’s 
control over the Domain Name System, in turn, encompasses the 
ability to enact policies regulating the acquisition and maintenance 
of domain names and hence regulating of the acquisition and 
maintenance of websites.  Accordingly, such control over the 
Domain Name System translates into control over speech on the 
Internet.   
ICANN’s power to regulate speech on the Internet in this 
way is not derived from a statutory or treaty-based exclusive right 
to administer the Domain Name System,30 but rather from its 
control over the set of computers that form the core of the Domain 
Name System as we know it.  The set of computers that ICANN 
controls are known as the “root server” and consist of a number of 
                                                          
25 See http://www.travelocity.com. 
26 See http://www.bobdylan.com. 
27 See http:/www.prochoice.com. 
28 See MANAGEMENT OF INTERNET NAMES AND ADDRESSES, 63 Fed. 
Reg. 31,741 (1998), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/ 
domainname/6_5_98dns.htm [hereinafter WHITE PAPER]. 
29 See text accompanying notes 165-92.   
30 Indeed, as I discuss infra at text accompanying notes 42-44, there are 
several other organizations – although insignificant in comparison to 
ICANN  -- that run domain name systems and assign domain names.  
See, e.g., AlterNIC, Inc., at http://alternic.net; The Internet Namespace 
Cooperative, at http://www.tinc-org.com; New.net, at http://www.new.-
net; and Newroot, at http://www.newroot.com. 
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computers with identical contents spread over several continents.31  
The United States Department of Commerce, which itself acquired 
control of the root server from the Department of Defense as part 
of the transformation of the Internet from a military network to a 
civilian one, granted ICANN control over the root server32 in 1998 
via a Memorandum of Understanding that it entered into with 
ICANN.33  In Part IV, I explore the circumstances under which the 
United States agreed to transfer such control to ICANN.  In this 
Part, I focus on the contours of the control that was transferred and 
the ways in which ICANN’s technical control over the root server 
and the Domain Name System has transformed into control over 
expression on the Internet. 
   As its name suggests, the Internet Corporation for 
Assigned Names and Numbers assigns not only names – domain 
names, like ASHCROFTLIED.COM34 and FUCKOSAMA.COM35 – but 
also numbers – Internet Protocol (IP) addresses, like 
128.164.132.16.36  IP addresses form the primary address system 
                                                          
31 There are currently 13 root servers.  See http://www.icann.org/ 
committees/dns-root/y2k-statement.htm. Technical guidelines for 
operation of the root servers may be found in RFC 2870. See 
http://www.icann.org/committees/dns-root/rfc2870.txt. 
32 “Control” is simply physical control of the computers, as enforced by 
the law of trespass and by federal laws against computer fraud and 
hacking.  For example, when Eugene Kashpureff, the founder of 
AlterNIC, hacked into the website of Network Solutions, Inc., which was 
then operating the root server, and diverted traffic from its website to 
AlterNIC’s for several days in June 1997, he was extradited from Canada 
and pled guilty to violations of a federal computer fraud law.  See 
Domain Name Guerilla Kashpureff Gets Off Lightly, NETWORK WEEK, 
August 7, 1998, at http://www.newslinx.com/News/August/cg-
080798c.html.  
33 See MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND INTERNET CORPORATION FOR 
ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS (Nov. 25, 1998), at 
http://www.icann.org/general/icann-mou-25nov98.htm  [hereinafter 
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING]. 
34 See http://www.ashcroftlied.com. 
35 See http://www.fuckosama.com. 
36 ICANN delegates the responsibility of assigning IP addresses to three 
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of the Internet, which enable information to be routed from one 
computer to another across many intermediate computers and the 
links between them.  Each computer linked to the (public) Internet 
must have a unique IP address in order for information to be 
routed correctly between computers.37  Although the Internet 
could, as a technical matter, function with numerical IP addresses 
alone, there are certain advantages to layering a name system on 
top of the numbering system.   First, human beings can use and 
remember letters and words (like STOPTHEWAR.COM) more easily 
than long strings of numbers (like the IP addresses that correspond 
to these domain names, such as 128.164.132.16).38  The Domain 
                                                                                                                                 
regional registries: the Asia Pacific Network Information Centre 
(APNIC), http://www.apnic.net; the American Registry for Internet 
Numbers (ARIN), http://www.arin.net; and the Réseaux IP Européens 
Network Coordination Centre (RIPE NCC), http://www.ripe.net.  Those 
regional registries in turn assign numbers to entities that can demonstrate 
a need for a large block of numbers, such as commercial Internet Service 
Providers or large companies. 
37 To be precise, first, it is each “interface” that must have a unique IP 
address.  Internet “host” computers (computers that run the applications 
that make the Internet useful to end-users, like web browsers and servers 
and e-mail clients and servers) need only one interface, as they are the 
sources or final destinations of Internet transmissions.  Routers and 
switches (computers that route information between host computers) 
need more than one interface, and hence need more than one IP address.  
Second, host computers can have “dynamic” IP addresses, which are 
assigned only for a temporary period, such as a single session using a 
dial-up modem to connect to an Internet Service Provider, as well as 
“static” IP addresses, which are assigned for a longer period.  Third, 
many computers on a local network can share a single connection to the 
public Internet, as methods are available for keeping each local 
computer’s use of the shared connection distinct.  That said, it is still the 
case that, at any one time, a computer using the Internet needs to be 
using some unique IP address to ensure correct routing.         
38 In addition, since many more trademarks are made up of words and 
other combinations of letters than of numbers, the branding of Internet 
destinations is easier with a word-based system.  Finally, a dual address 
system allows websites to keep the same names even if their IP addresses 
change (or even if the entire IP numbering system changes), which 
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Name System now administered by ICANN and coordinated at a 
technical level through its root server is the primary system for 
providing a name-based addressing system that makes possible the 
transmission of information across the network of computers that 
make up the Internet. 
The ICANN-run Domain Name System thus consists of a 
set of computers for storing top-level domain name information, 
as well as a protocol for translating (or “resolving”) domain names 
to IP addresses.  Every time an Internet user requests a website or 
sends an e-mail using a domain name, the first step her computer 
takes is to send a message requesting the IP address corresponding 
to that domain name.  Only after obtaining the IP address does the 
computer actually retrieve the page or send the e-mail, marking its 
destination with the IP address.   
The ICANN root servers are at the core of the Domain 
Name System run by ICANN.  Although the root servers do not 
themselves store all of the domain name/IP address matches, they 
keep track of other computers that do, and route requests for IP 
address matches onto those computers.  Thus, if ICANN wishes to 
terminate or reassign a domain name, it simply changes the 
information on its own computers, or requires others who own 
computers with that information to change it, upon threat of 
ceasing to route IP address requests to those computers.  The 
ICANN-run Domain Name System currently encompasses about 
245 “top-level domains,”39 including 13 “generic top-level 
                                                                                                                                 
provides useful stability for the Internet’s end-users. 
39 Each one of these top-level domains is administered by a separate 
organization, and ICANN exercises varying degrees of control over the 
policies of these organizations.  Generally, the most closely controlled of 
these organizations are those administering the nine generic top-level 
domains subject to registrar competition, namely, .COM, .NET, .ORG, 
.INFO, .BIZ., .AERO, .MUSEUM, .COOP, and .NAME.  These are soon to be 
joined by .PRO.  See  http://www.iana.org/gtld/gtld.htm. The top-level 
domains that are not generally open to the public and are not subject to 
registrar competition are .EDU, .MIL, .GOV, and .INT.  See id.    ICANN 
has entered into detailed registry  agreements with each of these 
organizations.  See, e.g., .COM Registry Agreement Between ICANN and 
Verisign, Inc., at http://www.icann.org/tlds/agreements/verisign/-com-
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domains”  (gTLDs), such as .COM, .ORG, .EDU, .INFO, and .AERO,40 
and about 230 “country-code top-level domains” (ccTLDs), such 
as .UK (United Kingdom) and .TV (Tuvalu).41  In other words, the 
ICANN root servers will route requests for IP addresses 
corresponding to any domain name ending in one of these top-
level domains.   
ICANN has no legal monopoly on running the Domain 
Name System, and several other organizations have in fact set up 
alternative domain name systems, running on alternative name 
server computers.42  If and to the extent that competitor domain 
name systems are able to make inroads into ICANN’s market, 
such competition in the market for domain name related policies 
will render the policy choices made by ICANN less significant.  
On the Internet as in real space, meaningful competition with 
respect to policy choices arguably provides some protection for 
individual rights, since individuals to some extent can protect 
their rights via the mechanism of exit.43  At present, however, the 
                                                                                                                                 
index.htm. In addition, ICANN has accredited other companies as 
independent registrars for these top-level domains, and has entered into 
registrar accreditation agreements with each of them.  The current list of 
ICANN-accredited registrars is available at http://www.icann.org/-
registrars/accredited-list.html.  The current Registrar Accreditation 
Agreement is available at http://www.icann.org/registrars/ra-agreement-
17may01.htm. These are also the most popular top-level domains.  
ICANN exercises somewhat looser control over the country-code top-
level domains (ccTLDs), in part out of deference to local cultures and 
governments.  Nonetheless, many ccTLD administrators voluntarily 
adhere to ICANN policies, including the Uniform Dispute Resolution 
Policy, discussed infra in Part II(C). 
40 The current list of generic top level domains is available at 
http://www.iana.org/gtld/gtld.htm. 
41 The current list of country code top level domains is available at 
http://www.iana.org/cctld/cctld-whois.htm. 
42 See, e.g., A. Michael Froomkin, ICANN’s Uniform Dispute Resolution 
Policy – Causes and (Partial) Cures, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 605 n.34 
(2002) (describing alternate domain name servers and ability to access 
alternate top level domains). 
43 David Johnson and David Post, for example, contend that: 
The separation of subsidiary "territories" or spheres of activity 
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alternative domain name systems and the alternative Top Level 
Domains (TLDs) they administer cannot be said to constitute 
meaningful competition for ICANN, and such systems are 
unlikely to gain appreciable market share in the near term.  
Virtually all Internet Service Providers provide domain name 
service that is part of the ICANN-run system.  Every computer 
configured to connect to the Internet through one of those 
services is initially set up to use the ICANN-controlled Domain 
Name System.  To surf the web using alternative top-level 
domains (such as .free or .ltd), one must reset one’s network 
settings or modify one’s browser software, and must be willing to 
trust name server computers that are not nearly as well-
established or numerous as those within the ICANN-run system.  
Very few Internet users are willing (or able) to take these steps.  
As Michael Froomkin explains: 
                                                                                                                                 
within Cyberspace ... allow[s] for the development of distinct 
rule sets and for the divergence of those rule sets over time .... 
Content or conduct acceptable in one "area" of the Net may be 
banned in another . . . . [As compared to real space, in 
cyberspace] any given user has a more accessible exit option, in 
terms of moving from one virtual environment's rule set to 
another's . . . . 
David R. Johnson and David G. Post, Law and Borders: The Rise of Law 
in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1397 (1996).  Johnson and Post 
contend that top-down regulation to protect individuals’ rights is 
unnecessary within such a model of cyberspace because different market 
actors will tend to produce a wide and divergent range of policy- or rule-
sets, embodying different value choices (some consistent with the First 
Amendment, for example, others not).  Such divergent policy-sets will 
provide users the freedom to choose which policy-set best accords with 
their preferences and values.  I have elsewhere questioned Johnson and 
Post’s implicit contention that fundamental individual rights can be 
adequately protected merely by virtue of a “market” in policy-sets.  See 
Dawn C. Nunziato, Exit, Voice, and Values on the ‘Net, 15 BERK. TECH. 
L. J. 753 (2000).  Because in any case no meaningful competition to 
ICANN’s domain name policy-making exists, an inquiry into how well 
ICANN’s policy-making protects fundamental individual rights is 
warranted.  
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Although there is no technical obstacle to anyone 
maintaining a TLD that is not listed in [ICANN’s root 
server or the “legacy root”], these “alternate” TLDs can 
only be resolved by users whose machines, or Internet 
service providers (ISPs) as the case may be, use a domain 
name server that includes this additional data or knows 
where to find it. A combination of consensus, lack of 
knowledge, and inertia among the people running the 
machines that administer domain name lookups means 
that domain names in TLDs outside the legacy root . . . 
cannot be accessed by the large majority of people who 
use the Internet, unless they do some tinkering with 
obscure parts of their browser settings.44 
As a result, anyone who wishes to communicate broadly 
on the Internet using a domain name, whether by establishing or 
accessing a website or by obtaining or using an e-mail address, 
will likely be hesitant to use an alternative top-level domain not 
supported by the ICANN Domain Name System.  Because the 
ICANN-run Domain Name System is likely to dominate in the 
foreseeable future,45 an inquiry into ICANN’s policy choices 
affecting Internet users’ rights is warranted. 
 
C. ICANN’s Decision-Making Implicating Anonymous Speech on 
the Internet 
 When the United States transferred control over the 
Domain Name System to ICANN, it also conveyed to ICANN the 
concomitant power to enact regulations affecting the registration 
and maintenance of domain names.  ICANN’s power over the 
registration and maintenance of domain names has transformed 
                                                          
44 Froomkin, supra note 1, at 42.  See also Weinberg, supra note 2, at 
198 (“Very few Internet users . . . look to alternative root servers.  The 
vast majority rely on the single set of [ICANN-controlled] authoritative 
root servers . . . that have achieved canonical status.) 
45 For its part, ICANN formally opposes the creation of alternative 
domain name systems, citing the benefits of “universal resolvability.”  
See http://www.internic.net/faqs/authoritative-dns.html. 
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into the power to enact regulations affecting the registration and 
maintenance of websites.  As part of ICANN’s power to regulate 
the Domain Name System, ICANN has established a set of 
foundational requirements that must be adhered to by anyone 
wishing to register and maintain a domain name.   Because 
registering a domain name is a prerequisite to establishing a 
website, the preconditions ICANN establishes for registering a 
domain name translate into preconditions for obtaining and 
maintaining an Internet website.  Maintaining an Internet website, 
in turn, is one of the most powerful vehicles of expression on the 
Internet, and indeed is becoming one of the most powerful vehicles 
of expression available within any forum.46 Accordingly, 
ICANN’s power to establish preconditions for registering domain 
names – and hence for websites -- translates into the power to 
establish prerequisites for engaging in an important form of 
expression.  And, as I discuss infra, no meaningful checks exist on 
ICANN’s power to establish such mandatory pre-requisites.47 
In exercising this power thus far, ICANN has established a 
set of foundational requirements that prohibit domain names from 
being registered -- and hence websites from being maintained --
anonymously (or pseudonymously).  While participation in many 
types of Internet communications and transactions – such as email, 
online discussion groups, chat rooms, etc. – can take place 
anonymously (or pseudonymously),48 dissemination of content via 
a website cannot.  This is because ICANN has established a policy 
mandating that anyone wishing to register a domain name first 
must provide, for public consumption,49 certain personal contact 
                                                          
46 See Part II(A) supra. 
47 See text accompanying notes 220-27. 
48 For example, Microsoft’s e-mail (Hotmail) and messenger (MSN 
Messenger) services allow their users to remain anonymous or 
pseudonymous.  See MSN Statement of Privacy, at 
http://privacy.msn.com/default.asp#MSNGR.  MSN will only disclose a 
user’s identity if ordered to do so by law.  See id.  America Online’s 
Instant Messenger™ privacy policy provides similar safeguards for the 
privacy of Internet users’ identities.  See Privacy Policy, at 
http://www.aol.com/info/privacy.html. 
49 See text accompanying notes 58-60. 
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information.  At the behest of interested intellectual property 
owners,50 who were concerned about their ability to police 
infringing content on the Internet, ICANN enacted a policy that 
requires those registering and maintaining a website to disclose to 
the public their name, address, and other contact information.  This 
mandatory ICANN policy, which ICANN implements through its 
contracts with domain name registries and registrars,51 requires 
that anyone wishing to acquire the right to use a domain name – 
which, in turn, is the prerequisite to publishing content on the 
Internet52 – first provide truthful and accurate contact information 
to her domain name registrar, including her full name and mailing 
address.53   Thus, for example, one wishing to establish the domain 
                                                          
50 The Intellectual Property Constituency, an interest group constituency 
within ICANN’s Domain Name Supporting Organization, has 
consistently maintained that intellectual property owners must have 
access to domain name registrants’ personal contact information in order 
to police infringement of their intellectual property.  See, e.g., Matters 
Related to WHOIS, DNSO Intellectual Property Constituency, at 
http://ipc.songbird.com/ whois_paper.html. 
51 For a list of the current ICANN-Registrar agreements, see 
http://www.icann.org/registrars/accredited-list.html.  All such registrars 
(approximately 160 as of this writing) are contractually obligated to 
collect and publish personal data of their registrants.  See, e.g., 
November 1999 Registrar Accreditation Agreement (which applies to 
registrars accredited in the top-level domains .COM, .NET, and .ORG), at  
http://www.icann.org/registrars/ra-agreement-10nov99.htm.  See also 
May 2001 Registrar Accreditation Agreement (which applies to 
registrars in .BIZ, .INFO, and .NAME top-level domains), at 
http://www.icann.org/registrars/ra-agreement-17may01.htm. 
52 There are, of course, other ways to communicate on the Internet other 
than by maintaining a web site, such as by electronic mail and 
messengering systems.   
53 See ICANN’s current Registrar Accreditation Agreement (May 17, 
2001), at http://www.icann.org/registrars/ra-agreement-17may01.htm,, 
which provides: 
Public Access to Data on Registered Names. During the Term of 
this Agreement: 
3.3.1 At its expense, Registrar shall provide an interactive web 
page and a port 43 Whois service providing free public query-
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name GEORGEWBUSH-IS-A-MURDERER.COM in order to maintain a 
website critical of the President’s foreign policy is first required to 
disclose her full name, address, and other contact information to 
her domain name registrar.  Although one of the important 
functions of ICANN has been to bring about choice and 
competition among domain name registrars, on policies like this 
one no divergence or competition is possible.  Each domain name 
registrar is obligated, in accordance with its contractual 
arrangements with ICANN, to adhere to this mandatory ICANN 
policy.54  And, just as domain name registrars are contractually 
obligated to adhere to this disclosure policy by virtue of their 
contracts with ICANN,55 domain name holders are required to 
assent to this disclosure policy by virtue of their contracts with 
                                                                                                                                 
based access to up-to-date (i.e., updated at least daily) data 
concerning all active Registered Names sponsored by Registrar 
for each TLD [Top Level Domain] in which it is accredited. The 
data accessible shall consist of elements that are designated from 
time to time according to an ICANN adopted specification or 
policy. Until ICANN otherwise specifies by means of an 
ICANN adopted specification or policy, this data shall consist 
of the following elements as contained in Registrar's database: 
3.3.1.1 The name of the Registered Name; 
3.3.1.2 The names of the primary nameserver and secondary 
nameserver(s) for the Registered Name; 
3.3.1.3 The identity of Registrar (which may be provided 
through Registrar's website); 
3.3.1.4 The original creation date of the registration; 
3.3.1.5 The expiration date of the registration; 
3.3.1.6 The name and postal address of the Registered Name 
Holder; 
3.3.1.7 The name, postal address, e-mail address, voice 
telephone number, and (where available) fax number of the 
technical contact for the Registered Name; and 
3.3.1.8 The name, postal address, e-mail address, voice 
telephone number, and (where available) fax number of the 
administrative contact for the Registered Name. 
(Emphasis added). 
54 See id. 
55 Id. 
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their domain name registrar.56  Accordingly, a domain name 
holder’s failure to initially provide, or to maintain on an ongoing 
basis, accurate personal contact information is grounds for 
cancellation of her domain name.57  Attempts to speak or publish 
anonymously via a website are thus subject to the penalty that 
one’s website will be taken down.  
Furthermore, mandatory ICANN policy obliges domain 
name registrars to maintain such contact information about all 
domain name holders in a publicly available and searchable form.  
Thus, anyone interested in learning the identity of the person 
responsible for registering and maintaining the website 
BUSHLIED.COM58 or FUCKSADDAM.COM59 would simply need to 
conduct a search at one of the many locations available on the 
Internet for searching the “WHOIS” database – i.e., the database of 
domain name holders’ contact information.60 
In short, ICANN, by virtue of its control over the Domain 
Name System, enjoys the power to establish prerequisites for 
obtaining a domain name, which translates into the power to 
establish prerequisites for maintaining a website.  Because the 
                                                          
56 See, e.g., VeriSign Service Agreement Version Number 6.4., Par. 4, at 
http://www.netsol.com/en_US/legal/static-service-agreement.jhtml 
(requiring domain name registrants to: “(1) provide certain true, current, 
complete and accurate information about you as required by the 
application process; and (2) maintain and update according to our 
modification procedures the information you provided to us when 
purchasing our services as needed to keep it current, complete and 
accurate.”). 
57 See, e.g., id.  Failure to provide accurate contact information is also a 
factor militating against a domain name holder’s ability to maintain 
ownership of the domain name in a dispute between a trademark owner 
and a domain name holder under ICANN’s Uniform Dispute Resolution 
Policy, see text accompanying notes 66-67, as well as under the recently-
enacted Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, see 17 U.S.C. § 
1125(d). 
58 See http://www.bushlied.com. 
59 See http://www.fucksaddam.com.  
60 See Verisign’s website for searching WHOIS records, at 
http:/www.netsol.com/cgi-bin/whois/whois. 
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ability to express oneself via a website constitutes one of the most 
powerful vehicles for expression available today, ICANN’s control 
over the Domain Name System translates into control over this 
form of expression on the Internet.  ICANN’s policy prohibiting 
domain names (and hence websites) from being maintained 
anonymously has a substantial impact on individuals’ ability to 
express themselves anonymously (or pseudonymously) via the 
Internet.  
 
D. ICANN’s Decision-Making Implicating Critical Speech on the 
Internet   
ICANN’s control over the Domain Name System also 
encompasses the power to establish policies for resolving disputes 
between intellectual property owners and domain name holders in 
ways that affect speech on the Internet.  As one of its most 
significant exercises of policy-making authority, ICANN enacted a 
policy for resolving disputes between trademark owners and 
domain name holders that impacts the free speech rights of Internet 
users.  When the United States ceded control over the Domain 
Name System to ICANN, it charged ICANN with developing a 
policy for resolving disputes between trademark owners and 
domain name holders over the entitlement to use a domain name.61  
When ceding this control over the Domain Name System and 
related policy-making to ICANN, the United States and other 
framers of ICANN were primarily concerned with the problem of 
bad faith “cybersquatting”62 -- the phenomenon of registering as 
domain names variants of famous trademarks (such as 
MCDONALDS.COM and CANDYLAND.COM63) by an entity other than 
                                                          
61 See WHITE PAPER, supra note 28, at 31,747. 
62 See id. at 31,746. 
63 In one of the earliest cases of cybersquatting, the domain name 
MCDONALDS.COM was registered by journalist Joshua Quittner in 1994, 
in an attempt to bring attention to the growing importance of the 
Internet.  McDonalds attempted to win the domain name in court, but 
was unsuccessful and thus had to reach an out-of-court settlement with 
Quittner.  See Michael Leventhal, Who Can Stake A Claim in 
Cyberspace? WIREDLAW, Nov. 6, 1995, at 
http://technoculture.mira.net.au/hypermail/0001.html.  See also Joshua 
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the trademark owner in order to sell back such a domain name to 
the trademark owner for profit.  At the time, courts in the United 
States and other countries were becoming overwhelmed with 
handling such cases of cybersquatting, while trademark owners 
were clamoring for more powerful causes of action and 
jurisdictional tools to pursue bad faith cybersquatters.  Reacting to 
these concerns, the United States and other framers of ICANN 
believed that ICANN could implement a policy regarding 
cybersquatting that would enable the efficient resolution of such 
disputes via online, extrajudicial mechanisms, in a manner that 
would not impact Internet users’ substantive rights.  Accordingly, 
soon after its formation, ICANN exercised the policy-making 
authority specifically conferred upon it64 and adopted its Uniform 
                                                                                                                                 
Quittner, Billions Registered -- Right Now, There Are No Rules To Keep 
You From Owning a Bitchin' Corporate Name as Your Own Internet 
Address, WIRED, October 1994, at http://www.wired.com/wired/-
archive/2.10/mcdonalds.html.  See also Hasbro, Inc. v. Internet 
Entertainment Group, Ltd., No. C96-130WD, 1996 WL 84853 (W.D. 
Wash. Feb. 9, 1996), available at  http://www.jmls.edu/cyber/-
cases/candy.txt (Hasbro, owner of the mark “Candy Land” for the 
popular children’s board game, successfully sought preliminary 
injunction against website’s use of CANDYLAND.COM in connection with 
pornographic website). 
64 The manner in which ICANN exercised this policy-making authority is 
detailed with great care by Laurence R. Helfer and Graeme B. 
Dinwoodie.  See Laurence R. Helfer and Graeme B. Dinwoodie, 
Designing Non-National Systems: The Case of the Uniform Domain 
Name Dispute Resolution Policy, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 141 (2001).  
In short, in the White Paper, the Department of Commerce specified that 
recommendations regarding a trademark/domain name dispute resolution 
policy be initially developed by the World Intellectual Property 
Organization, a specialized agency of the United Nations charged with 
promoting the protection of intellectual property throughout the world.  
The Department of Commerce recommended that WIPO conduct an 
international consultation on the subject.  Although WIPO apparently 
attempted to fulfill its advisory charge in this policy development 
process in such a way as to maximize opportunities for broad based 
global input and comment, see id. at 166-67, the consultative process 
suffered from a number of flaws, notably (and unsurprisingly) the 
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Dispute Resolution Policy (the UDRP).65  This Policy allocates 
rights between trademark owners and domain name holders in a 
manner favorable to trademark owners relative to pre-existing 
trademark law.  It empowers the owner of a trademark (or of some 
other recognized right in a name66) to have a domain name 
                                                                                                                                 
domination by commercial and intellectual property interests.  See id. at 
169; A. Michael Froomkin, Of Governments and Governance, 14 BERK. 
TECH. L. J. 617 (1999); A. Michael Froomkin, A Commentary on 
WIPO’s Management of Internet Names and Addresses (May 1999), 
available at http://www.law.miami.edu/~amf/commentary.htm.  
Although the White Paper specified that WIPO’s policy development 
role was to be purely advisory, in actuality its recommendations were 
treated as presumptively valid by the relevant ICANN decision-makers.  
See Helfer & Dinwoodie, supra, at 177-78 & n.124.  Shortly after WIPO 
submitted its domain name dispute policy recommendations to ICANN, 
in April 1999 ICANN’s (interim) board of directors referred the report to 
its Domain Name Supporting Organization – the lower level ICANN 
organization charged with developing policy on domain name matters.  
The DNSO’s Names Council formed a working group to study the WIPO 
recommendations.  Although this working group was supposed to 
represent the views of various Internet stakeholders, in fact it failed to 
include a representative of the Noncommercial Domain Name Holders 
Constituency, which was to represent noncommercial organizations 
concerned with freedom of expression.  See id. at 181 & n.143.  After 
adopting the working group’s report (with minor modifications), the 
Names Council submitted this report to the ICANN Board.  Shortly 
thereafter, the ICANN Board convened a small drafting committee to 
finalize the domain name dispute resolution policy.  On October 24, 
1999, the ICANN Board approved the final Uniform Domain Name 
Dispute Resolution Policy, as well as the Rules for the Uniform Domain 
Name Dispute Resolution Policy.  See id. at 178-79. 
65 See ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, at 
http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/policy.htm [hereinafter UDRP]. 
66 Although the text of the UDRP limits its scope to trademarks and 
service marks, UDRP panels have ordered the transfer of domain names 
involving common law marks, company names, trade names, and 
personal names. See, e.g., Julia Fiona Roberts v. Russell Boyd WIPO 
Case No. D2000-0210 (May 29, 2000), available at 
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0210.html  
(personal name); Realmark Cape Harbour L.L.C. v. Lawrence S. Lewis, 
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removed from a domain name holder by establishing: (1) that the 
domain name is identical or “confusingly similar” to the trademark 
at issue; (2) that the domain name holder has no “rights or 
legitimate interests” regarding the domain name; and (3) that the 
domain name was registered and is being used in “bad faith.”67  In 
determining whether to remove the domain name from a holder, 
the administrative panelist charged with such decision-making68 is 
required to take into account the nature of the expressive content 
provided on the domain name holder’s website, as well as the 
expressive nature of the disputed domain name itself (such as 
BURLINGTONMURDERFACTORY.COM).  The Policy therefore 
requires the decision-maker to weigh competing intellectual 
property and free speech claims of trademark owners and domain 
name holders.  Decisions reached under the Policy essentially have 
the effect of law because all domain name registrars are required to 
comply with them pursuant to their contracts with ICANN,69 and 
all domain name holders are required to comply with them by 
virtue of their contracts with their domain name registrars.70  
Because, as I discuss below, this dispute resolution policy 
implicates domain name holders’ free speech rights – with respect 
to the expression embodied within domain names themselves and 
                                                                                                                                 
WIPO Case No. D2000-1435 (December 11, 2000), available at 
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-1435.html  
(common law trademark).  See generally Annette Kur, UDRP, Max-
Planck-Institute for Foreign and International Patent, Copyright and 
Competition Law,  at http://www.intellecprop.mpg.de/Online-
Publikationen/2002/UDRP-study-final-02.pdf. 
67 See UDRP, supra note 65, at 4(a). 
68 Decisions under the UDRP are made by Administrative Panels from 
one of four ICANN-approved Dispute Resolution Providers. See UDRP, 
supra note 65, at Par. 1.  A list of such Providers is available at 
www.icann.org/udrp/approved-providers.htm.  
69 See text accompanying note 55. 
70 See, e.g., VeriSign Service Agreement Version Number 6.4., Par. 5, at 
http://www.netsol.com/en_US/legal/static-service-agreement.jhtml (“If 
you registered a domain name through us, you agree to be bound by our 
current domain name dispute policy that is incorporated herein and made 
a part of this Agreement by reference [i.e., the UDRP]”). 
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with respect to the expressive content available on the websites at 
issue – the Policy represents another important example of ICANN 
decision-making affecting speech on the Internet.  
The Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy was designed to 
facilitate the rapid, online resolution of global disputes between 
trademark owners and domain name holders over the entitlement 
to use a particular domain name.71  Because the Policy provides 
for the online, extra-judicial resolution of disputes in a timeframe 
of unprecedented speed and low cost,72 it is very attractive to 
trademark owners compared to litigation (whether under 
traditional trademark infringement,73 trademark dilution,74 the 
recently-enacted Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act,75 
or other causes of action available under national law).  
Proceedings under the Policy are decided by private arbitrators 
from one of four dispute resolution providers selected by 
ICANN.76  Since the Policy became effective in 1999, it has been 
                                                          
71 The Policy provides for evidence on the entitlement to use the domain 
name to be presented electronically and for decisions to be reached 
within 60 days of an action being filed.  See UDRP, supra note 65, Pars. 
2, 15. 
72 The UDRP Rules require parties to submit evidence in electronic form 
and to communicate with the Dispute Resolution Provider in the same 
manner. See UDRP, supra note 65, at Par. 2. 
73 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). 
74 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c). 
75 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d). 
76 The four approved dispute resolution providers that are currently 
operating are the Asian Domain Name Dispute Resolution Centre; the 
CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution; the National Arbitration Forum; 
and the World Intellectual Property Organization.  See ICANN, 
Approved Providers for Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution 
Policy, at http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/approved-providers.htm.  
Under the Policy, the Complainant is required to pay the costs of 
arbitration and is entitled, in the first instance, to select which arbitration 
provider’s panelist will handle the dispute, see UDRP, supra note 65, at 
Par. 4(d).  The Respondent domain name holder, however, may opt to 
augment the arbitration panel from one to three members (in which case 
the Respondent is entitled to designate three candidates drawn from any 
ICANN-approved Provider’s list of panelists to serve as an additional 
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invoked by trademark owners in more than 6,000 cases involving 
over 10,000 domain names.77    
An examination of several decisions reached under the 
Policy elucidates the ways in which this Policy implicates Internet 
users’ free speech rights.  Although I do not attempt to conduct a 
comprehensive analysis of the thousands of cases decided under 
the UDRP, I focus instead on a disturbing trend – a line of cases 
that, according to Milton Mueller’s comprehensive analysis of the 
6,000+ UDRP decisions rendered, poses “a significant threat to 
free and robust expression on the Internet.”78  As Mueller 
explains, these decisions make clear that “numerous complainants 
have used domain name challenges as part of an attempt to silence 
critics.”79  Below I examine several representative UDRP cases 
that implicate Internet users’ right to free expression in subtle but 
nonetheless significant ways.    
In one such case, Burlington Coat Factory brought an 
action against the holder of various domain names incorporating 
the “Burlington” trademark challenging the latter’s registration of 
the domain names BURLINGTONMURDERFACTORY.COM, 
BURLINGTONKILLFACTORY.COM, 
BURLINGTONDEATHFACTORY.COM, BURLINGTONBLOOD-
FACTORY.COM, and BURLINGTONHOLOCAUST.-COM.80  As is typical 
of the circumstances of many such actions, in the Burlington case 
the domain name holder (one Martin Bender), an outspoken 
                                                                                                                                 
panelist), in which case the Respondent must share the costs of the 
arbitration.  For a persuasive argument that the current system facilitates 
forum-shopping on the part of Complainants that undermines the 
fairness of ICANN’s UDRP, see Michael Geist, Fair.com?: An 
Examination of the Allegations of Systematic Unfairness in the ICANN 
UDRP, 27 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 903 (2002). 
77 See Milton Mueller, Success by Default: A New Profile of Domain 
Name/Trademark Disputes under ICANN’s UDRP, at 
http://dcc.syr.edu/markle/markle-report-final.pdf. 
78 Id. at 27. 
79 Id. at 23.  
80 Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Corporation v. Smartsoft, L.L.C. 
c/o Jan Knepper, WIPO Case No. D2001-1792 (March 1, 2001), at  
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-1792.html. 
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animal rights activist, was using the domain names themselves, as 
well as the speech made available at the websites under such 
domain names, to criticize the trademark owner.  The challenged 
websites criticized Burlington Coat Factory’s animal treatment 
practices and contained, for example, pictures of animals allegedly 
mistreated by Burlington in its manufacturing process (including 
pictures of allegedly skinned dogs).81 Burlington alleged that the 
above domain names were “confusingly similar” to its Burlington 
mark and claimed that Internet users would be confused as to 
whether Burlington had endorsed or sponsored such marks. 
Despite the fact that the domain names themselves 
embodied bona fide criticism of Burlington, the UDRP panelist 
deciding the case concluded that the domain names were 
confusingly similar to the Burlington trademark, that Bender had 
no rights or legitimate interests in the domain names at issue, and 
that the domain names were acquired and used in “bad faith.”   
Accordingly, the panelist ordered the challenged domain names 
removed from Bender and transferred to Burlington.  First, the 
panelist held that in order to find that the domain names at issue 
were not confusingly similar to the trademarks at issue, the use of 
the domain names “must be genuine protest or criticism, and must 
not be commercial.”82  The panelist went on to inquire into the 
nature and content available at the challenged websites and to hold 
that because the websites at issue contained commercial 
advertisements, they could not be considered genuine protest or 
criticism sites, despite the fact that the commercial (banner) 
advertisements they contained were not in any way related to the 
Burlington mark nor to Burlington’s products.  On the second 
element – the domain name holder’s legitimate rights or interests 
in the domain names at issue – once again the panelist adverted to 
the commercial nature of the advertisements available on the 
challenged website and found that because the websites available 
under these domain names included a modicum of commercial 
content -- viz., commercial advertisements for unrelated Internet 
services – Bender could not be found to be making “fair use for a 
                                                          
81 See http://www.skinnedpuppy.com. 
82 WIPO Case No. D2001-1792. 
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non-commercial purpose” under the Policy and therefore could not 
be said to have “rights or legitimate interests” in the disputed 
domain names.83  Finally, on the issue of bad faith, the panelist 
again found that the presence of commercial content on the 
website at issue was dispositive against the domain name holder.84    
In short, in the Burlington case, an inquiry into the nature 
of the content available at the challenged websites – and 
particularly the presence of advertisements on the Burlington 
protest website that were wholly unrelated to the Burlington mark 
or products -- led the panelist to conclude that the challenged 
domain names were not protected under the Policy and must be 
transferred to Burlington, despite the fact that both the domain 
names themselves and the content of the web sites available under 
such domain names were devoted to legitimate expression critical 
of the trademark owner.  
 In many other cases, the Uniform Dispute Resolution 
Policy has been interpreted in a manner implicating Internet users’ 
free speech rights and, in particular, their right to engage in critical 
speech.  For example, in the case involving the domain name 
LAKAIXA.COM,85 a well-known Spanish bank and owner of the 
registered trademark “La Caixa” brought an action seeking to 
prevent the use of this domain name.86  The domain name holder in 
that case registered this domain name -- in which the “C” in “La 
Caixa” mark was switched to a “K” -- in order to use the domain 
name itself, and the content available on the website, to convey 
“political and cultural criticism of La Caixa’s banking activity, 
international banks, and capitalism in general.”87  Toward that end, 
the domain name holder provided content on his site that was 
“critical of capitalism, the international banking system, and La 
                                                          
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 See Caixa d’Estalvis y Pensions de Barcelona ("La Caixa") v. 
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Caixa.”88  Once again, despite the bona fide critical expression 
provided at the challenged website and embodied within the 
challenged domain name itself, the trademark owner claimed that 
LAKAIXA.COM was confusingly similar to its mark, that the domain 
name holder had no rights or legitimate interests in the name, and 
that the name was registered and used in bad faith.   
The LAKAIXA.COM panelist acknowledged that the domain 
name holder was using the content available at the site -- and the 
domain name itself -- to criticize the trademark owner’s banking 
practices and to protest its policies, but nonetheless found in favor 
of the trademark owner on grounds similar to those found in the 
Burlington proceeding.   While acknowledging that “it has become 
common to substitute the letter ‘K’ for the letter ‘C’ in order to 
express a left-wing or anarchist protest,”89 and that the 
LAKAIXA.COM website itself “made quite a liberal use of the letter 
‘K’ in the above counterculture sense,”90 the panelist nevertheless 
ordered that the domain name be removed from the critic and 
transferred to the trademark owner.  Finding that the 
“counterculture meaning of political criticism embodied in 
converting ‘Cs’ to ‘Ks’ would likely be understood only by a 
minority of Internet users,” and adverting to the fact that one of the 
links on the website at issue was to an (unrelated) commercial 
service, the panelist found that the domain name was confusingly 
similar to the trademark, that the domain name holder had no 
rights or legitimate interests in the domain name, and that the 
domain name was registered and used in bad faith.91  
The Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy has also been 
invoked in disputes involving domain names of the 
“[company]sucks” variety, such as the dispute involving the 
                                                          
88 Id. 
89 The panelist acknowledged that “in the slang of a certain juvenile 
counterculture, spellings such as ‘kommunist,’ ‘komrade,’ and so on are 
quite common, originating in an old expression of political science, 
‘factor K’ (from ‘Kremlin’), in order to indicate the geopolitical 
significance of Soviet Russia.” Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
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domain name VIVENDIUNIVERSALSUCKS.COM, used by the domain 
name holder to criticize the practices of Vivendi Universal, a 
global entertainment conglomerate and parent of Universal City 
Studios.92  In that dispute, the panelist found that, because non-
English speakers might be unfamiliar with the negative 
connotations of the term “sucks,” it was reasonable to conclude 
that VIVENDIUNIVERSALSUCKS.COM was confusingly similar to the 
trademark owner’s mark “Vivendi Universal.”93  The panelist also 
found that the domain name holder’s “supposedly free speech use 
of the disputed domain name” was illegitimate and insufficient to 
establish his “rights or legitimate interests” in the domain name, 
and that the domain name was registered and used in bad faith, and 
accordingly ordered the domain name removed from the domain 
name holder.94  Among the 6,000 plus decisions that have been 
handed down applying the Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy to 
over 10,000 domain names, many similar cases95 implicate Internet 
                                                          
92 Vivendi Universal v. Mr. Jay David Sallen and GO247.COM, INC., 




95 See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Walsucks and Walmarket Puerto 
Rico, WIPO Case No. D2000-0477 (July 20, 2000), at 
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0477.html; 
Direct Line Group Ltd., Direct Line Insurance plc, Direct Line Financial 
Services Ltd , Direct Line Life Insurance Company Ltd, Direct Line 
Unit Trusts Ltd, Direct Line Group Services Ltd v. Purge I.T., Purge I.T. 
Ltd, WIPO Case No. D 2000-0583 (August 13, 2000), at 
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0583.html; 
Dixons Group PLC v. Purge I.T. and Purge I.T. Ltd, WIPO Case No. D 
2000-0584 (August 13, 2000), at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/ 
decisions/html/2000/d2000-0584.html; Freeserve PLC v. Purge I.T. and 
Purge I.T. Ltd, WIPO Case No. D 2000-0585 (August 13, 2000), at 
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0585.html; 
National Westminster Bank PLC v. Purge I.T. and Purge I.T. Ltd, WIPO 
Case No. D2000–0636 (August 13, 2000), at 
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0636.html; 
Standard Chartered PLC v. Purge I.T., WIPO Case No. D2000-0681 
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users’ right to maintain a website critical of a trademark owner.  
Indeed, Dr. Mueller’s comprehensive analysis of the 6,000+ 
domain name proceedings reported thus far demonstrates that in 
cases where domain name holders used their domain names to 
criticize or comment upon complainants’ mark or business, 
complainants successfully invoked the Policy to silence such 
criticism or commentary in 67% of the cases.96  This analysis 
demonstrates that the UDRP has had a significant impact on 
Internet users’ ability to engage in critical speech.    
It might be objected that the Uniform Dispute Resolution 
Policy does not substantially affect Internet users’ right to free 
speech because and to the extent that users can ultimately 
vindicate their free speech rights within their own national courts.  
Although the Policy was intended to provide a global forum for the 
resolution of international trademark/domain name disputes in the 
first instance, in theory the Policy does not wholly supplant 
national trademark or free speech protections.97    It is unclear, 
however, whether a domain name holder whose domain name is 
removed from her under a UDRP action will be able effectively to 
invoke her own country’s substantive trademark or free speech 
                                                                                                                                 
(August 13, 2000), at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/ 
html/2000/d2000-0681.html; Cabela's Incorporated v. Cupcake Patrol, 
NAF Case No. FA95080 (August 29, 2001), at http://www.arbitration-
forum.com/domains/decisions/95080.htm; Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. 
Richard MacLeod d/b/a For Sale, WIPO Case No. D2000-0662 
(September 19, 2000), at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/ 
2000/d2000-0662.html; Société Accor contre M. Philippe Hartmann, 
WIPO Case No. D2001-0007 (March 13, 2001), at 
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2001/d2001-0007.html; 
ADT Services AG v. ADT Sucks.com, WIPO Case No. D2001-0213 
(April 23, 2001), at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/ 
decisions/html/2001/d2001-0213.html; Bloomberg L.P. v. Secaucus 
Group, NAF Case No. 97077, at http://www.arb-
forum.com/domains/decisions/97077.htm (June 7, 2001).  See also  
Mueller, supra note 77.  
96 Mueller, supra note 77, at 11. 
97 See UDRP, supra note 65, at 4(k). 
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protections to overturn the result reached under the UDRP.98  
                                                          
98 It is debatable, for example, whether a disappointed U.S. domain name 
holder will be able effectively to assert a First Amendment defense in 
federal court against (1) a trademark holder who brought a successful 
UDRP action against her, (2) a UDRP panel, or (3) ICANN itself.  First, 
although UDRP procedures are not binding on U.S. courts per se, it may 
be difficult for a defeated domain name holder to convince a U.S. court 
to consider an “appeal” of an unfavorable UDRP decision.  Unless a 
disappointed domain name registrant brings a challenge in court within 
10 days of the UDRP decision, the UDRP decision is deemed final and 
binding upon the domain name registrar (and registrant).  See UDRP, 
supra note 65, at 4(k).  This short window itself, coupled with the 
difficulty and expense of hiring an attorney within this 10-day window to 
represent oneself in court, is a powerful disincentive to seeking review 
by a U.S. court.  See, e.g., Helfer & Dinwoodie, supra note 64, at 203-4 
(explaining that the “extremely short ten-day window within which 
respondents must file such a proceeding is likely to exert a significant 
deterrent effect on national court review.”) 
Furthermore, it is doubtful whether a defeated domain name 
holder would be able to sue ICANN or a UDRP arbitration panel directly 
in a federal court for infringing the domain name holder’s free speech 
rights based on the former’s adoption of the UDRP or the latter’s 
implementation thereof.  Because ICANN and the UDRP panel may not 
be considered state actors under the First Amendment’s state action 
doctrine, see Froomkin, supra note 1, at 113, a defeated domain name 
holder may be unable to sue ICANN or a UDRP panel for violating her 
First Amendment rights.  
Finally, a U.S. (or other national) court considering an “appeal” 
of a UDRP decision in which a defeated domain name holder sues the 
trademark owner may conclude that it does not have subject matter 
jurisdiction over such a dispute because no state action was involved or 
because the dispute presents no case or controversy under U.S. law.   See 
Helfer & Dinwoodie, supra, at 205 (“It is unclear whether respondents 
who do muster the resources to appeal panel decisions in fact possess a 
cause of action against a trademark owner under national laws seeking 
retention of the domain name.”) 
The arbitration and litigation over the domain name 
“CORINTHIANS.COM” is illustrative in this regard.  In that case, 
Corinthians Licenciamentos LTDA, an entity that held the Brazilian 
trademark rights to the mark “Corinthians” for a Brazilian soccer team, 
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It might be further objected that the UDRP has built-in 
checks to prevent its abusive use by trademark owners.  Indeed, 
the UDRP was intended to apply only to clear cases of bad faith 
cybersquatting and was not intended to apply to cases where 
domain name holders enjoyed legitimate rights and interests in 
their domain names.  Toward that end, the UDRP discourages bad 
faith complaints by trademark owners by empowering panelists to 
label bad faith or abusive complaints as “reverse domain name 
hijacking.”99  However, beyond being labeled a “reverse domain 
                                                                                                                                 
brought a UDRP proceeding against the domain name registrant of 
“CORINTHIANS.COM,” who had used this website, at least in part, to offer 
biblical quotes from the Book of Corinthians.  The UDRP panel 
considering the dispute ordered the transfer of  “CORINTHIANS.COM” to 
the Brazilian trademark owner.  See Corinthians Licenciamentos LTDA 
v. David Sallen, WIPO Case No. D2000-0461 (July 17, 2000).  The 
domain name holder challenged this decision in U.S. district court, 
seeking a declaratory judgment that his use of the domain name did not 
violate the Brazilian entity’s trademark rights.  The Brazilian trademark 
owner, in its motion to dismiss, contended that it had no intention of 
bringing a lawsuit against the domain name holder under U.S. (or any 
other countries’) trademark law, and that therefore the U.S. district court 
did not enjoy subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute. See Sallen v. 
Corinthians Licenciamentos Ltda., CV-00-11555-WGY and CV-00-
12011-WGY (D. Mass. Dec. 19, 2000).   The district court agreed, 
finding that there was no case or controversy for it to adjudicate, and 
dismissed plaintiff’s declaratory judgment action.  Id.  While the First 
Circuit reversed and held that U.S. trademark law provided it with 
subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute, see Sallen v. Corinthians 
Licenciamentos Ltda., 273 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 2001), this issue is still one 
of first impression within other U.S. circuit courts and has not been 
resolved definitively within other nations’ courts.   
In short, it is fair to conclude that “national courts are unlikely to 
exercise significant de facto external checks on abuses of authority by 
UDRP panelists . . . .”  Helfer & Dinwoodie, supra, at 210. 
99 See UDRP, supra note 65, Rule 15(e) (“If after considering the 
submissions the Panel finds that the complaint was brought in bad faith, 
for example in an attempt at Reverse Domain Name Hijacking or was 
brought primarily to harass the domain-name holder, the Panel shall 
declare in its decision that the complaint was brought in bad faith and 
Freedom of Expression, Democratic Norms, 
 and Internet Governance 
   37 
name hijacker,” there are no sanctions for such bad faith behavior 
on the part of trademark owners and the UDRP currently provides 
no meaningful disincentives to trademark owners’ engaging in 
such overreaching. 
It might be further objected that, at the end of the day, 
ICANN merely enjoys the power to remove a domain name from a 
domain name holder or to prevent an entity from registering a 
domain name in the first place, and that, given this limited power, 
ICANN’s speech-regarding policies do not justify an in-depth 
inquiry into ICANN’s policies and governance structure.  While 
this argument has some merit, I contend that, first, a governing 
entity such as ICANN that functions as a public actor regulating a 
forum of expression need not enjoy a monopoly on the use of force 
(or otherwise satisfy the traditional requirements of a “state”) to 
justify such an inquiry.100  Second, even though ICANN’s 
authority is currently limited, some have called for ICANN’s 
power to be expanded in the future,101 while others have held out 
ICANN as a model for international policy-making and dispute 
resolution involving a broader class of Internet-related issues.102  If 
we conceptualize ICANN as ICANN Version 1.x or as a dry run 
for an international policy-making body of broader powers over 
the Internet, it becomes important at this early stage to undertake 
an inquiry into how to incorporate liberal democratic norms within 
such a decision-making body in order to render such decision-
making morally legitimate. 
                                                                                                                                 
constitutes an abuse of the administrative proceeding.”) 
100 See, e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 107 
(1989) (explaining that an organization need not constitute a state in the 
usual sense of a coercive order in order for us meaningfully to inquire 
into the democratic legitimacy of its decision-making processes).  
101 WIPO, for example, has suggested that the scope of the UDRP be 
expanded.  See World Intellectual Property Organization, The 
Recognition of Rights and the Use of Names in the Internet Domain 
Name System, at http://wipo2.wipo.int/process2/report/html/-
executivesummary.html. 
102 See Froomkin, supra note 1, at n.36 (quoting United States and other 
officials’ calls for ICANN to serve as a “model for global rule-making in 
the Twenty-First Century.”). 
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In short, ICANN today serves a subtle but significant role 
in regulating Internet speech.  ICANN enjoys the power to 
establish prerequisites for registering domain names, which 
translates into the power to establish prerequisites for maintaining 
websites, and thus for engaging in an important form of 
expression.  In exercising this authority to date, ICANN has 
established a policy prohibiting the anonymous registration of 
domain names, and hence prohibiting Internet users from engaging 
in anonymous or pseudonymous speech via their websites.  
Furthermore, ICANN has exercised its authority over the Domain 
Name System to implement a policy for resolving disputes 
between trademark owners and domain name holders.  This policy 
involves consideration of the nature and content of speech 
embodied within domain names and contained within websites, 
and implicates Internet users’ ability to engage in critical 
expression.  Because ICANN enjoys the power to enact binding 
policies affecting speech within this important forum for 
expression, ICANN serves a significant public ordering 
function103 – the power to allocate rights in ways that implicate 
freedom of speech.  Given its performance of this function, 
ICANN’s governance structure should embody the normative 
ideals – both procedural and substantive – of liberal democracy.  
In particular, as I explain below, given ICANN’s power to 
implement regulations affecting speech, it does not suffice for 
ICANN merely to embody the procedural democratic norm of 
political equality by embodying representative decision-making 
structures; rather, ICANN must also embody substantive 
democratic norms, and accord special protections for the 
fundamental individual rights that are integral to liberal 
democracy, including the right of freedom of expression. 
 
III. NORMATIVE IDEALS OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND THE 
PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 
 
When the United States ceded control over the Domain 
Name System and other elements of the Internet’s infrastructure to 
                                                          
103 See, e.g., Weinberg, supra note 2, at 215-16. 
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ICANN, it sought assurances from ICANN that it would embody 
certain norms of democratic decision-making within its 
governance structure.  As I explain in Part IV, ICANN’s framers 
sought to ensure that ICANN’s decision-making would reflect and 
account for the views of those affected by its decision-making, by 
incorporating representative decision-making structures and by 
conducting direct elections of representatives by Internet users 
worldwide.  ICANN’s framers, however, were unconcerned with 
the issue of whether and how ICANN’s form of government would 
secure individuals’ fundamental rights, including the right to free 
speech.  As a result, while ICANN’s framers were clearly 
concerned with the extent to which ICANN would embody 
procedural democratic norms, they were insufficiently concerned 
with how well ICANN would embody the substantive norms 
integral to liberal democracy.  In this Part, I consider the 
procedural and substantive normative ideals that are integral to 
liberal democracy and that should therefore be embodied within 
ICANN’s governance structure. 
The concept of liberal democracy, like the concept of 
democracy itself, means many things to many people.104  Yet 
shared among these divergent conceptions of liberal democracy is 
a core of normative ideals, including both procedural and 
substantive normative ideals.  In this Part, I elucidate the essential 
contours of these core normative ideals, focusing in particular on 
certain shared normative ideals of liberal democracy that are 
integral to large-scale governments and implicated by ICANN’s 
governance of the Internet’s infrastructure.  I then discuss in Parts 
IV and V how these procedural and substantive normative ideals 
can be implemented within the context of ICANN’s governance 
structure.  
While the primary purpose of all democratic systems of 
government is to effectuate the will of the people, the goal of 
                                                          
104 See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Cyberspace Self-Governance: A 
Skeptical View from Liberal Democratic Theory, 88 CAL. L. REV. 395, 
407 (2000) (quoting Don Herzog’s comment that “liberalism is a 
tradition, not a single view, and like any other tradition it is best 
conceived of as a family of disagreements.”) 
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liberal democratic systems is to effectuate the will of the people 
within a framework of protections for individual rights and 
freedoms.105  Liberal democracy thus requires that persons affected 
by collective democratic decision-making be accorded certain 
fundamental rights, and that these fundamental rights be protected 
from infringement by the democratic process itself.106  Thus, while 
liberal democracies have in place procedural mechanisms to 
advance the democratic norms of political participation and 
political equality and to ensure that each citizen’s vote is counted 
fairly and equally, they also provide frameworks for protecting 
fundamental individual rights from infringement by democratic 
decision-making processes.107   
While liberal democratic theorists are united in their 
commitment to protecting fundamental individual rights and 
freedoms, they differ in their understanding of how such rights are 
best protected.  “Procedural” democratic theorists generally claim 
that individual rights will be adequately protected by procedural 
mechanisms alone – i.e., by essentially democratic processes 
designed with an eye toward protecting against abridgements of 
fundamental rights.108  Procedural democratic theorists thus 
contend that carefully-designed representative systems of 
government over large-scale democratic units will adequately 
protect individuals’ fundamental rights, and will best advance 
(what they consider to be) the pre-eminent individual right – the 
right to self-governance.  “Substantive” democratic theorists, on 
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Inquiry into International Law, 87 GEO. L. J. 707 (1999) (defining liberal 
democracy as “a political system with governments elicited by popular 
majority, and with the rule of law enshrined to protect those not in the 
majority.”) 
107 See, e.g., Netanel, supra note 104, at 408 (explaining that “while 
democracy aims to actualize the popular will, liberalism gives primacy to 
individual liberty.”) 
108 See, e.g., DAHL, supra note 105, at 163-92; JOHN HART ELY, 
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). 
Freedom of Expression, Democratic Norms, 
 and Internet Governance 
   41 
the other hand, remain skeptical about the capacity of thorough-
going democratic processes to protect fundamental individual 
rights, and contend that other mechanisms beyond essentially 
democratic processes are necessary to protect such rights – for 
example, constitutionally-enshrined fundamental rights and 
systems of (non-democratic) judicial review of democratic 
decision-making to protect such rights.109  While both schools of 
liberal democratic theory begin with the premise that governments 
should reflect the will of the people while protecting individuals’ 
fundamental rights, they embody different conceptions as to how 
to best protect such rights within an essentially democratic form of 
government. 
  
A. Procedural Norms of Liberal Democracy: Political Equality 
and Representation 
A fundamental component of liberal democracy is the norm 
of political equality, which requires, at a minimum, that each 
citizen’s views are counted equally on matters within the scope of 
the government’s decision-making.110  The norm of political 
equality presupposes, at the very least, a system of fair voting 
within a context of broad suffrage.111  Within this essential 
framework of political equality, the past several centuries have 
brought about a dramatic transformation in the way in which the 
norm of political equality is implemented within democratic 
systems.  In particular, as the size of democratic units expanded, 
the character of democratic government transformed from direct or 
plebiscitary democracy to indirect, representative democracy.112  
Within small-scale democratic systems (such as ancient Greek 
city-states), the fundamental normative ideal of political equality 
was implemented in the form of direct democracy, in which all 
citizens could physically assemble in one place to deliberate and 
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vote upon matters put to collective decision-making.113   As the 
size and scope of democratic units expanded, the normative ideal 
of political equality of necessity became implemented in a 
different manner, via indirect, representative systems.  Systems of 
representative democratic decision-making thus brought with them 
the ability to implement indirect systems of democracy over units 
of ever-increasing size and scale.  In translating the logic of 
political equality from small-scale to large-scale democratic units, 
the direct democracy of citizen assemblies was thus replaced by 
indirect, representative forms of government.  As this transition 
was effected, the upper limits on the size of a democratic unit – 
which had previously been set by the practical limits of such an 
assembly -- were eliminated, with the consequence that no citizen 
body was too large to enjoy a democratic form of government.114  
The representative form of government thus became integral to 
translating the quintessential democratic norm of political equality 
within large-scale democratic units. 
 While essentially necessitated by the change in the size 
and scale of a democratic unit, the move from direct to 
representative democracy is also accompanied by an increased 
capacity of such systems to protect individuals’ fundamental 
rights, according to procedural democratic theorists.115  Such 
theorists contend that representative democratic systems are 
inherently more conducive, as compared to direct democratic 
systems, to advancing the values of liberal democracy, in that they 
are more conducive than direct democracies to protecting 
individuals’ fundamental rights.  First, representative democracies 
are more conducive than direct democracies to deliberative 
decision-making, which in itself is an important safeguard for 
individual rights.116  Second, systems of representation for large-
scale democratic units are less prone to factional decision-
                                                          
113 Id. 
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making.117  According to procedural democratic theorists, these 
features of representative decision-making within large-scale 
democratic units  serve as important safeguards for fundamental 
individual rights that are essential to liberal democracy. 
 
1. Representation and Deliberation 
For procedural democratic theorists, two important moves 
for protecting fundamental individual rights within a democracy 
are the move from direct democracy to a representative democracy 
and the move from representative democracy over a limited sphere 
to representative democracy over an extended sphere.118  Within 
direct democracies (of necessarily smaller scale), it is more likely 
that a majority will be motivated by a desire to invade the 
fundamental rights of some members of the minority, while a 
representative democracy serves as a potential antidote to such 
tendencies.119  Although the interposition of representatives into 
the majoritarian democratic process cannot fully eliminate the 
possibility that collective decisions will invade individuals’ 
fundamental rights, it can substantially neutralize such 
potential.120  First, the interposition of representatives facilitates 
the introduction of deliberation, perspective, and public-
mindedness into the decision-making process.  By filtering 
individuals’ immediate passions and interests through the lens of 
representatives, a representative government tends to “refine” 
those passions and interests, channel them toward the public good, 
and concomitantly reduce the likelihood that collective decisions 
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will be made in derogation of fundamental individual rights.121  
Introducing representatives who enjoy the opportunity and 
inclination to deliberate toward achieving the overall public good 
and are less inclined to act out of partial or impassioned motives 
brings us closer the goal of implementing a liberal democratic 
government that secures individuals’ fundamental rights and 
freedoms.  Representative democracy thus constitutes a significant 
step beyond direct democracy in its power to discern the 
considered, deliberative voice of the people and to hold in check 
the potential of collective decision-making to invade individuals’ 
fundamental rights.  The facilitation of deliberation in the 
collective decision-making process enables the decision-makers to 
“arrive at the cool and deliberate sense of the community,”122 as a 
means of protecting citizens “against their own temporary errors 
and delusions.”123   
Because the deliberative nature of the representative 
democratic process carries so much theoretical weight for the 
procedural democratic theorist in protecting individuals’ rights 
and freedoms, it becomes crucial to articulate a meaningful and 
robust definition of deliberation.  Modern procedural democratic 
theorists have devoted substantial efforts to articulating an ideal of 
deliberation within a system of representative democracy that aims 
to fulfill this important theoretical role.124  James Fishkin, among 
the pre-eminent modern theorists of deliberative democracy, 
articulates an ideal of deliberation that is characterized by “free 
and equal discussion, unlimited in its duration, constrained only 
by the consensus which would be arrived at by the force of the 
better argument,”125 in which every argument thought to be 
relevant by anyone would be given as extensive a hearing as 
anyone wanted.126  In a similar vein, theorist David Braybrooke 
articulates the deliberative ideal of the “logically complete 
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debate,” which enjoys similarities to philosopher Jurgen 
Habermas’s “ideal speech situation.”127  Within the logically 
complete debate,  
 
[T]he participants, turn by turn, raise proposals and invoke 
arguments for them; and the other participants deal with all 
the proposals and answer all the arguments not their own . 
. . Thus when the issue is resolved, say by a majority 
voting to adopt a certain set of proposals, every participant, 
whether in the majority or in the minority, will have the 
same complete information about the track that the debate 
has taken.128 
 
Such deliberation among decision-makers, and presumably also 
among citizens affected by such decision-making, serves to ensure 
that all reasonable arguments in favor of and against a particular 
act of collective decision-making are heard, and that the decision-
makers have before them complete information about the effects 
of their proposed decision-making.  Facilitating such robust 
deliberation within a government’s decision-making helps to 
ensure that such decision-making will not invade individuals’ 
fundamental rights.   
In short, procedural democratic theorists claim that 
representative democratic systems are more conducive than direct 
democracies to protecting individuals’ fundamental rights because 
and to the extent that they facilitate an abstraction from 
individuals’ “temporary errors and delusions,” elicit the “cool and 
deliberate sense of the community,” and facilitate deliberative, 
impartial, and logically complete decision-making. 
 
2. Extending the Sphere of the Democratic Unit 
 Beyond the values of perspective, impartiality, and 
deliberation that representative democratic systems presumably 
bring to bear on collective decision-making, the size, scope, and 
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complexity of interests at play within large-scale democratic 
systems also play an important role in protecting individuals’ 
fundamental rights, according to procedural liberal democratic 
theorists.129  Within a small-scale democratic unit, so the theory 
goes, citizens are more likely to be homogenous, to readily form 
effective factions adverse to the fundamental rights of members of 
the minority, and to reach and implement collective decisions 
(whether directly or through their representatives) that threaten 
such rights.  As the sphere is expanded, a greater diversity and 
multiplicity of interests is comprehended, serving to neutralize the 
potential for factional decision-making adverse to fundamental 
rights.   
The salutary consequences of extending the sphere of the 
democratic unit for the protection of individual rights are 
powerfully drawn out by James Madison in The Federalist Papers.  
Building upon the political theory of philosopher David Hume,130 
Madison contends in Federalist 10 that within a representative 
democracy, as you “extend the sphere and you take in a greater 
variety of parties and interests, you make it less probable that a 
majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the 
rights of other citizens.”131  Expanding upon this argument in 
Federalist 51, Madison explains that:  
 
It is of great importance in a [representative democracy] . . 
. to guard one part of society against the injustice of the 
other part . . . . [The method of providing against this evil 
within a representative democracy is by] comprehending in 
the society so many separate descriptions of citizens as will 
render an unjust combination of a majority of the whole 
very improbable, if not impracticable.  [In this way,] the 
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society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests, 
and classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals or of 
the minority will be in little danger of interested 
combinations of the majority.  In a free government the 
security for civil rights . . . consists . . . in the multiplicity of 
interests.  The degree of security . . . will depend upon the 
number of interests . . . . and this may be presumed to 
depend on the extent of the country and the number of 
people comprehended under the same government. . . . 
[T]he larger the society, provided it be within a practical 
sphere, the more duly capable it will be of self-
government.132   
 
According to this theory, within any given small-scale (and likely 
homogenous) democratic unit, it is not unlikely that a particular 
interest adverse to the rights of some members of the minority 
(think Socrates in ancient Greece133) will dominate.  But, as the 
scope of the democratic unit as a whole – and of each 
representative’s districts – is expanded to encompass a multiplicity 
of interests, it becomes less likely that any one such potentially 
factional interest will be able to capture any one representative, 
and more importantly, less likely that any one interest will be able 
to dominate the ultimate decision-making body.   Extending the 
sphere of a representative democracy thus renders it more likely 
that representatives will be elected free of factional concerns and 
of interests that would otherwise potentially threaten individuals’ 
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fundamental rights and freedoms.134   
Modern advocates of procedural democratic theory contend 
that extending the sphere of a republic correlates with 
incorporating a multiplicity of interests among citizens that holds 
in check the potential for factional decision-making for two 
reasons: first, because of the likelihood that citizens’ interests 
would be multidimensional, and second, because citizens would 
need to become part of shifting coalitions to advance and protect 
these interests.135  According to this theory, these shifting 
coalitions of interest groups will then serve to hold in check the 
potential for democratic systems to engage in decision-making 
adverse to fundamental individual rights.   The multiplicity of 
interests that is presumed to be coextensive with an extended 
sphere serves as a check on the formation and efficacy of majority 
factions that would act in disregard of individuals’ fundamental 
rights.  A large-scale democratic unit would likely incorporate 
such a heterogeneity of interests that no single faction could 
(permanently) oppress the rest of the republic because this 
multiplicity of interests would lead to constantly shifting 
coalitions.136  Within an extended republic, members of an 
electorate with complex and diverse interests would be less likely 
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to form permanent effective factional coalitions because of the 
likelihood that members of one coalition will over time need the 
support of members of other coalitions on subsequent (or 
concurrent) issues of importance to them.  As Robert Dahl 
describes this “hypothesis of overlapping memberships”: 
 
If most individuals in the society identify themselves with 
more than one group, then there is some positive 
probability that any majority contains individuals who 
identify themselves for certain purposes with the threatened 
minority.  Members of the threatened minority who 
strongly prefer their alternative will make their feelings 
known to these members of the tentative majority who also, 
at some psychological level, identify themselves with the 
minority.  Some of these sympathizers will shift their 
support away from the majority alternative and the majority 
will crumble.137   
 
 In short, procedural democratic theorists contend that the 
extension of the sphere of a (representative) democracy itself is an 
important means of protecting individuals’ fundamental rights 
because extending the sphere enables the comprehension of a 
dynamic multiplicity of interests within the democratic unit, which 
serves to hold in check the power of any one factional interest 
adverse to the fundamental rights of individuals to dominate.  
Together with the values that the representative form of 
government itself brings to bear on collective decision-making, 
systems of representation over the large scale embody meaningful 
safeguards for individuals’ fundamental rights, according to 
procedural democratic theorists.   
 
B. Substantive Norms of Liberal Democracy and the Protection of 
Freedom of Expression 
While procedural democratic theorists contend that the 
embodiment of procedural normative ideals -- such as deliberative, 
representative decision-making over the large scale – provides 
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meaningful protections for individuals’ fundamental rights, 
substantive democratic theorists contend that democratic processes 
alone cannot secure individuals’ fundamental rights against the 
potential for adverse decision-making.  These theorists contend 
that individuals cannot and should not simply commit themselves 
to whatever the outcome of the democratic process happens to be, 
however procedurally shored up to attempt to protect individuals’ 
fundamental rights.  Substantive democratic theorists thus “give 
priority to the justice or rightness of the substantive outcomes of 
decisions rather than to the process by which the decisions are 
reached,”138 and believe that “because the liberty [such 
fundamental rights] make possible is potentially threatened by the 
democratic process, to preserve fundamental rights and liberties 
we must protect them from infringement even by means of the 
democratic process itself.”139 As democratic theorist James Fishkin 
puts it, “even when votes are counted equally or viewpoints are 
equally voiced . . . , there remains the possibility that majorities 
can do bad things, that they can commit sufficiently flagrant 
injustices upon some of their number that any normative claim of 
democracy would be undermined.”140  Thus, unless one takes the 
position that democracy is an end in itself irrespective of the 
substance of the decisions it produces, in designing a democratic 
system, it will be important to embody substantive protections for 
certain fundamental individual rights within the democracy’s 
governance structure.141   
Substantive democratic theorists contend that, no matter 
how extensively and deeply a representative decision-making body 
deliberates, the possibility still exists that it would choose to act in 
such a way as to infringe fundamental individual rights.  Such 
theorists claim that it is therefore necessary to embody certain 
substantive normative ideals within a democratic government, 
substantive means by which to evaluate the decisions of the 
                                                          
138 DAHL, supra note 105, at 169. 
139 Id. 
140 JAMES FISHKIN, TYRANNY AND LEGITIMACY: A CRITIQUE OF 
POLITICAL THEORIES 5-6 (1979). 
141 See JAMES FISHKIN, DEMOCRACY AND DELIBERATION 35 (1991). 
Freedom of Expression, Democratic Norms, 
 and Internet Governance 
   51 
democratic government (and to invalidate such decisions), to 
ensure that such decisions do not invade individuals’ fundamental 
rights.  As democratic theorist Robert Dahl characterizes this issue, 
“special procedures . . . do not solve the problem with which we 
began: how to protect fundamental rights and interests from 
violation by the democratic process if those rights or interests are 
invaded by means of the democratic process.”142  Substantive 
democratic theorists thus contend that democratic systems, to be 
legitimate, must incorporate substantive checks on the power of 
the people to effectuate their will.  Encompassed within such 
substantive checks is the articulation of fundamental rights within 
a constitution or some other embodiment of higher-order 
democratic decision-making that cannot be abridged by ordinary 
democratic decision-making processes, matters affecting which are 
effectively removed from the purview of such collective decision-
making.  
The articulation and imposition of substantive checks on 
democracies present several formidable problems.  First, 
proponents of substantive checks need to justify some means by 
which to discern those rights that are so fundamental as to be 
protected from democratic decision-making.  If such rights are to 
be protected from the purview of ordinary democratic decision-
making, then some process other than democratic decision-making 
itself is needed to articulate such rights.  Relatedly, such theorists 
need to confront and respond to the “countermajoritarian 
difficulty,”143 to provide a coherent theoretical justification for 
overruling the will of (the majority of) the people in order to 
protect fundamental individual rights (of the minority), to provide 
a justification for pre-empting the moral authority of the people to 
self-governance in the name of (what substantive democratic 
theorists claim to be) fundamental individual rights. 
 Substantive democratic theorists have long struggled with 
the theoretical issues associated with the protection of fundamental 
individual rights, such as freedom of speech, articulated in 
documents such as the United States Bill of Rights and the 
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European Convention on Human Rights.144  How one approaches 
the protection of fundamental rights within democracies in turn 
depends on one’s overarching notion of democracy itself.  If one 
begins from the premise that the most important right to advance 
within liberal democracies is the right to self-governance itself, 
then one will be reticent to champion special protections for any 
particular substantive rights, or will be willing to grant special 
protections only for those substantive rights and freedoms that are 
themselves integral to self-governance.145  If, on the other hand, 
one’s version of liberal democracy entails a theory of prior rights – 
of rights such as freedom of conscience or freedom of expression 
that are prior to the right to self-governance and possess a moral 
standing independent of the right to self-governance  – then the 
right to self-governance may justifiably be limited where necessary 
to protect such prior, independent rights.  In what follows, I 
explore the justifications for protecting fundamental individual 
rights within liberal democracies, with a focus on protection for 
freedom of expression. 
  
1. Process-Based Justifications for Protecting Freedom of 
Expression 
As we saw above, procedural democratic theorists 
generally claim that carefully-designed democratic processes will 
provide meaningful safeguards for fundamental individual rights, 
and are reticent to prescribe or evaluate substantive outcomes of 
such democratic processes.  Yet even theorists who would rely 
primarily on democratic processes to protect fundamental 
individual rights acknowledge that certain substantive rights are so 
integral to the democratic process itself that they must be accorded 
special protection.  Because of the essential role that such 
substantive rights serve within the democratic process, and 
because of the potential that an unrestrained democracy might 
infringe such rights, even procedurally-oriented democratic 
theorists advocate (or at least tolerate) special protections for such 
rights.  Robert Dahl’s explication of the importance of protecting 
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certain substantive rights within democratic systems is 
representative of this approach:  
 
The right to self-government through the democratic 
process is itself one of the most fundamental rights a 
person can possess. . . . But if people are entitled to govern 
themselves, then they are also entitled to all of the rights 
that are necessary in order for them to govern themselves, 
that is, all the rights that are essential to the democratic 
process.  On this reasoning, a set of basic political rights 
can be derived from one of the most fundamental of all the 
rights to which human beings are entitled: the right to self-
government through the democratic process. . . . This 
general moral right translates into an array of moral and 
legal rights [that are] integral to the democratic process.  
They aren’t ontologically separate from – or prior to or 
superior to – the democratic process.  To the extent that the 
democratic process exists in a political system, all of these 
rights must also exist. . . . The right to the democratic 
process is [therefore] a claim to all the general and 
specific rights – moral, legal, and constitutional – that are 
necessary to it, including freedom of speech, press, 
assembly, and association. . . . The democratic process is 
not only essential to one of the most important of all 
political goods – the right of people to govern themselves – 
but is itself a rich bundle of substantive rights.146 
 
According to such theorists, certain fundamental rights – including 
the right to free speech, press, assembly, and association -- are so 
integral to the democratic process that they must be accorded 
special protections within the democratic process – and if 
necessary, against the democratic process -- on the grounds that 
they are necessary to the effective functioning of the democratic 
process itself.   
John Hart Ely147 and Alexander Meiklejohn148 advance 
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similar instrumentalist theories for according special protections 
for the right to free speech within a democratic society, and if 
necessary, against the democratic process itself.  Ely, for example, 
claims that according special protections for certain substantive 
rights – protections against ordinary majoritarian democratic 
decision-making processes --  is necessary and justified to the 
extent that such protections are integral to the effective functioning 
of the democratic process itself.  He claims that because freedom 
of expression, in particular, is necessary to “make our 
governmental processes work, to ensure the open and informed 
discussion of political issues, and to check government when it 
gets out of bounds,” according special protections for freedom of 
expression is justified on instrumentalist grounds.149  Similarly, 
Meiklejohn claims that because citizens of a democratic state are 
required to govern themselves, they must be accorded the right to 
express themselves and to have full access to relevant information 
in order to perform their duties as self-governing citizens.150  Such 
process-based accounts share the feature of justifying protection 
for freedom of expression not on the grounds that this right is 
intrinsically valuable, but rather on the instrumentalist grounds that 
protecting freedom of expression is integral to the functioning of a 
democratic system.   Accordingly, although process-oriented 
democratic theorists generally rely upon procedural democratic 
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norms, such as representation and deliberation, to safeguard 
individuals’ fundamental rights, because of the important role 
freedom of expression serves within the process of self-
governance, such theorists acknowledge the necessity of according 
special protections for freedom of expression – even against the 
democratic process, if necessary.  
 
2. Foundationalist Justifications for Protecting Freedom of 
Expression  
A separate strain of liberal democratic theory justifies 
protecting substantive rights, such as freedom of expression, 
within democratic governments on the ground that such rights 
possess a moral standing independent of and prior to the 
democratic process.  Such foundationalist accounts of protecting 
free expression do not appeal to the function that free speech 
serves in advancing the democratic process itself.  Rather, 
foundationalist accounts justify protecting freedom of expression 
on the grounds that such protection is essential in order to regard 
citizens as equal, autonomous, rational agents, each of whom is 
sovereign in deciding for himself or herself what to believe and on 
what basis to believe it.151  Under such accounts, which find their 
roots in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant,152 for citizens to 
recognize a democratic government as legitimate, they must be 
able to regard themselves – and require that their government 
regard them – as equal, autonomous, rational agents with the right 
to receive and share information to enable them to make up their 
minds on all manner of issues.  Therefore, in order for the 
authority of a democratic government to be considered morally 
legitimate, such authority cannot encompass the power to restrict 
the liberty of citizens by controlling their sources of information or 
the expression of information that is integral to citizens’ 
autonomous decision-making.153 
Philosopher John Rawls advances a similar account of the 
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importance of protecting freedom of expression within democratic 
systems of government.   In brief, Rawls sets forth in Political 
Liberalism a framework for the protection of political and personal 
liberties within a democratic society.  He begins by developing a 
conception of justice from the perspective of persons as free and 
equal, and argues that individuals’ freedom consists in their 
possession of two moral powers: a capacity for a sense of justice 
and for a conception of the good.154  Rawls then derives a scheme 
of equal basic liberties that are “essential social conditions for the 
adequate development and full exercise of the two powers of moral 
personality over a complete life.”155  Included among these equal 
basic liberties are freedom of thought, freedom of association, 
liberty of conscience, and political liberties – including 
representative democratic institutions, freedom of speech and the 
press, and freedom of assembly.156  According to these 
foundationalist accounts, freedom of speech is granted special 
primacy and must be granted special protection within democratic 
institutions because such freedom is essential for citizens to realize 
their potential as rational, autonomous, equal individuals with a 
capacity for a conception of the good and for a sense of justice.  
Having argued in favor of granting special protection for 
the right to freedom of expression within democratic systems – 
whether on instrumentalist or foundationalist grounds -- it then 
becomes necessary to consider the means by which such protection 
can be meaningfully implemented.  One familiar form of 
protection is to articulate such fundamental rights in a constitution 
or bill of rights157 and then to commit the protection of such rights 
to extra-democratic guardians not subject to democratic decision-
making processes themselves – such as within a system of 
independent judicial review.  Although democratic theorists 
espouse widely divergent views of the legitimacy of such 
democracy-checking institutions,158 even procedurally-inclined 
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democratic theorists acknowledge the important role served by 
such democracy-checking institutions in protecting certain 
fundamental rights.159  Thus, procedural democratic theorists such 
as Robert Dahl160 and John Hart Ely161 acknowledge that where a 
system of judicial review is limited to invalidating laws that 
infringe upon those individual rights and freedoms that are integral 
to the democratic process itself – including the right to freedom of 
expression -- such a system would be instrumental to and 
consistent with (what they take to be) the pre-eminent liberal 
democratic value – viz., the  right to self-governance through the 
democratic process.  Substantive democratic theorists, of course, 
look more favorably upon the role of democracy-checking 
institutions like judicial review and claim that such institutions are 
integral to granting meaningful protections for individuals’ 
(intrinsically valuable) fundamental rights.162   
In short, liberal democracies accord protections not only 
for the procedural value of political equality advanced through 
carefully-designed representative governments, but also for certain 
substantive values, such as freedom of expression.  In general, 
such substantive values are justified by procedural democratic 
theorists on the grounds that they are integral to the democratic 
process itself and by substantive democratic theorists on the 
grounds that they are intrinsically valuable and necessary for 
citizens to be regarded as equal, autonomous, and rational agents.  
Whether justified on instrumentalist grounds or foundationalist 
grounds, the right to freedom of expression is an essential 
component of liberal democratic systems, as are requisite 
institutions – such as the institution of independent judicial review 
– that are empowered to protect such rights.  
 
IV. ICANN’S GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE AND ITS 
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When the United States ceded control over key elements of 
the Internet’s infrastructure to ICANN, it recognized that ICANN, 
in exercising its substantial policy-making authority with respect 
to issues of intellectual property and domain names, would have 
the power to affect Internet users’ rights and interests worldwide.  
In view of the substantial policy-making control over Internet 
conduct that it was vesting in this new entity, the United States 
sought assurances from ICANN that it would embody important 
procedural norms of democracy within its governance structure.  In 
particular, as I discuss in this Part, the United States required – and 
ICANN promised – that ICANN would embody norms of 
deliberative and representative decision-making (over an extended 
sphere) that would enable it to take into account the preferences of 
Internet users worldwide while attempting to constrain the 
potential for factional decision-making.  In five years since 
ICANN has assumed this power, ICANN’s powers have expanded 
beyond those initially contemplated and ICANN revisited its 
commitment to embodying such procedural democratic norms 
within its governance structure.   First, ICANN’s decision-making 
authority has extended to encompass the authority to regulate 
speech on the Internet.163  Second, after a period of self-evaluation, 
ICANN is now retreating from its initial commitments to 
embodying procedural norms of liberal democracy within its 
governance structure.  In this Part, I examine ICANN’s initial 
commitments to embodying procedural norms of liberal 
democracy within its governance structure, as well as ICANN’s 
recent retreat from these commitments.  In the next Part, I contend 
that because ICANN has the authority to enact policies affecting 
speech, ICANN’s governance structure should be revised to 
incorporate meaningful protections for the substantive democratic 
norm of freedom of expression.  
In the early days of the formation of (what was to become) 
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ICANN, several of the ICANN “framers” believed that, in 
exercising its responsibility over key elements of the Internet’s 
infrastructure, ICANN could and should limit itself to technical 
issues, and therefore need not – and indeed should not -- be 
designed as a democratic institution of governance that accounted 
for the preferences of those affected by its decision-making.164  
Other framers insisted that ICANN would inevitably be drawn into 
policy-making, including policy-making affecting Internet users’ 
substantive rights, and that ICANN – in order to exercise its 
authority legitimately --  must incorporate norms of democratic 
decision-making within its governance structure.  The United 
States government – which because of its historical role in 
managing the Domain Name System was deeply involved in the 
formation and structuring of ICANN165 -- (correctly) predicted that 
governance of the Internet infrastructure would likely involve both 
issues of a technical nature166 and matters of substantive policy-
formation.  Recognizing the dual nature of the responsibility for 
governing the Internet’s infrastructure that it was about to commit 
to this sui generis entity, the U.S. government sought to bring into 
being an institution that included a role both for technical expertise 
and a role for essentially democratic decision-making – complete 
with mechanisms designed to secure ICANN’s embodiment of 
globally representative and deliberative decision-making 
structures.  In designing the technical standard-setting component 
of this entity, the U.S. government drew on pre-existing groups of 
experts that had largely been responsible for coordinating technical 
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Internet infrastructure issues.167  In contemplating the requirements 
for the substantive policy-making component of this entity, the 
framers of ICANN had a more difficult task.  They could not rely 
upon the carefully-designed, pre-existing structures of 
representative government embodied within the United States 
government, because of course they were attempting to create a 
globally representative entity to establish policies governing 
Internet conduct the effects of which transcended the boundaries of 
territorial sovereigns.  And, the framers chose not to work within 
the framework of any pre-existing international entities committed 
to policy-making on such matters (like a branch of the United 
Nations such as the International Telecommunications Union or 
the World Intellectual Property Organization),168 because of the 
concern that such international governance entities would be 
unable to respond quickly and efficiently to the fast-paced nature 
of Internet-related developments.169  Instead, ICANN’s framers  
chose to embark upon an unprecedented project of designing 
specifications for a new type of global democratic decision-making 
entity that was to be essentially unaffiliated with any pre-existing 
governmental entity, and yet representative of and accountable to 
those affected by its decision-making.   
The United States, acting through the Department of 
Commerce,170 first set out its understanding of and requirements 
for the governance structure of (what was to become) ICANN in 
its Domain Name System White Paper of 1998.171  Shortly 
thereafter, ICANN was formed as a non-profit corporation with the 
hopes of satisfying the specifications set forth in the White Paper 
and being chosen for the role of governing the Domain Name 
System.  ICANN then promulgated its Articles of Incorporation 
and Bylaws in accordance with the requirements set forth in the 
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White Paper.  ICANN was then chosen by the United States to 
take over governance of the Domain Name System and other 
aspects of the Internet’s infrastructure,172 and accordingly, the 
Department of Commerce and ICANN entered into a 
Memorandum of Understanding which set forth further 
requirements that ICANN’s governance structure was to meet in 
order to assume this governance role.173  
Over the past five years, as ICANN has exercised its power 
to regulate aspects of Internet conduct in ways that affect the rights 
of Internet users worldwide, ICANN has been the subject of 
substantial scrutiny.174  As the scope of its power becomes more 
widely understood, ICANN must be called upon to embody more 
effectively the procedural norms of liberal democracy that it 
initially committed to, as well as to embody the substantive 
democratic norm of protecting freedom of expression.  In Part V, I 
consider the ways in which ICANN should encompass protections 
for freedom of expression.  In this Part, I analyze the extent to 
which the procedural ideals of liberal democracy are embodied 
within (1) the original understanding of and specifications for the 
design of ICANN’s governance structure, as set forth by its 
framers in the White Paper and the Memorandum of 
Understanding between Department of Commerce and ICANN; (2) 
ICANN’s initial governance structure, as embodied in its initial 
Bylaws and other constitutive documents; and (3) ICANN’s 
reformed governance structure, as set forth in the Committee on 
ICANN Evolution and Reform’s October 2002 Final 
Implementation Report and Recommendations.175 
 
B.  The Original Understanding of and Specifications for ICANN’s 
Governance Structure 
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In 1997, in response to calls from industry for Internet self-
regulation and to calls from international entities for reducing U.S. 
control over the Internet, then-President Clinton charged the 
Department of Commerce with the responsibility of divesting the 
U.S. government of control over key elements of the Internet’s 
infrastructure and with privatizing the Domain Name System.176  
After consulting extensively with various parties that would be 
affected by such privatization and receiving comments on a draft 
statement of policy,177 in 1998 the Department of Commerce set 
forth a Statement of Policy, known as the Domain Name System 
White Paper.  In the White Paper, the Department of Commerce 
set forth requirements for the entity that would govern these key 
elements of the Internet’s infrastructure and the requisite 
characteristics of this entity’s governance structure.   The White 
Paper sets forth four key principles based on which the U.S. 
Government was prepared to transfer governance of the Domain 
Name System to a private entity: (1) maintaining stability of the 
Internet in the transition process; (2) enabling competition within 
the Domain Name System; (3) effectuating private, bottom-up 
coordination of the Domain Name System in lieu of any form of 
(traditional) top-down governmental control (whether national or 
international); and (4) representation of the interests of Internet 
users worldwide in developing policies regarding the Internet’s 
infrastructure.178   
In setting forth the United States’ understanding of and 
specifications for this new institution, the White Paper placed 
particularly strong emphasis on the role that representation would 
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play in securing democratic legitimacy for this new entity.  
Although the White Paper does not refer to norms of democratic 
government explicitly, it does commit this entity to embodying 
representative decision-making structures to take into account the 
diversity of interests of Internet users worldwide.179  Specifically, 
the White Paper asserted that this new governance entity must 
embody structures designed to “reflect the functional and 
geographic diversity of the Internet and its users,”180 and 
articulated several specific types of Internet-related interests and 
functions that should be represented.181  The White Paper stated 
further that “since these constituencies are international, we would 
expect the [new entity’s decision-making body] to be broadly 
representative of the global Internet community.”182  On the 
subject of representation within this entity’s ultimate decision-
making body -- the Board of Directors -- the White Paper 
committed the entity to “establishing a system for electing a Board 
of Directors that reflected the geographical and functional 
diversity of the Internet, [which] preserves as much as possible the 
tradition of bottom-up governance of the Internet, and [through 
which] Board members are elected [to] ensure broad representation 
and participation in the election process.”183  Consistent with its 
focus on the importance of broad suffrage and representation of 
Internet users’ interests, the White Paper was also concerned to 
limit the possibility of factional decision-making by self-interested 
parties, which it hoped to reduce through open, transparent, and 
representative decision-making.  The White Paper states, for 
example, that the entity’s organizing documents should ensure that 
it will be “governed on the basis of a sound and transparent 
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decision-making process, which protects against capture by a self-
interested faction,” and that its “processes should be fair, open, and 
pro-competitive, protecting against capture by a narrow group of 
stakeholders.”184 
Regarding the embodiment of substantive democratic 
norms, such as freedom of expression, within this new entity’s 
foundational documents, at the time the White Paper was drafted, 
the United States and other ICANN framers failed to appreciate or 
anticipate the ways in which governance of the Internet’s 
infrastructure would implicate such substantive rights.  
Accordingly, the White Paper failed to provide for the embodiment 
of such substantive democratic norms within ICANN’s 
foundational documents.  Several commentators on the 
Department of Commerce’s earlier, draft statement of policy 
contended that ICANN’s decision-making would affect speech and 
that therefore its foundational documents should embody explicit 
protections for freedom of expression.  In response, the White 
Paper observed (ironically, in light of the countermajoritarian185 
function of protections for freedom of expression) that such free 
speech concerns were raised only by a minority of commentators 
and concluded summarily that “free speech protections will not be 
disturbed [by ICANN’s Internet governance] and, therefore, need 
not be specifically included with its core principles.”186   
Similarly, on the issue of whether domain name registrars 
should maintain a publicly-available database correlating domain 
names with the names and addresses of individuals who registered 
such domain names, the White Paper dismissed the free speech and 
informational privacy concerns of a (small) number of 
commenters.  Observing that “commentators largely agreed that 
domain name registries should maintain up-to-date, readily 
searchable domain name databases that contain the information 
necessary to locate a domain name holder so as to better track 
cases of intellectual property infringement,”187 while only “a few 
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commentators noted that privacy and free speech issues should be 
considered in this context,”188 the White Paper once again 
dismissed this “minority” position, and encouraged ICANN to 
require individuals to disclose their identity as a prerequisite for 
registering a domain name (and hence for maintaining a web 
site).189   
Finally, the White Paper, while committing ICANN to 
developing a mandatory dispute resolution policy for resolving 
disputes between trademark owners and domain name holders, 
predicted (naively) that such a policy could be limited to disposing 
of cases of uncontroversial bad faith cybersquatting, that such a 
policy would not extend to disputes involving “legitimate 
competing rights” between trademark owners and domain name 
holders, and therefore that such a policy would not implicate 
domain name holders’ free speech rights.190  In short, the White 
Paper (naively, at least in retrospect) predicted that ICANN could 
exercise its control over the Internet’s infrastructure in such a way 
as to not implicate Internet users’ free speech (or other important) 
substantive rights, and therefore concluded that ICANN’s 
governance structure need not embody any special protections for 
such rights.  Rather, it insisted that ICANN’s normative 
obligations would be exhausted by embodying the procedural 
norms of liberal democracy, such as deliberation and 
representation over an extended sphere.   
 After setting forth the processes and principles under 
which this new entity should govern and outlining the policies that 
this entity would be charged with implementing, the White Paper 
concluded that “the U.S. Government is prepared to recognize, by 
entering into agreements with and to seek international support for, 
a new not-for-profit corporation formed by private sector Internet 
stakeholders to administer policy for the Internet name and address 
system.”191  As to how such an entity would come into existence, 
the White Paper invited “Internet stakeholders . . . to work together 
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to form a new, private, not-for-profit corporation to manage 
Domain Name System functions”192 in accordance with the 
principles and policies set forth in the White Paper.   
 
C. The Memorandum of Understanding and ICANN’s Initial 
Governance Structure 
Several months after the White Paper was released, a group 
of Internet experts established a private, not-for-profit corporation 
-- the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers -- as 
a candidate for assuming the responsibility of governing the 
Domain Name System and other key elements of the Internet’s 
infrastructure.193  Within a short period of time, the Department of 
Commerce concluded that ICANN was “the organization that best 
demonstrated that it can accommodate the broad and diverse 
interest groups that make up the Internet community.”194  
Thereafter, the Department of Commerce entered into a 
Memorandum of Understanding with ICANN, under which the 
two entities agreed to work together to “jointly design, develop, 
and test the mechanisms, methods, and procedures that should be 
in place, and the steps necessary to transition management 
responsibility for DNS functions now performed by, or on behalf 
of, the U.S. Government”195 to ICANN.   
In this Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), the 
Department of Commerce and ICANN reiterated and expanded 
upon the commitments regarding ICANN’s governance structure 
that were earlier articulated in the White Paper.  The MoU, like the 
White Paper, emphasized the importance of ICANN’s developing 
processes of representative decision-making and committed the 
parties to “collaborate on the design, development, and testing of 
appropriate membership mechanisms that foster accountability to 
and representation of the global and functional diversity of the 
Internet and its users.”196  The MoU, however, went beyond the 
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White Paper by including an important check on the scope of 
ICANN’s power, by requiring independent review of ICANN 
decision-making. Specifically, the MoU committed the parties to 
“collaborate on the design, development, and testing of procedures 
by which members of the Internet community adversely affected 
by decisions that are in conflict with the bylaws of the organization 
can seek external review of such decisions by a neutral third 
party.”197 
The Memorandum of Understanding also incorporated by 
reference ICANN’s initial Bylaws198 and Articles of 
Incorporation,199 in which ICANN further elaborated its 
commitments to embodying certain procedural norms of 
democratic decision-making.  In particular, ICANN’s initial 
Bylaws embodied its commitment to effectuating (1) a robust 
system of representation, whereby half of the members of its Board 
of Directors200 -- the At Large Directors -- would be directly 
elected by Internet users, while other Board Members would 
represent a pre-determined set of Internet-related functions and 
interests201; (2) open forums for meaningful deliberation regarding 
policy matters committed to ICANN; and (3) a mechanism for 
adversely affected individuals to seek independent review by a 
quasi-judicial body of ICANN decisions that were allegedly 
reached in violation of ICANN’s Bylaws.  Within the 
manifestation of ICANN’s governance structure reflected in 
ICANN’s Bylaws, ICANN thus committed itself to embodying 
several important procedural democratic norms, which I consider 
in greater detail below. 
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1. Commitments to Representation within ICANN’s Initial 
Governance Structure 
ICANN’s initial Bylaws incorporate a commitment to 
embodying the democratic norm of political equality, achieved 
both through direct election of representatives by Internet users 
worldwide and through the selection of representatives tied to 
Internet-related interests and functions.  As set forth in these 
Bylaws, ICANN’s ultimate decision-making body, the Board of 
Directors, is comprised both of “At Large” representatives -- who 
are to be directly elected by Internet users worldwide -- and 
representatives selected to represent particular Internet-related 
interests.202  First, ICANN’s initial Bylaws commit it to 
developing a system for the direct election by Internet users 
worldwide of a substantial subset (initially half203) of the Members 
of its Board of Directors.204  In effectuating this commitment, after 
an extensive process of evaluating methods and procedures for 
global Internet elections,205 three years ago ICANN conducted an 
election in which Internet users worldwide were able to vote and 
which resulted in the election of five At Large Directors to 
ICANN’s Board.206  Second, ICANN’s initial Bylaws provide for a 
second subset of the Members of its Board to be directly elected by 
three lower level councils or Supporting Organizations, each of 
which is devoted to a different component of ICANN’s policy-
making.  In particular, three Board Members are selected by its 
Domain Name Supporting Organization,207 three by its Address 
Supporting Organization,208 and three by its Protocol Supporting 




205 See ICANN AT-LARGE MEMBERSHIP STUDY COMMITTEE, FINAL 
REPORT ON ICANN AT-LARGE MEMBERSHIP (November 5, 2001), at 
http://www.atlargestudy.org/final_report.shtml. 
206 For the results of this election, see ELECTION.COM, ICANN BOARD 
OF DIRECTORS -- RESULTS OF THE 2000 AT LARGE MEMBERSHIP VOTE, 
at http://www.election.com/us/icann/icannresult.html. 
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Organization.209  
Each of these lower level Supporting Organizations was 
charged with initially developing substantive or technical policy 
within its subject area, and with forwarding its policy 
recommendations to the Board of Directors, which enjoys ultimate 
decision-making authority.210  The Protocol and Address 
Supporting Organizations were charged with technical matters that 
do not involve determinations of substantive policy, and as such, 
their management structures are not designed to be broadly 
representative.  By contrast, the Domain Name Supporting 
Organization was charged with responsibility for establishing 
policy on a variety of domain name matters implicating speech.  In 
recognition of the important policy-making role it would come to 
serve, the Domain Name Supporting Organization was itself 
designed to be broadly representative along both functional and 
interest group lines.  The Domain Name Supporting Organization 
Names Council, which was responsible for initially developing 
policies concerning the Domain Name System, was elected by 
members of seven pre-determined interest group constituencies211: 
(1) commercial and business interests; (2) trademark and other 
intellectual property and other counterfeiting interests; (3) non-
commercial domain name holders; (4) Internet service providers 
and connectivity providers; (5) registrars; (6) global top level 
domain registries; and (7) country code top level domain registries.   
The DNSO also included a General Assembly, which was a forum 
for representation of domain name holders generally that was 
“open to all who are willing to contribute effort to the work of the 
DNSO.”212   
Thus, the Domain Name Supporting Organization, which 
was initially responsible for developing domain name policy, was 
designed to be representative of Internet users along functional and 
interest group lines.  In turn, the Board of Directors, which is 
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ultimately responsible for developing and implementing all 
policies within ICANN’s decision-making purview, was to be 
comprised both of representatives directly elected by Internet users 
worldwide and by Directors selected to represent specific, pre-
determined Internet-related interests and functions. 
 
2. Opportunities for Deliberation within ICANN’s Initial 
Governance Structure 
ICANN’s initial Bylaws also commit it to providing 
substantial opportunities for deliberation and public participation 
on decision-making matters within its purview, both within the 
Board of Directors and within its lower level councils.  These 
Bylaws commit the Board of Directors to providing members of 
the public affected by the Board’s decision-making with 
reasonable notice of and opportunity to comment on its adoption of 
proposed policies, to see and reply to comments of others, and to 
providing a public forum at which proposed policies are openly 
discussed.213  The Bylaws also provide opportunities for 
deliberation on matters of policy development when they are 
initially formulated within its Supporting Organizations.  For 
example, the Domain Name Supporting Organization’s Names 
Council, which is responsible for initially developing domain 
name policy, is charged with providing “appropriate means for 
input and such participation as is practicable under the 
circumstances by other interested parties.”214   In formulating its 
decisions, the Names Council is also required to give the public an 
opportunity to review and comment upon all relevant 
documents,”215 and to ensure that all responsible views have been 
heard and considered prior to a decision by the Names Council.”216  
Additionally, the Domain Name Supporting Organization General 
Assembly is designed to be an “open forum for participation in the 
work of the DNSO, and open to all who are willing to contribute 
                                                          
213 See BYLAWS, supra note 198, Art. III, Sec. 4(b).  
214 Id. 
215 Id. 
216 Id., Art. VI, Sec. 2. 
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effort to the work of the DNSO.”217  Furthermore, all Supporting 
Organizations make extensive use of electronic listservs, which 
provide a forum for interested and affected Internet users to voice 
their concerns on and contribute extensively to policy matters 
under consideration.  
 
3. Commitments to Independent Review of ICANN Decision-
Making Within ICANN’s Initial Governance Structure 
ICANN’s initial Bylaws also commit it to implementing a 
system of independent, quasi-judicial review of its decision-
making in the form of an Independent Review Panel, which would 
be responsible for reviewing policies adopted by the ICANN 
Board to determine whether the Board acted in conformance with 
the Bylaws in adopting such policies.218  Specifically, ICANN’s 
initial Bylaws require the Board of Directors to “adopt policies and 
procedures for independent third party review of Board actions 
alleged by an affected party to have violated [ICANN’s] Articles 
of Incorporation or its Bylaws.”219   
ICANN has undertaken steps to constitute an Independent 
Review Panel, but to date, has not actually constituted such a 
Panel.   A Commission appointed by the Board to constitute an 
Independent Review Panel concluded that insurmountable 
obstacles existed that would prevent it from fulfilling its charge,220 
and no forum as yet exists for affected Internet users to seek 
independent review of decisions by ICANN that implicate such 
users’ rights and interests. 
In sum, ICANN’s initial governance structure was 
characterized by a partially-fulfilled commitment to representative 
and deliberative decision-making and an unfulfilled commitment 
to independent review of ICANN decision-making.  
Representation of Internet users’ interests was to be achieved via 
two mechanisms – first, through Internet users’ direct elections of 
                                                          
217 Id. 
218 Id., Art. III.  
219 Id. 
220 See ICANN, INDEPENDENT REVIEW, at http://www.icann.org/ 
committees/indreview/index.html. 
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members to the ICANN Board, and second, through representation 
of certain pre-determined interests groups and ICANN functions.   
Achieving meaningful representation via the mechanism of 
direct election of representatives is surely fraught with many 
difficulties, as the inquiries of ICANN’s At Large Study 
Committee and the research into Internet elections in general have 
established.221  Yet, at first blush, it would appear that meaningful 
representation of Internet users’ interests could in theory be 
secured via the mechanism of direct elections in which affected 
Internet users across an extended sphere could have a voice.   
As discussed above, ICANN’s initial governance structure 
arguably incorporates some of the mechanisms designed to protect 
individual rights and to check faction that are advanced by 
procedural democratic theorists.222  ICANN was initially designed 
as a representative democratic government (of sorts) that enjoyed 
an extended sphere and that facilitated deliberation within its 
decision-making processes.223 Despite these initial appearances, 
however, the underlying predicates for the effective 
implementation of these checks on faction do not obtain within the 
ICANN realm. 
 Procedural democratic theorists of the Madisonian strain 
contend that extending the sphere of a republic makes it less likely 
that a majority with factional or tyrannous motives will in fact 
exist and that even if such a majority did in fact exist, it would be 
less likely to act as a unity.224  One might therefore conclude that 
extending a republic’s sphere to incorporate the world over, while 
employing technological advances to render representation 
feasible, would advance the Madisonian desideratum of checking 
factional decision-making (or decision-making violative of 
individuals’ fundamental rights).  Yet, these claims are based on 
two assumptions that do not necessarily obtain within the ICANN 
sphere: first, that potentially factional interests are correlated with 
                                                          
221 See, e.g., the Brookings Institute’s series of articles on Internet voting, 
at http://www.brook.edu/dybdocroot/gs/projects/iVoting.htm. 
222 See text accompanying notes 110-37. 
223 See text accompanying notes 176-217. 
224 See text accompanying notes 129-37. 
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geography, such that extending the sphere necessarily entails 
multiplying interests, and second, that the government at issue has 
the power to act so as to implicate a multiplicity of interests.   
First, procedural democratic theorists of the Madisonian 
strain assume that the way to encompass a multiplicity of interests 
– in order ultimately to have these interests hold one another in 
check – is to expand the geographic scope of the government.  
This in turn is premised upon the assumption that interests are 
correlated with geography.  The relevant diversity of interests with 
respect to regulation of Internet-related conduct, however – and 
within the modern economy generally – does not neatly correlate 
with diversity of geographic locale.  Thus, an extended geographic 
sphere by itself cannot ensure the requisite multiplicity of interests, 
and some other method must be implemented in order to achieve 
the desideratum of a multiplicity of interests.  Second, although 
there no doubt exists a multiplicity of interests among individuals 
with respect to the regulation of Internet conduct, only a small 
subset of such interests is implicated or put into play by ICANN 
decision-making.  Internet users throughout the world surely enjoy 
a multiplicity of interests with respect to the regulation of Internet-
related conduct generally – interests in expanding the e-commerce 
infrastructure, in providing greater Internet access and connectivity 
to poorly served communities, protecting content from 
unauthorized copying, securing protection for trademark and other 
business interests, ensuring privacy of electronic communications, 
protecting the free flow of information, etc.  If a global, 
representative government were to encompass and implicate such a 
multiplicity of Internet-related interests, it might well suffice to 
rely upon the mechanisms of representation and deliberation to 
constrain the factional potential of such a government’s decision-
making.  ICANN, however, is a government of quite limited scope.  
Broad enough to implicate free speech and intellectual property 
rights, to be sure, but not broad enough as it is currently 
configured to encompass a multiplicity of interests sufficient to 
drive the system of checks on faction contemplated by procedural 
democratic theorists to protect individuals’ fundamental rights.  
ICANN’s decision-making power extends only to a narrow range 
of issues.  With respect to ICANN decision-making regarding the 
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resolution of trademark/domain name disputes, for example, the 
array of interests is generally unidimensional on the intellectual 
property–free speech axis.225   
The application of the extension of the sphere component 
of this proceduralist check on faction thus requires a 
reconsideration of the mechanism by which to render this check 
meaningful.  First, extending the sphere, for procedural democratic 
theorists, serves as a proxy for encompassing a citizen body with a 
multiplicity of interests, and in particular, a dynamic multiplicity 
of interests.  Second, this check functions effectively with respect 
to a government of broad jurisdiction that enjoys the power to 
enact policies implicating not just one but several of a citizen’s 
potential interests.  But we have also seen that, because interests 
do not necessarily correlate with geography in the Internet sphere, 
the extension of the sphere in the Internet realm does not 
necessarily bring with it the requisite complexity of interests, 
especially given the narrow band of ICANN’s decision-making 
power.   The question becomes, are there other ways to achieve 
within ICANN the proceduralist desideratum of a dynamic 
complexity of interests so as to effectively implement this 
procedural check on faction?   
The framers of ICANN attempted to encompass and 
represent a diverse set of interests on matters implicated by 
ICANN decision-making in part by pre-determining these 
implicated interest groups or constituencies.  For example, 
ICANN’s Domain Name Supporting Organization Names 
Council226 is elected by members of seven pre-determined interest 
group constituencies: (1) commercial and business interests; (2) 
trademark and other intellectual property and other counterfeiting 
interests; (3) non-commercial domain name holders; (4) Internet 
service providers and connectivity providers; (5) registrars; (6) 
                                                          
225 See EPSTEIN, supra note 130, at 104 (discussing slavery as an 
example of an issue with respect to which there existed a duality of 
interests and for which the Madisonian theory of checks on faction 
would be ineffective).   
226 See ICANN’s Domain Name Supporting Organization (DNSO) site, 
at http://www.icann.org/dnso/dnso.htm. 
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global top level domain registries; and (7) country code top level 
domain registries.227  Although these pre-determined interest 
groups or constituencies were intended to ensure representation for 
the variety and complexity of interests encompassed within each 
such group, the pre-determined nature of such interests groups 
means that members of such groups are less likely to be able to 
dynamically array themselves into different interest groups and are 
less likely to form shifting coalitions to protect against faction.  
From the procedural democratic perspective, such pre-determined 
interest groups may bind representatives elected by such groups 
too closely to the partial interests of the pre-determined interest 
groups that elected them into office and frustrate their ability to 
transcend factional interests. 
In sum, the extension of the sphere component of the 
proceduralist check on faction serves as a proxy for incorporating 
a dynamic complexity of interests among citizens, which in turn 
serves to check faction in a representative government of 
sufficiently broad powers.  Because ICANN’s powers are limited, 
however, the relevant interests of members of ICANN’s electorate 
may be unidimensional, not complex.   And, because ICANN’s 
governance structure, in an attempt to incorporate a variety of 
interests, partially pre-determined and crystallized this array of 
interests, the relevant interests of members of ICANN’s electorate 
may be static, not dynamic.   Lacking the requisite complexity of 
implicated interests among those affected by its decision-making, 
and lacking a dynamic complexity of interests, ICANN’s (initial) 
system of representation is insufficient to impose meaningful 
checks on factional decision-making or decision-making adverse 
to fundamental individual rights.  In order to embody meaningful 
protections for fundamental individual rights within ICANN’s 
governance structure, either a dynamic multiplicity of interests 
needs to be implicated by ICANN’s decision-making to render 
proceduralist checks meaningful, or ICANN must embody 
meaningful substantive constraints on its decision-making power 
to constrain its ability to implicate fundamental individual rights.  
  
                                                          
227 See BYLAWS, supra note 198, Art. VI-B. 
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D. ICANN’s Proposed Reform of Its Governance Structure 
Over the past five years, ICANN’s governance structure 
has been the subject of substantial analysis and scrutiny, both 
internal and external.  First, as required by its initial Bylaws, 
ICANN appointed an At Large Study Committee to evaluate how 
best to conduct a system of global Internet elections of At Large 
representatives to its Board of Directors.  Second, and as also 
required by its Bylaws, ICANN appointed an Independent Review 
Commission to evaluate how to constitute an Independent Review 
Panel responsible for reviewing ICANN policy decisions that 
allegedly violated ICANN’s commitments made within its 
foundational documents.228  Finally, and most significantly, in 
February 2002 ICANN’s President released a report calling for 
sweeping reforms of ICANN’s governance structure,229 in which 
he called for, among other things, an end to direct elections by 
Internet users of representatives to the Board of Directors230 and an 
abandonment of ICANN’s commitment to constitute an 
Independent Review Panel responsible for reviewing ICANN 
policy decisions.231  The President’s calls for these sweeping 
reforms in turn led to the appointment of an internal Committee on 
ICANN Evolution and Reform.232  The Committee, building upon 
                                                          
228 See text accompanying notes 218-20. 
229 M. Stuart Lynn, President's Report: ICANN – The Case for Reform 
(Feb. 24, 2002), at http://www.icann.org/general/lynn-reform-proposal-
24feb02.htm. 
230 See id. at 13-15 (“I have come to the conclusion that the concept of At 
Large membership elections from a self-selected pool of unknown voters 
is not just flawed, but fatally flawed, and that continued devotion of 
ICANN's very finite energy and resources down this path will very likely 
prevent the creation of an effective and viable institution.”) 
231 Id. (“The incipient Independent Review Panel has all the hallmarks of 
adding to this waste.”) 
232 See ICANN, Committee on ICANN Evolution and Reform, at 
http://www.icann.org/committees/evol-reform/.  See also ICANN, 
Preliminary Report Third Annual Meeting of the ICANN Board in 
Marina del Rey (Nov. 15, 2001), at http://www.icann.org/ 
minutes/prelim-report-15nov01.htm#01.132.  The Committee was 
initially charged with the issuance of recommendations regarding the 
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the recommendations of ICANN’s President, released its Final 
Implementation Report and Recommendations in October 2002, 
which was adopted by ICANN at its last meeting.233  During this 
same period, ICANN’s governance structure and policy-making 
has come under scrutiny from Congress and the Department of 
Commerce as ICANN’s continued authority over the Internet’s 
infrastructure was under consideration.234  An in-depth inquiry into 
ICANN’s governance structure is therefore particularly timely as 
ICANN’s governance structure is currently the focus of intense 
scrutiny from many quarters. 
                                                                                                                                 
following topics:  
First and foremost, a list of essential functions of ICANN, and a 
proposed mission statement for ICANN;  ensuring that ICANN 
decision-making takes proper account of the public interest in its 
activities; meaningful participation and input from informed 
Internet users participating through an At Large mechanism; the 
structured participation of all stakeholders in the organization's 
deliberations and decision-making, and in providing input for 
policy that guides the decisions; the ways the different 
components of any proposed structure will function together and 
interact; the system of checks and balances that will ensure both 
the effectiveness and the openness of the organization; the ways 
in and conditions under which essential components of any 
proposed structure that may not be able to be fully incorporated 
at the start of the reform process will be included when 
appropriate; and a description of a proposed transition process 
from the current structure to any recommended new structure, 
including a description of how the present components of 
ICANN relate to the new proposed structure, and the anticipated 
timetable for that transition. 
See id. 
233 See ICANN Preliminary Report, Meeting in Shanghai, 31 October 
2002, at http://www.icann.org/minutes/prelim-report-31oct02.-
htm#EvolutionandReform. 
234 ICANN Officers, Directors and other ICANN officials have been 
called to testify before Congress several times, most recently, on June 
12, 2002.  See U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science & 
Transportation, Hearing Statements -- Hearing on ICANN Governance, 
at http://commerce.senate.gov/hearings/hearings0202.htm. 
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1. Reforms Proposed Within The October 2002 Final 
Implementation Report and Recommendations 
 ICANN’s proposed reforms call for sweeping changes to 
ICANN’s governance structure that substantially undermine its 
commitment to embodying certain procedural norms of liberal 
democracy and that fail in any way to embody the substantive 
norms of liberal democracy.  Because these reforms represent a 
step in the wrong direction for ICANN, Congress and the 
Department of Commerce should look with a critical eye upon 
such proposed reforms, should insist that ICANN recommit itself 
to embodying the procedural norms of liberal democracy, and 
moreover, should require that ICANN’s governance structure 
embody certain substantive norms of liberal democracy as a 
precondition to ICANN’s continuing in its important public 
ordering role. 
 
 A. Abandonment of Commitment to Direct Election of 
Representatives to ICANN’s Board of Directors 
 The Committee on ICANN Evolution and Reform’s Final 
Implementation Report wholly abandons ICANN’s commitment to 
global direct elections by Internet users of the majority of 
representatives to the Board of Directors.  In place of direct 
elections, the Report proposes a “Nominating Committee” 
responsible for selecting eight of the 15 members to the Board.235 
Second, the Report substantially weakens ICANN’s earlier 
commitment to establish an Independent Review Panel that would 
be responsible for reviewing challenged ICANN decisions to 
determine whether they are in conformance with its Bylaws.236 
                                                          
235 The Nominating Committee is discussed in greater detail below.  The 
Board would also be composed of two directors selected by each of the 
three new Supporting Organizations and the President of ICANN as an 
ex officio Director.  See Proposed New Bylaws Recommended by the 
Committee on ICANN Evolution and Reform, at 
http://www.icann.org/committees/evol-reform/proposed-bylaws-
02oct02.htm [hereinafter PROPOSED BYLAWS], Art. VI. 
236 See PROPOSED BYLAWS, supra note 235, Art. IV, Section 3, Pars. 2 
and 3. 
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 The use of a Nominating Committee to select the majority 
of Board members – in lieu of having such Board members be 
directly elected by Internet users – seriously erodes ICANN’s 
commitment to being representative of and accountable to Internet 
users worldwide.  Under the proposed new Bylaws, the 
Nominating Committee would be composed of a group of 
delegates with eighteen voting and four non-voting members from 
various “constituencies.”237  Five of the voting delegates would be 
selected by the newly-established At Large Advisory Committee, 
while others would be appointed by constituencies such as a 
“small business users’ constituency”; a “large business users’ 
constituency”; an “intellectual property  constituency”; etc.238  The 
proposed Bylaws essentially leave unclear how any given 
constituency would be formed and recognized, as well as how such 
constituencies would select their delegate to the Nominating 
Committee (not to mention how the Nominating Committee would 
go about selecting members of the Board).   
The Report attempts to encompass and represent a diverse 
set of interests on matters implicated by ICANN decision-making 
by pre-determining these implicated constituencies.  While, as 
before, it might be argued that this pre-determination of interest 
groups is necessary to allow ICANN to encompass the multiplicity 
of interests necessary to impose meaningful checks on factional 
decision-making, by pre-determining such interests, this proposed 
structure makes it more difficult for affected interest groups to 
form the shifting coalitions necessary to protect effectively against 
faction.239  From a procedural democratic perspective, such pre-
                                                          
237 The Blueprint states that “the Nom Com would initially be a 19-
member body composed of delegates (not representatives) appointed by 
the following constituencies: gTLD registries; gTLD registrars; ccTLD 
registries; Address registries; Internet service providers; Large business 
users; Small business users; IP organizations; Academic and other public 
entities; Consumer and civil society groups; Individual domain name 
holders; IAB/IETF; TAC; GAC; Unaffiliated public interest persons.”  
In addition, there would be a Chair appointed by the Board and two non-
voting liaisons.  Id. at 13. 
238 See PROPOSED BYLAWS, supra note 235, Art. VII, Section 2. 
239 See text accompanying notes 135-37. 
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determined interest groups may bind the members of the Board 
elected by such groups too closely to the partial interests of the 
pre-determined interest groups that elected them.  
Second, the Report fails to include a vehicle for meaningful 
independent review of the ICANN Board’s decision-making.  In 
form, the Report improves upon the President’s recommendations 
by providing for an Independent Review Panel to check the 
Board’s decision-making against the Bylaws, while the President’s 
recommendations and the Interim Report abandoned the 
commitment to independent review.  The Proposed New Bylaws 
provide that, in addition to a reconsideration process through 
which the Board can be requested to reconsider its own decisions, 
affected persons can seek review of ICANN Board Decisions by 
an Independent Review Panel.240  There are several problems with 
the contemplated review process.  First, the Bylaws contemplate 
that the Independent Review Panel will be operated by “an 
international arbitration provider appointed from time to time by 
ICANN . . . .”241  ICANN’s Board thus has the incentive to choose 
in the first instance an international arbitration provider (such as 
the World Intellectual Property Organization) that will be reticent 
to overrule the Board.  Second, ICANN will have an incentive to 
remove or decline to reappoint any such international arbitration 
provider that overrules a decision of the ICANN Board.  Because 
such providers are to be appointed by ICANN “from time to time,” 
there appear to be no obstacles to ICANN’s removing a provider at 
will.  Third, the Bylaws provide that independent review by such 
an international arbitration provider shall be on a loser pays 
basis.242  While such fee-shifting systems arguably have merit in 
proceedings in which monetary relief is reasonably anticipated, 
such systems unreasonably skew litigants’ incentives when the 
only relief available is injunctive, as here.243 Since the costs 
                                                          
240 See PROPOSED BYLAWS, supra note 235, Art. IV, Section 3, Pars. 2 
and 3.   
241 See id., Art. IV, Section 3, Par. 4. 
242 Id. 
243 The Bylaws grant the IRP the authority to “declare whether an action 
or inaction of the Board was inconsistent with the Articles of 
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associated with an international arbitration panel may be quite 
high, this loser pays system will likely impose a substantial 
disincentive to bringing challenges to ICANN’s decision-making.     
In short, ICANN’s initial and fundamental commitment to 
take into account the preferences of Internet users affected by its 
decision-making is seriously eroded by the Final Report’s 
recommendation to abandon direct elections by Internet users of 
Board members and replace this system with the selection of those 
Board members by an unelected Nominating Committee that 
predetermines a set of interest groups in a manner that will likely 
be ineffective in checking factional decision-making.  
Furthermore, the method by which the proposed new Bylaws 
would implement a system of independent review of ICANN’s 
decision-making seriously undermines ICANN’s earlier 
commitment to meaningful independent review of its decision-
making. The Report therefore marks a substantial retreat from 
ICANN’s initial commitments to embodying the procedural 
normative ideals of liberal democracy and reflects a step in the 
wrong direction for ICANN’s governance structure.   Moreover, 
the Report fails in any way to embody the substantive norms of 
liberal democracy, the most relevant of which, for our purposes, is 
freedom of expression. The Internet community and the 
Department of Commerce should reject the proposals embodied in 
the Report that weaken ICANN’s commitment to the procedural 
ideals of liberal democracy and should insist that ICANN 
recommit meaningfully to embodying such procedural norms.  
Furthermore, ICANN should be required to embody the 
substantive democratic norm of freedom of expression within its 
foundational documents.  
Even if ICANN were perfectly to embody the procedural 
democratic norms of political equality, representation, and 
deliberation, the embodiment of such procedural democratic norms 
would not exhaust ICANN’s normative obligations.  In order to 
                                                                                                                                 
Incorporation or the Bylaws,” see PROPOSED BYLAWS, supra note 235, 
Art. V, Sec. 3, Par. 8b, but the IRP apparently does not have the 
authority to grant any monetary relief to one challenging ICANN’s 
policy-making. 
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protect Internet users’ fundamental individual rights – most 
importantly, the right of freedom of expression – ICANN’s 
governance structure must be reformed to incorporate meaningful 
protections for Internet users’ right to freedom of expression.  As 
we have seen,244 even a democratic system that perfectly embodied 
the procedural norms of liberal democracy would still need to 
secure special protections for fundamental rights such as freedom 
of speech.  Toward that end, in the next Part, I explain how 
ICANN’s governance structure should be revised to incorporate 
special protections for the fundamental right of freedom of 
expression.  
 
V. REVISING ICANN’S GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE TO INCORPORATE 
THE SUBSTANTIVE LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC NORM OF FREEDOM OF 
EXPRESSION 
 
ICANN’s governance structure, while subject to substantial 
revision, at best has reflected only the procedural norms of liberal 
democracy – namely political equality, representation over an 
extended sphere, and deliberation within its decision-making.  
While ICANN should be called upon to recommit its governance 
structure to embodying these procedural democratic norms,245 such 
a recommitment is necessary but not sufficient to protecting 
Internet users’ fundamental rights.  Because ICANN enjoys the 
power to enact policies affecting speech within the most important 
public forum for expression ever created, ICANN must be held not 
only to the procedural norms of liberal democracy, but also to the 
substantive norms of liberal democracy.  Specifically, ICANN 
must be called upon to embody the substantive democratic norm of 
freedom of expression within its governance structure and policy-
making.  In according special protection for freedom of 
expression, ICANN should learn from the ways in which the 
United States --  a liberal democracy with a long-term commitment 
to protecting freedom of expression – has implemented this 
commitment.   
                                                          
244 See text accompanying notes 146-50. 
245 See supra Part IV(D). 
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A. Implementing Special Protections for Freedom of 
Expression within ICANN’s  Foundational Documents 
Secured by Independent Judicial Review 
 
The United States experience teaches that merely 
embodying the procedural democratic norm of political equality 
may not suffice to secure freedom of expression, and that therefore 
special protections for free speech are necessary.  Such protections 
should be embodied within a government’s foundational 
documents and secured by independent review of legislation 
affecting speech.  ICANN’s original foundational documents, as 
examined above, embody a commitment to the procedural 
democratic norms of representation and deliberation.  Its Bylaws 
commit ICANN to representation of Internet users affected by its 
decision-making along both functional and geographic lines and to 
facilitating meaningful deliberation and public participation within 
its decision-making.  ICANN’s founders, however, failed to 
incorporate within its foundational documents any commitments to 
the substantive democratic norms integral to liberal democracy, 
most importantly, the substantive democratic norm of freedom of 
expression.  Because ICANN has the power to enact regulations 
affecting speech, ICANN’s foundational documents should be 
amended to embody an explicit commitment to protecting the 
substantive democratic norm of freedom of expression. 
Specifically, the enumeration of ICANN’s general powers and 
limitations on ICANN’s powers set forth within ICANN’s Bylaws 
should commit ICANN to refrain from acting in such a way so as 
to abridge Internet users’ freedom of expression.  A provision 
should be added to the section of ICANN’s Bylaws setting forth 
limitations on its powers,246 with language to the following effect: 
  
ICANN, in developing and applying its standards, policies, 
procedures, or practices, should not act in such a way as to 
abridge Internet users’ freedom of expression.   
                                                          
246 See BYLAWS, supra note 198, Art. IV(1)(B),(C) (setting forth 
limitations on ICANN’s powers). 
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In order to render meaningful this commitment to 
protecting freedom of expression – along with its commitments to 
procedural democratic norms embodied within its foundational 
documents – ICANN should make good on its promise to 
constitute meaningful independent review by an Independent 
Review Panel.247  The Independent Review Panel should be 
appointed and serve in a manner that is independent of ICANN’s 
Board of Directors  -- rather than being appointed by and serving 
solely at the pleasure of the ICANN Board.  
Upon incorporating special protection for freedom of 
expression within its foundational documents and securing 
enforcement of such protections via a meaningful independent 
review process, ICANN’s appropriate policy-making bodies 
should revise its speech-regarding policies to render them 
protective of Internet users’ freedom of expression.  In so doing, 
ICANN should conform its policy-making to the general principle 
of First Amendment jurisprudence that any regulation that restricts 
speech must serve an articulated and important purpose and must 
advance this purpose in such a way as to restrict the least speech 
possible.248  Furthermore, ICANN should accord meaningful 
protection for two types of countermajoritarian speech that would 
otherwise be rendered particularly vulnerable within democracies -
- anonymous speech and critical speech.  In particular, ICANN 
should revise its policy prohibiting the anonymous registration and 
maintenance of websites, which restricts individuals’ right to 
engage in anonymous speech on the Internet, to render this policy 
narrowly tailored to an important, articulated ICANN interest.  
ICANN should also revise its policy for resolving disputes 
between trademark owners and domain name holders, which 
restricts individuals’ right to engage in critical expression on the 
Internet, to render this policy narrowly tailored to an important, 
articulated ICANN interest.   
 
                                                          
247 See supra Part IV(C)(3). 
248 See, e.g., Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 117 S.Ct. 2329 
(1997). 
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B. Embodying the Right to Freedom of Expression within ICANN’s 
Policy-Making: Lessons from First Amendment Protections for 
Anonymous Speech 
As discussed above, ICANN presently has in effect a 
mandatory policy that prohibits Internet users from anonymously 
registering and maintaining a website.249  As a prerequisite for 
registering and maintaining a domain name -- and a website 
available at that domain name -- an individual must reveal to her 
domain name registrar her name and mailing address, as well as a 
host of other contact information, and must also consent to the 
publication of such personal information.  ICANN requires all 
domain name registrars to collect and publicize the names, 
addresses, and other contact information of everyone who 
maintains a website.  This policy restricts Internet users’ free 
speech rights by imposing substantial burdens on their ability to 
speak and to publish anonymously on the Internet.  A 
consideration of the United States’ anonymous speech 
jurisprudence illuminates the importance of protecting speakers’ 
anonymity, which is an integral component of the right to free 
speech. 
Protecting the right to express oneself anonymously250 has 
been an important component of American free speech 
jurisprudence since the founding.  Throughout the history of the 
United States251 -- and indeed critical to its formation and 
                                                          
249 See text accompanying notes 46-60. 
250 My use of the term “anonymous” includes not only speech with no 
attribution of authorship, but also speech with a pseudonymous 
attribution of authorship (such as THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, which the 
true authors -- Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay – 
chose to publish pseudonymously under the name of "Publius," a 
pseudonym that referred to Publius Valerius Publicola, a defender of the 
ancient Roman Republic.  See, e.g., MARTIN DIAMOND, THE 
FEDERALISTS, in HISTORY OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 573 (Leo Strauss 
& Joseph Cropsey, eds., 1963)). 
251 Justice Clarence Thomas summarizes relevant aspects of this history 
in his concurrence in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission: 
There is little doubt that the Framers engaged in 
anonymous political writing.  The essays in the Federalist 
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development as a liberal democracy -- the right of publishers and 
authors to remain anonymous has served as an important 
component of the First Amendment right to freedom of speech and 
of the press.252  Protecting the anonymity of publishers and authors 
serves two fundamental speech-protective purposes: First, 
protecting speakers’ anonymity allows the content of a speaker’s 
                                                                                                                                 
Papers, published under the pseudonym of Publius, are only the 
most famous example of the outpouring of anonymous political 
writing that occurred during the ratification of the Constitution.  . 
. . The earliest and most famous American experience with 
freedom of the press, the 1735 Zenger trial, centered around 
anonymous political pamphlets.  The case involved a printer, 
John Peter Zenger, who refused to reveal the anonymous authors 
of published attacks on the Crown governor of New York.  
When the governor and his council could not discover the 
identity of the authors, they prosecuted Zenger himself for 
seditious libel.  See J. ALEXANDER, A BRIEF NARRATIVE OF THE 
CASE AND TRIAL OF JOHN PETER ZENGER 9-19 (S. Katz ed. 
1972).  The case . . . signified at an early moment the extent to 
which anonymity and the freedom of the press were intertwined 
in the early American mind.   
During the Revolutionary and Ratification periods, the 
Framers' understanding of the relationship between anonymity 
and freedom of the press became more explicit.  In 1779, for 
example, the Continental Congress attempted to discover the 
identity of an anonymous article in the Pennsylvania Packet 
signed by the name Leonidas.  Leonidas, who actually was Dr. 
Benjamin Rush, had attacked the members of Congress for 
causing inflation throughout the States and for engaging in 
embezzlement and fraud.  13 LETTERS OF DELEGATES TO 
CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 141 n. 1 (G. Gawalt & R. Gephart eds. 
1986).  Elbridge Gerry, a delegate from Massachusetts, moved to 
haul the printer of the newspaper before Congress to answer 
questions concerning Leonidas.  Several members of Congress 
then rose to oppose Gerry's motion on the ground that it invaded 
the freedom of the press.  D. Teeter, Press Freedom and the 
Public Printing: Pennsylvania, 1775-83, 45 JOURNALISM Q. 
445, 451 (1968). 
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 350 (1995). 
252 See text accompanying notes 253-73. 
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message to be evaluated on its merits instead of in the context of 
the identity or reputation of the author.253  Second, and 
concomitantly, protecting speakers’ anonymity allows proponents 
of unpopular positions or causes to express their views without 
fear of personal reprisal.254  As such, the protection of anonymous 
speech is critical to fulfilling the countermajoritarian function of 
the First Amendment by insulating speakers of unpopular 
messages from the potential threat of reprisal.  As the Supreme 
Court explained in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission,255 
drawing from the theory of free speech protection set forth by John 
Stuart Mill in ON LIBERTY256: 
 
Anonymous speech is not a pernicious, fraudulent practice, but 
an honorable tradition of advocacy and dissent.  Anonymity is 
a shield from tyranny of the majority.  It thus exemplifies the 
purpose behind the Bill of Rights, and of the First Amendment 
in particular: to protect unpopular individuals from retaliation 
– and their ideas from suppression – at the hand of an 
intolerant society.257   
 
If a speaker’s anonymity were not protected, advocates of 
unpopular ideas would often be dissuaded from speaking, thereby 
impoverishing the marketplace of ideas.  As Justice Hugo Black 
explained Talley v. California,258 “persecuted groups and sects 
from time to time throughout history have been able to criticize 
                                                          
253 See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995) 
(“Anonymity provides a way for a writer who may be personally 
unpopular to ensure that readers will not prejudge her message simply 
because they do not like its proponent.”); Lee Tien, Who’s Afraid of 
Anonymous Speech? McIntyre and The Internet, 75 OR. L. REV. 117, 144 
(1996). 
254 See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 374; Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 
(1960); Tien, supra note 253, at 144 (observing that “one obvious cost of 
regulating anonymity is potential retaliation against the speaker.”) 
255 514 U.S. 334 (1995). 
256 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859). 
257 514 U.S. at 347. 
258 362 U.S. 60 (1960). 
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oppressive practices and laws either anonymously or not at all.”259   
The protection for anonymous speech is thus a critical component 
of an expressive public forum in which individuals can share their 
opinions with others free of personal reprisal, and have their 
opinions be evaluated on their own merits.  As Robert Post 
contends, First Amendment jurisprudence reflects an affirmative 
preference for anonymous speech in the public sphere, to allow 
speakers to “divorce their speech from the social contextualization 
that knowledge of their identities would necessarily create in the 
minds of their audience.”260 
Although the justifications for protecting anonymous 
speech are arguably strongest with respect to political speech, the 
First Amendment’s protections for anonymous speech extend 
beyond highly-valued political speech to other types of speech as 
well.  As the Supreme Court explained in McIntyre: 
 
Anonymous pamphlets, leaflets, brochures, and even books 
have played an important role in the progress of mankind. . 
. . The author’s decision in favor of anonymity may be 
motivated by fear of economic or official retaliation, by 
concern about social ostracism, or merely by a desire to 
preserve as much of one’s privacy as possible.  Whatever 
the motivation may be, . . . the interest in having 
anonymous works enter the marketplace of ideas 
unquestionably outweighs any public interest in requiring 
disclosure as a condition of entry.   Accordingly, an 
author’s decision to remain anonymous, like other 
decisions concerning omissions or additions to the content 
of a publication, is an aspect of the freedom of speech 
                                                          
259 362 U.S. at 64.  See Tien, supra note 253, at 128-29 (explaining that 
McIntyre is about “fear of viewpoint discrimination, because anonymity 
is historically tied to the ability of the unpopular and persecuted to 
criticize oppressive practices and laws.”) 
260 See Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse, 
103 HARV. L. REV. 603 (1990).  See also Seth F. Kreimer, Sunlight, 
Secrets, and Scarlet Letters: The Tension between Privacy and 
Disclosure in Constitutional Law, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1991).  
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protected by the First Amendment.261 
 
Anonymity thus protects an author’s prerogative in defining how 
to present her ideas to the world.  As such, anonymity “safeguards 
the ability independently to define one’s identity that is central to 
any concept of liberty.”262 
 Notwithstanding the importance of protecting anonymous 
expression, legislatures over the centuries have attempted to erode 
this protection and compel the disclosure of the speakers’ and 
publishers’ identities in the name of various countervailing 
interests.263  For example, in McIntyre, the legislature sought to 
justify a prohibition on the anonymous distribution of campaign 
literature on the grounds, inter alia, that compelling disclosure of 
speakers’ identities was necessary to prevent fraud and libel.264   
While recognizing the importance of such state interests, the 
Supreme Court found that the state had sufficient means of directly 
protecting against fraud and libel in the relevant contexts, and that 
the state’s ban on anonymous campaign literature was an indirect 
and insufficiently narrowly tailored means of advancing these 
important state interests.265  While the state’s interest in preventing 
fraud and libel might justify a more limited disclosure 
requirement,266 the Supreme Court found that State’s total ban on 
anonymous pamphleteering was unjustified.267 
Similarly, in the recently-decided case of Watchtower Bible 
and Tract Society of New York v. Village of Stratton,268 the 
Supreme Court rejected the locality’s justification for mandating 
disclosure of the identity and affiliation of door-to-door 
canvassers.  In Watchtower, the Village of Stratton, Ohio, 
attempted to justify this disclosure requirement, inter alia, on the 
                                                          
261 514 U.S. at 340. 
262 Tien, supra note 253, at 123. 
263 See text accompanying notes 264-69. 
264 Id. at 342. 
265 Id. at 344. 
266 Id. 
267 Id.  
268 No. 00-1737,  ___ S.Ct. ___ (2002). 
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grounds of preventing fraud and crime.  The Supreme Court found 
that the complete ban on anonymous door-to-door canvassing that 
the regulation effected – which applied not only to commercial 
transactions and to the solicitation of funds, but also to religious 
and political canvassers and others seeking to enlist support for 
their causes – was insufficiently narrowly tailored to advance the 
locality’s important interests.  Accordingly, the locality’s total ban 
on anonymous door-to-door canvassing was found to be 
unjustified and its mandatory disclosure requirement for door-to-
door canvassers was invalidated.269     
The First Amendment right to speak anonymously has also 
been specifically recognized in the context of Internet 
communications.270  In a case that involved the right to speak 
anonymously in the specific context of Internet communications, 
the State of Georgia was found to have run afoul of the First 
Amendment in attempting to prohibit all anonymous and 
pseudonymous Internet communications.  In Zell v. Miller,271 
Georgia made it a crime falsely to identify one’s name (and hence 
to communicate pseudonymously or anonymously) for the purpose 
of electronically transmitting data, such as via email.  Relying 
upon McIntyre, the court struck down this statute, holding that it 
impermissibly burdened the constitutional “right to communicate 
anonymously and pseudonymously over the Internet.”272  While 
crediting the state’s compelling interest in preventing fraud in 
                                                          
269 Id. 
270 See Zell v. Miller, 977 F. Supp. 1228 (N. D. Ga. 1997); American 
Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 831 (1996) 
(recognizing importance of online anonymity to speakers who seek 
access to sensitive information), aff’d, 117 S.Ct. 2329 (1997).  See also 
Anne W. Branscomb, Anonymity, Autonomy, and Accountability: 
Challenges to the First Amendment in Cyberspaces, 104 YALE L.J. 1639 
(1995); A. Michael Froomkin, Anonymity and Its Enmities, 1995 J. 
ONLINE L. art. 4 (1995); George P. Long III, Comment, Who Are You?: 
Identity and Anonymity in Cyberspace, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 1177 (1994); 
David Post, Pooling Intellectual Capital: Anonymity, Pseudonymity, and 
Contingent Identity in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139. 
271 977 F. Supp. 1228 (N. D. Ga. 1997). 
272 Id. at 1232. 
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Internet communications,273 the court nevertheless found that the 
statute’s blanket prohibition on anonymous and pseudonymous 
Internet communications was not narrowly tailored to advance this 
compelling state interest.  
 Because of the important role anonymous speech serves 
within expressive forums – which in turn are integral to democratic 
governments -- ICANN should, in re-evaluating its policies to 
accord meaningful protection for freedom of expression, revise its 
policy requiring domain name holders publicly to disclose their 
names and addresses.  While protecting anonymous Internet 
speech is clearly an important component of free speech within the 
United States, it is arguably even more important for ICANN to 
protect the identity of speakers from countries that are more 
inclined to retaliate against speakers based on the ideas they 
express.  In its brief history, the Internet’s role in facilitating 
anonymous speech, through the use of encryption and related 
technologies, has been critical to enabling speakers from foreign 
countries to express themselves without fear of reprisal.274  In 
embodying meaningful protection for the substantive democratic 
value of freedom of expression while advancing its other important 
interests, ICANN should accord as much protection as possible for 
anonymous Internet speech.  In reformulating its WHOIS policy, 
ICANN should conform its policymaking to the general principle 
of First Amendment jurisprudence requiring it to articulate an 
important interest that it seeks to advance by this policy and 
formulate the policy such that it restricts the least amount of 
speech possible consistent with the advancement of this interest.275  
Below I provide some suggestions as to how ICANN could 
conform its policymaking to this general First Amendment 
principle.   
As is typical of efforts to compel disclosure of speakers’ 
                                                          
273 Id. 
274 See, e.g., Geoffrey Gordon, Note, Breaking the Code: What 
Encryption Means for the First Amendment and Human Rights, 32 
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 477 (2001). 
275 See text accompanying notes 280-89. 
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identities,276 ICANN’s mandatory disclosure requirement flows 
out of legitimate (and perhaps even compelling) interests – the 
interest in facilitating intellectual property owners’ policing of 
infringing use of their intellectual property on the Internet.277  
Intellectual property owners lobbied, and have continued to lobby, 
for a mandatory policy requiring disclosure and publication of 
website owners’ names, addresses, and other personal contact 
information because such disclosure and publication would 
facilitate the policing and apprehension of alleged infringers.278  If 
a copyright or trademark owner believes that a website infringes 
her content, for example, under ICANN’s current policy, she can 
simply query the WHOIS database to discern the name and address 
of the individual responsible for such content,279 and commence 
steps to seek a judicial order requiring such infringing content to 
be removed.  Yet, as with other efforts to require disclosure of the 
identity of speakers that are motivated by important interests, 
ICANN’s policy is insufficiently protective of Internet users’ free 
speech rights and should be revised to render it more carefully 
tailored to advancing the important interest of facilitating the 
policing of infringing conduct while restricting the least amount of 
speech possible. 
 There are several ways in which ICANN could render its 
WHOIS policy more speech-protective while still advancing the 
interest of policing infringing content on the Internet.  First, 
ICANN could require that those interested in registering a domain 
name and maintaining a website merely provide their e-mail 
address – instead of their name and (physical) address – to their 
                                                          
276 See text accompanying notes 264-73. 
277 See WHITE PAPER, supra note 28, at 31,744.  ICANN’s Domain 
Name Supporting Organization’s Intellectual Property Constituency, for 
example, has forcefully argued that intellectual property owners must 
have access to domain name registrants’ contact information in order to 
police infringement of their intellectual property.  See, e.g., Matters 
Related to WHOIS, DNSO Intellectual Property Constituency, at 
http://ipc.songbird.com/whois_paper.html. 
278 See, e.g., Matters Related to WHOIS, DNSO Intellectual Property 
Constituency, at http://ipc.songbird.com/whois_paper.html. 
279 See text accompanying note 60. 
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domain name registrar.  The registrant’s email address would 
provide a pseudonymous form behind which the speaker could 
shield her identity if she so chose, but would still provide a point 
of contact for each domain name registrant.  Thus, instead of 
requiring the domain name registrant of GEORGEWBUSH-IS-A-
MURDERER.COM or SADDAM-IS-A-MURDERER.COM to reveal to the 
public his or her true identity, ICANN could merely require that 
the domain name registrant provide a valid email address by way 
of contact information.  Requiring only an e-mail address as 
contact information would serve the purpose of enabling 
intellectual property owners (or others who believe their rights 
were infringed) to contact the domain name registrant and 
undertake initial steps (such as sending a cease and desist notice) 
to inform the registrant of the allegation of infringement.280 
 Under this email-only scenario, if a rights holder alleged 
that his or her intellectual property rights were being infringed by a 
domain name holder -- about which the only information readily 
available was an email address -- the rights holder would still have 
several powerful remedies readily available to her.  A copyright 
owner who claims that her rights were infringed by the content on 
a particular website could bring an action under Section 512 of the 
Copyright Act,281 through which she could essentially compel the 
                                                          
280 Email addresses would also serve as sufficient contact information for 
other purposes, such as if the domain name registrar needed to inform the 
domain name registrant of a proposed change in the terms of the 
agreement, or if another individual or entity interested in purchasing the 
rights to the domain name wished to contact the domain name holder.   
281 17 U.S.C. § 512.  Section 512’s notice and take down provisions 
allow an owner of a copyrighted work who believes her work is 
infringed by the content on a website to request the Internet Service 
Provider (ISP) hosting the website to take down the material.  The ISP 
must take down the allegedly infringing material in order to avoid being 
held directly, contributorily or vicariously liable for copyright 
infringement based on hosting (or linking to) the allegedly infringing 
content.  When complaining of the infringement to the ISP, the copyright 
owner need not identify the infringing party.  Rather, it suffices under the 
statutory scheme for her to “identify the material that is claimed to be 
infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity and that is to be 
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Internet Service Provider hosting the allegedly infringing content 
to take it down – without needing to know the identity of the 
alleged infringer.282  Similarly, a trademark owner who alleges that 
a domain name holder is infringing her trademark could bring an 
action under ICANN’s Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy283 or 
under the in rem provisions of the Anticybersquatting Consumer 
Protection Act284 to have the allegedly infringing domain name 
cancelled or transferred, again without needing to know the true 
identity of the domain name registrant.   
 It might be objected that access to mere email addresses 
insufficiently accommodates the intellectual property owner or 
other rights holder who wishes to sue a domain name holder for 
violating her intellectual property or other rights, and that 
ICANN’s current policy requiring public access to domain name 
holders’ names and addresses is necessary to facilitate such 
interests.  There are, however, several possibilities short of 
ICANN’s current mandatory disclosure and publication policy that 
would accommodate the interests of rights holders while still being 
more protective of free speech.  ICANN could, for example, 
require that domain name registrants provide to their domain name 
registrar their email address as well as their name and physical 
address, but only allow (or require) registrars to publish the 
domain name holders’ email address.  Under this scenario, the 
domain name registrar would maintain (1) a publicly searchable 
database correlating domain names with email addresses of 
domain name holders, and (2) a confidential database correlating 
domain names with names and addresses of domain name holders 
that would only be accessible upon a heightened showing.   Upon a 
                                                                                                                                 
removed or access to which is to be disabled, and information reasonably 
sufficient to permit the service provider to locate the material.”  17 
U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(iii).  Section 512 also provides a mechanism for 
the copyright owner to secure a subpoena to order the ISP to disclose the 
identity of the alleged direct infringer.  See § 512(i). 
282 See, e.g., A&M Records v. Napster, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
283 See supra Part II(C). 
284 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A) (setting forth circumstances under 
which a trademark owner can bring an in rem action against a domain 
name itself). 
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proper heightened showing by a rights holder – such as, at a 
minimum, filing a legitimate complaint against a domain name 
holder and providing a copy of the same to the domain name 
registrar – the domain name registrar could then be required to 
reveal the identity of the domain name registrant to the rights 
holder for purposes of the latter’s prosecuting the lawsuit only.   
 United States courts’ recent efforts to balance Internet 
users’ right to communicate anonymously against other 
individuals’ property, reputational, and privacy rights are 
instructive for ICANN in reworking this policy to achieve a 
balance between the rights of Internet users to speak and publish 
anonymously and other rights holders’ interests.   In a series of 
recent cases in which plaintiffs alleged that they were defamed by 
anonymous postings to web-based forums and sought to discover 
the identities of the individuals responsible for such postings from 
the relevant Internet Service Providers, courts have imposed 
stringent requirements on plaintiffs’ efforts to discover the 
identities of such individuals.  For example, in Doe v. 
2TheMart.com,285 the plaintiff, who claimed that she was defamed 
by an anonymous post, sought to discover from the ISP the identity 
of an alleged defamatory poster.  The court looked critically at 
plaintiff’s allegations of defamation and imposed stringent 
standards on plaintiff’s ability to discover the poster’s identity, in 
order to protect the poster’s right to engage in anonymous speech.  
Holding that “discovery requests seeking to identify anonymous 
Internet users must be subject to careful scrutiny by the courts,”286 
the court set forth a multifactor test287 for evaluating whether 
plaintiff’s need for such information outweighed the poster’s right 
                                                          
285 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (W.D. Wash. 2001),  
286 Id. at 1092. 
287 Id. Under this four part test, the court will inquire into the following 
factors in considering whether a subpoena for the identity of non-party 
Internet speakers should be upheld: “(1) Was the subpoena brought in 
good faith? (2) Does the information relate to a core claim or defense? 
(3) Is the identifying information directly and materially relevant to that 
claim or defense? (4) Is the information available from other sources?”  
Id. at 1092.  
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to speak anonymously.   Only upon satisfying this heightened 
showing would plaintiff’s right to access such information in order 
to prosecute her defamation action be found to outweigh 
defendant’s right to speak anonymously.288  Courts have imposed 
close scrutiny in several other recent cases on requests to discover 
the identity of individuals who allegedly violated plaintiffs’ 
rights.289   
 In short, American free speech jurisprudence has for 
centuries recognized the importance of protecting speakers’ 
anonymity as an integral component of the right to freedom of 
expression.  Such jurisprudence is illuminative for ICANN in 
revising its policies for acquiring domain names (and hence 
websites) to render them less restrictive of speech, while still 
advancing ICANN’s interest in facilitating the policing of 
infringement. 
 
C. Embodying the Right to Freedom of Expression within ICANN’s 
Policy-Making: Lessons from First Amendment Protections for 
Critical Speech 
 American First Amendment jurisprudence also provides 
helpful guidance for ICANN regarding the protection of critical 
speech within the context of intellectual property law.  An 
important function of intellectual property law in liberal 
democracies is to prevent intellectual property owners from 
exercising full monopoly control over components of the common 
language or culture, in particular in cases of criticism leveled 
against such intellectual property owners.290  The United States 
government has long wrestled not only with protection for free 
expression in general but also with such protection within the 
context of intellectual property law -- and as against competing 
claims by intellectual property owners.  Accordingly, United 
                                                          
288 Id. 
289 See, e.g., Dendrite Int’l Inc. v. Doe, 342 N.J. Super 134 (App. Div. 
2001); Global Telemedia Int’l v. Doe, 132 F. Supp. 2d 1261 (C. D. Cal. 
2001). 
290 See, e.g., Neil Weinstock Netanel, Market Hierarchy and Copyright 
in Our System of Free Expression, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1879 (2000).  
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States intellectual property law reflects a nuanced working out of 
the ways in which free speech values are protected against 
overreaching by intellectual property owners. 
 Several important branches of intellectual property law, 
including copyright law291 and trademark law,292 impose 
substantial limitations on intellectual property owners’ exclusive 
monopoly rights in their intellectual property in order to advance 
free speech values.293  Recognizing the dangers to free speech 
implicit in granting intellectual property owners unlimited 
monopoly rights over components of our shared language and 
culture, U.S. copyright and trademark law reflects a balance of 
competing intellectual property rights and free speech rights.  
Indeed, both the federal copyright and trademark statutes provide 
explicit exceptions to their coverage for uses of copyrighted works 
and trademarks that are in the nature of criticism, commentary, and 
other bona fide expression.294  Because ICANN’s policy-making 
primarily affects trademark and cognate branches of intellectual 
property, I focus below on guidance that United States trademark 
jurisprudence provides in according special protections for 
freedom of expression.  
                                                          
291 See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 
U.S. 539 (1985) (copyright law's idea/expression dichotomy "strike[s] a 
definitional balance between the First Amendment and the Copyright 
Act by permitting free communication of facts [and ideas] while still 
protecting an author's expression.”); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating 
Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1 
(2001). 
292 See text accompanying notes 303-85. 
293 See, e.g., Michael K. Cantwell, Confusion, Dilution, and Speech: 
First Amendment Limitations on the Trademark Estate, 87 TRADEMARK 
REP. 48 (1997) (comparing First Amendment limitations on copyright 
and trademark holders’ rights).   
294 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4)(c) (providing exception from coverage of 
federal trademark causes of action for “all forms of news reporting and 
commentary”); 17 U.S.C. § 107 (including “criticism” and “comment” 
among purposes tending to establish fair use of another’s copyrighted 
work). 
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 U.S. trademark law, codified in the Lanham Act295 and 
under various state statutes,296 provides trademark owners with the 
limited exclusive right to use their marks (such as “McDonalds” or 
“Barbie”) in commerce to designate the source or origin of their 
products or services.  The Lanham Act, along with various state 
statutes, provide trademark owners with a cause of action for 
trademark infringement against one who uses their trademark in 
commerce to designate source or origin or where such use is likely 
to cause confusion, mistake, or to deceive as to affiliation or 
sponsorship.297  The Federal Trademark Dilution Act,298 as well as 
various state anti-dilution statutes,299 further provide to owners of 
marks the right to prevent the dilution of their marks – i.e., the 
reduction of their marks’ capacity to identify and distinguish their 
goods or services – via tarnishment300 or blurring301 (such as the 
use of the mark “Barbie” in connection with a pornographic 
website).  Finally, the recently-enacted Anticybersquatting 
Consumer Protection Act302 provides to owners of marks the right 
to prevent the bad faith use of a domain name that is identical to, 
confusingly similar to, or dilutive of the owner’s mark. 
The First Amendment requires that trademark owners’ 
rights in their marks not extend to silence others’ speech that is 
expressive,303 so long as such speech is not likely to cause 
confusion as to source and is not dilutive of the mark’s 
identificatory power.   In many cases in which trademark interests 
have been pitted against free speech interests, courts have properly 
held that the extension of trademark infringement and/or dilution 
law to silence use of a trademark for expressive or communicative 
purposes such as criticism, commentary, parody, or satire, is 
                                                          
295 15 U.S.C. § 1125. 
296 See, e.g., J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION (1984) [hereinafter MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS]. 
297 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). 
298 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d). 
299 See, e.g., MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 296. 
300 See id. at 419. 
301 Id. 
302 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d). 
303 See text accompanying notes 308-53. 
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violative of the right to free speech embodied in the First 
Amendment.304  Furthermore, in the Anticybersquatting Consumer 
Protection Act – which was enacted to address the same conflicts 
between trademark owners and domain name owners as ICANN’s 
Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy – Congress and the courts 
clearly recognized that Internet users’ free speech rights impose 
significant limitations on overreaching by trademark owners in this 
context.305  Over the years, as trademark owners have sought to 
wield their trademarks to silence criticism directed at them or other 
unwelcome use of their marks, courts have construed the First 
Amendment to protect such speech against trademark 
infringement, dilution, and cybersquatting claims.306  Although 
free speech interests have not always prevailed over trademark 
interests in such cases,307 the First Amendment has nonetheless 
served as a powerful check on trademark owners’ monopoly rights 
over expressive speech incorporating their marks. 
The cause of action for trademark infringement per se, as 
distinct from trademark dilution, has often been unavailing to 
trademark owners in their attempts to silence expressive uses of 
their marks.  Where another entity makes use of a plaintiff’s 
trademark for truly expressive or communicative purposes, 
plaintiffs have had difficulty establishing a key element of 
trademark infringement -- the likelihood of confusion as to 
plaintiff’s sponsorship or endorsement of such speech.308  In many 
cases in which defendants used plaintiffs’ marks to communicate a 
message – including but not limited to messages that are critical of 
plaintiffs – courts have held that the trademark owner failed to 
meet its burden of establishing likelihood of confusion,309 and have 
                                                          
304 Id. 
305 See text accompanying notes 364-66. 
306 See text accompanying notes 308-85. 
307 See infra. 
308 See Cantwell, supra note 293, at 57 (observing that “a separate First 
Amendment defense to an infringement claim will generally not be 
necessary to protect expressive speech so long as courts objectively 
analyze the likelihood of confusion issues.”) 
309 See text accompanying notes 311-15. 
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accordingly found it unnecessary to rely upon the First 
Amendment in order to protect defendants’ expressive use.310  The 
Reddy Kilowatt311 case is instructive on this point.  In that case, the 
trademark owner of the cartoon character Reddy Kilowatt, which 
was used as a promotional device for electrical utilities, sued an 
environmental organization that had fashioned a mocking 
caricature of the cartoon character in order to criticize the 
electrical utilities’ policies in its mailings.  Upon holding that there 
was no likelihood of confusion between defendant’s use and 
plaintiff, the court threw out plaintiff’s trademark infringement 
action.  Because plaintiff could not show likelihood of confusion, 
defendant’s First Amendment defense to trademark infringement 
was irrelevant.312 The court’s analysis of defendant’s First 
Amendment defense was therefore unnecessary, because no 
likelihood of confusion was found in the first place.313  In a similar 
case, a court held that the United States government’s exclusive 
rights in the name and character “Smokey Bear” must yield to 
permit an environmental group to sponsor an advertisement 
involving the use of Smokey to criticize the U.S. Forest Service’s 
                                                          
310 See generally Cantwell, supra note 293, at 49 (“In theory, limiting 
recovery to confusing uses of a trademark would seem to adequately 
protect free speech interests, for the First Amendment has no stake in the 
spread of misleading information.); Robert C. Denicola, Trademarks as 
Speech: Constitutional Implications of the Emerging Rationales for the 
Protection of Trade Symbols, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 158, 165 (where 
defendant’s use of plaintiff’s trademark is deceptive or misleading, First 
Amendment provides no defense to claim of trademark infringement and 
accordingly “traditional trademark theory, with is reliance on the 
confusion rationale, poses no threat to freedom of expression.”) 
311 Reddy Communications, Inc. v. Environmental Action Foundation, 
477 F. Supp. 936 (D.D.C. 1979).  
312 The Reddy court in fact looked unfavorably upon defendant’s First 
Amendment defense, finding that defendant had adequate alternative 
means to convey its message criticizing plaintiff other than by using 
plaintiff’s mark.  477 F. Supp. at 938.  See text accompanying notes 316-
23. 
313 Id. at 939. 
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logging policies.314  The advertisement, in which Smokey appeared 
trying to hide a chainsaw behind his back, was captioned “Say it 
ain’t so, Smokey.”  The court held that the use of Smokey Bear in 
this critical context would be unlikely to cause confusion, and 
constituted “a form of criticism of government policies on the 
highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values.”315  
Accordingly, the court found that the statute granting the United 
States government the exclusive right to use the name and 
character of Smokey Bear was unconstitutional as applied to 
enjoin the environmental organization’s noncommercial use of 
Smokey Bear. 
In both the Reddy Kilowatt and Smokey Bear cases, 
plaintiffs were unable to prevail in trademark infringement and 
cognate actions against defendants who used their marks to 
criticize plaintiffs because the use of plaintiffs’ mark in these cases 
was a uniquely powerful vehicle for criticizing plaintiffs.  
Furthermore, the critical nature of such use served to dispel 
confusion as to whether plaintiff sponsored such use.  Where 
defendants have sought to use plaintiffs’ marks for expressive 
purposes unrelated to criticizing plaintiffs, courts have been less 
sympathetic to defendants’ free speech claims.  For example, in the 
Mutant of Omaha case, defendant sought to use the above 
variation of plaintiff’s mark “Mutual of Omaha” on T-shirts and 
other products to express his views about nuclear weapons.  The 
court held that defendant enjoyed no First Amendment right to 
enlist plaintiff’s trademark in the service of his opposition to 
nuclear weapons, explaining that defendant enjoyed adequate 
alternative means (beyond using plaintiff’s trademark) of 
conveying his message.316   
                                                          
314 Lighthawk Envir. Air Force v. Robertson, 812 F. Supp. 1095 (W.D. 
Wash. 1993).  This case, however, involved not the Lanham Act but a 
federal statute granting the United States government the exclusive right 
to use the name and character of Smokey Bear.  The court found that the 
statute was unconstitutional as applied to enjoin the environmental 
organization’s noncommercial use of Smokey Bear. 
315 Id. 
316 See Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 648 F. Supp. 905, aff’d, 836 
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This adequate alternative means of communication test, 
borrowed from cases involving real property/free speech 
conflicts,317 has been employed by the Mutant of Omaha and other 
courts in evaluating plaintiffs’ trademark interests against 
defendants’ free speech interests in a way that has generally 
favored trademark interests.318  It is hard for a defendant to 
establish that no adequate alternative means exist to express his 
message other than by using plaintiff’s trademark in general, but 
especially in cases where defendant is not using plaintiff’s mark to 
express an opinion about plaintiff but is rather co-opting the 
expressive power of plaintiff’s mark to express views on an 
unrelated matter.  The underprotective nature of this test has led 
some courts, including the Second Circuit, to abandon its use in 
adjudicating trademark/free speech conflicts, and to adopt more 
speech-friendly balancing tests.319  For example, in Rogers v. 
Grimaldi, discussed in greater detail infra,320 Ginger Rogers sued 
to enjoin the use of her name in the title of Federico Fellini’s film 
“Ginger and Fred.”321  Rogers argued that because Fellini had 
adequate alternative means to express his artistic message other 
than using Rogers’ name within his film title, Fellini’s First 
Amendment defense to her trademark infringement claim should 
fail.  The Second Circuit took this opportunity to reject the 
adequate alternative avenues of expression test (which it had 
earlier adopted), explaining that “the ‘no alternative avenues’ test 
does not sufficiently accommodate the public’s interest in free 
expression.”322  In its stead, the court adopted a balancing test 
                                                                                                                                 
F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1987). 
317 See Lloyd v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972) (holding that individuals 
did not enjoy a First Amendment right to engage in political expression 
within privately-owned shopping mall, because these speakers enjoyed 
adequate alternative avenues for communicating their message). 
318 See, e.g., Cantwell, supra note 293, at 56 (criticizing adequate 
alternative means of communication test as insufficiently protective of 
free speech).  
319 See Cantwell, supra note 293, at 62 & n.70.  
320 See text accompanying notes 374-79. 
321 Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d at 999. 
322 Id. 
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whereby plaintiff’s trademark interest would prevail “only where 
the public interest in avoiding commercial confusion outweighs the 
public interest in free expression.”323 
The recently federally enshrined cause of action for 
trademark dilution has strengthened trademark owners’ rights 
against those using their marks for expressive purposes, because 
no showing of likelihood of confusion is necessary under a dilution 
cause of action.324 Well over half the states provide anti-dilution 
statutes,325 and with the passage of the Federal Trademark Dilution 
Act in 1995,326 trademark owners were granted additional rights 
under the Lanham Act, including the right to protect their famous 
marks against another’s use that tarnishes or dilutes the ability of 
the mark to identify and distinguish plaintiff’s goods and 
services.327  With protection against trademark dilution comes the 
increased opportunity for trademark owners to wield their 
trademark rights in ways that would impact free speech interests.  
In particular, trademark owners have sought to establish that the 
critical or otherwise unwelcome use of their marks tarnishes the 
value of their marks and thereby constitutes actionable dilution.   
As Roger Denicola explains, the tarnishment prong of trademark 
dilution constitutes “an open-ended invitation to restrict any use 
that undermines the commercial value or appeal of the trademark” 
and therefore more severely threatens free speech values.328 
                                                          
323 Id. 
324 See Denicola, supra note 310, at 200. 
325 See MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 296, §24.14[2], at 24-
125. 
326 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c). 
327 Specifically, the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA) grants 
owners of famous marks the right to enjoin another’s “commercial use in 
commerce of their mark,” where such use causes dilution of the 
distinctive quality of the mark.  Id.  Three types of uses, however, were 
carved out as non-actionable under the Act: (1) the fair use of the famous 
mark in comparative commercial advertising or promotion to identify the 
competing goods or services of the owner of the famous mark; (2) 
noncommercial uses of the mark; (3) all forms of news reporting and 
commentary.  Id. 
328 See Denicola, supra note 310, at 200. 
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In the eight years since the Federal Trademark Dilution Act 
has been passed, courts have struggled with how to balance 
trademark owners’ additional anti-dilution rights against the free 
speech interests of those using their marks for expressive purposes.  
Although free speech interests fare less well in trademark dilution 
causes of action than in trademark infringement causes of 
action,329 the First Amendment nonetheless imposes substantial 
limitations on trademark owners’ anti-dilution rights.  
 The case of L.L. Bean v. Drake Publishers330 is illustrative 
of a trademark owner’s attempts to wield infringement and dilution 
causes of action to silence expressive speech incorporating its 
trademark.  In that case, High Society, a commercial, adult-
oriented magazine, published an article parodying the popular L.L. 
Bean sportswear catalog, under the title “L.L. Beam’s Back-to-
School-Sex-Catalog.”  The content of the article, like the article’s 
title, included variations on L.L. Bean’s trademarks and featured 
pictures of nude models in sexually explicit positions using 
products similar to those offered in L.L. Bean catalogs and 
described in a “crudely humorous fashion.”331  L.L. Bean, not 
amused, sued the publisher of High Society for trademark 
infringement and dilution.  Consistent with the above analysis of 
trademark infringement, the district court readily found that the 
article engendered no real likelihood of confusion, and dismissed 
Bean’s cause of action for trademark infringement.332  The district 
court, however, sustained Bean’s cause of action for trademark 
dilution, finding that High Society’s parodic use of the L.L. Bean 
mark within this context diluted the mark’s distinctive qualities,333 
and accordingly enjoined publication of the article.334   
High Society appealed, claiming that the district court’s 
order enjoining publication of the article violated its right to 
                                                          
329 See Denicola, supra note 310; Cantwell, supra note 293.  
330 L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1987). 
331 Id. at 28. 
332 See L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 625 F. Supp. 1531 (D. Maine 
1986), rev’d, 811 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1987). 
333 Id. 
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freedom of expression.  The First Circuit agreed, explaining that: 
Trademarks, and in particular famous trademarks, offer a 
particularly powerful means of conjuring up the image of 
their owners, and thus become an important, perhaps at 
times indispensable, part of the public vocabulary.  Rules 
restricting the use of well-known trademarks may therefore 
restrict the communication of ideas . . . . The constitutional 
implications of extending the trademark infringement, 
misappropriation or tarnishment rationales to cases in 
which defendant’s speech is particularly unflattering may 
often be intolerable.  Since a trademark may frequently be 
the most effective means of focusing attention on the 
trademark owner or its product, the recognition of 
exclusive rights encompassing such use would permit the 
stifling of unwelcome discussion.335   
  
The First Circuit concluded that while the Constitution tolerates 
incidental impacts on free speech where necessary to prevent a 
defendant from merchandising its products by using another’s 
mark, the First Amendment prohibits the extension of a trademark 
owner’s monopoly to enjoin the non-confusing, expressive – albeit 
critical -- use of another’s trademark, whether under trademark 
infringement or dilution causes of action.  
The case of Mattel v. MCA Records336 further illuminates 
the contours of First Amendment protection for speech that 
incorporates another’s trademark as against claims of trademark 
infringement and dilution.  In that case, Mattel, the owner of the 
famous mark “Barbie,” brought a trademark dilution action against 
the music group Acqua to enjoin the release of the song Barbie 
Girl, which referred to Barbie as a “blond bimbo girl” who “loves 
to party” and whose “life is plastic.”337  Mattel claimed both that 
Acqua’s use of the song title “Barbie Girl” and associated lyrics 
incorporating its famous mark constituted trademark infringement 
by creating a likelihood of confusion as to Mattel’s sponsorship of 
                                                          
335 811 F.2d at 29 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
336 Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (C.D.Cal. 1998). 
337 Id. at 1124. 
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the song, and that such use constituted actionable trademark 
dilution under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act because it 
disparaged Barbie’s otherwise wholesome image.  In ruling on 
plaintiff’s trademark infringement and dilution causes of action, 
the Mattel court found that the First Amendment provided a 
defense to both, and refused to enjoin the song’s release.338  
 The Mattel court first explained that a trademark owner’s 
rights are limited to the use of its mark “for the identification of 
the manufacturer or sponsor of a good or the provider or a 
service.”339   Trademark rights, being limited property rights in 
particular words, phrases, or symbols, “do not allow trademark 
holders to censor or silence all discussion of their products that 
they find annoying or offensive.”340  Observing that plaintiff’s 
attempt to wield its trademark rights to enjoin the expressive use of 
its mark would implicate the right to freedom of expression, the 
court concluded that “to deny the opportunity to poke fun at the 
symbols and names which have become woven into the fabric of 
our daily life would constitute a serious curtailment of a protected 
form of expression.”341  The court considered plaintiff’s evidence 
of likelihood of confusion, but concluded that “the First 
Amendment interests at stake outweigh the possibility that some 
people might not interpret the song’s lighthearted lyrics as a 
comment or spoof on the popular Mattel product and might be 
confused as to whether Mattel put out or authorized the song.”342    
Turning to plaintiff’s trademark dilution claim, the Mattel 
court held that even if the song could be said to tarnish or dilute 
the Barbie mark and even though the song was commercially 
released for profit, defendant’s use of plaintiff’s mark was “non-
commercial” and therefore protected under the “noncommercial 
use of a mark”343 exception to the Federal Trademark Dilution Act.   
Even though defendant’s use of the mark was in the larger context 
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of a commercial, for-profit work, because the specific context in 
which the use was made was expressive, it was nonetheless 
protected speech under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act.  The 
Mattel court’s analysis demonstrates the important distinction 
drawn by the FTDA between noncommercial uses of another’s 
mark, which are not actionable under the FTDA, and commercial 
uses of another’s mark, which are actionable under the FTDA. 
In conclusion, the Mattel court refused to “apply anti-
dilution statutes to permit a trademark owner to enjoin the use of 
his mark . . . simply because [he or she] finds such use negative or 
offensive.  [Otherwise], a corporation could shield itself from 
criticism by forbidding the use of its name in commentaries critical 
of its conduct, with detrimental consequences to free speech in this 
society.”344   
To be sure, courts have not unilaterally ruled in favor of 
free speech interests in every case in which such interests are 
pitted against trademark holders’ anti-dilution rights, whether 
under state or federal statutes.345  And because federal protection 
against dilution is less than one decade old, courts have not yet had 
a full opportunity to develop a thoughtful balancing of free speech 
interests against such trademark interests.  A mature trademark 
dilution jurisprudence would accord trademark owners meaningful 
rights against dilution of their marks while restricting the least 
amount of bona fide expression possible.  While the First 
Amendment should not be understood to serve as a trump card for 
defendants in trademark dilution causes of action, it has and should 
continue to impose on courts the duty to grant meaningful 
consideration to defendants’ assertions that their expression 
incorporating plaintiffs’ marks, even if critical of plaintiffs, is 
worthy of protection.  
Along with emphasizing the importance of imposing free 
speech limitations on trademark owners’ anti-dilution rights, the 
                                                          
344 Id. (emphasis added).  
345 See generally MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 269, at § 
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Mattel and L.L. Bean cases also demonstrate that the commercial 
or for-profit character or context of speech is not a bar to a holding 
that such speech is protected under the First Amendment.  In the 
L.L. Bean case, for example, the court emphasized that, despite the 
fact that defendant engaged in its speech for profit in the context of 
a commercial periodical, “such speech nonetheless constitutes 
[protected] editorial or artistic, rather than a commercial, use of 
plaintiff’s mark, [because defendant] did not use Bean’s mark to 
identify or promote goods or services to consumers.”346  Despite 
the fact that the defendant in L.L. Bean engaged in use of 
plaintiff’s mark in the larger context of a commercial enterprise, 
defendant’s speech in that case was expressive and therefore 
protected by the First Amendment.347  Similarly, the Mattel court 
held that the overall commercial context in which defendant 
embedded its expressive use of plaintiff’s mark did not reduce the 
protection accorded to such use, because the specific context in 
which the use was made was itself expressive.348  As the court 
explained, “the fact that defendants’ product makes a profit or is 
successful . . . does not affect the protections afforded to it by the 
First Amendment.”349 The court went on to emphasize that speech 
engaged in for profit is nonetheless protected by the First 
Amendment: “The fact that expressive materials are sold neither 
renders the speech unprotected nor alters the level of protection 
under the First Amendment.”350  Significantly, free speech is 
accorded its strongest protection when applied to such expressive 
works as newspapers and periodicals, which are generally sold for 
profit and contain commercial advertisements.351  The commercial 
content of such materials in no way reduces the level of protection 
accorded them, nor by itself moves them into the lower category of 
“commercial speech” as that term is used within First Amendment 
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348 28 F. Supp. 2d at 1124. 
349 Id. at 1125.   
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jurisprudence.352   
In short, under U.S. First Amendment and trademark 
jurisprudence, the use of another’s trademark for expressive 
purposes is protected by the right to freedom of expression even 
where such use is engaged in for-profit or is part of a larger 
commercial enterprise,353 so long as defendant does not use 
plaintiff’s mark as a source identifier in a manner that is likely to 
cause confusion or that causes dilution of another’s mark.   
 The First Amendment right to freedom of expression also 
specifically extends to the use of another’s trademark in the 
context of domain names.  Because domain names themselves, like 
titles of traditional expressive works, can serve powerful 
expressive functions, they constitute speech protectible by the First 
Amendment.  Indeed, Congress and the courts have expressly 
recognized that domain names can constitute First Amendment 
protected speech.354  In cases where trademark owners have 
attempted to wield their intellectual property rights to enjoin the 
expressive use of their marks within the context of domain names, 
courts have recognized that domain names themselves can 
constitute protected speech.  Although, as above, defendants’ free 
speech interests have not prevailed in every case,355 the First 
Amendment imposes limitations on trademark owners’ rights 
against domain name holders.  For example, in the case of Bally 
Total Fitness Holdings v. Faber,356 the court held that the First 
Amendment protected the expressive use of a plaintiff’s trademark 
incorporated in a domain name criticizing plaintiff.357  The domain 
                                                          
352 Id. 
353 See Arlen W. Langvardt, Protected Marks and Protected Speech: 
Establishing the First Amendment Boundaries in Trademark Parody 
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name holder in that case, Andrew Faber, devoted a section of his 
website – which he entitled “Bally Sucks” and which included 
“Ballysucks” as part of its domain name  – to criticizing the 
practices of the popular Bally health club business.358  The “Bally 
Sucks” section of the website contained the Bally logo and mark 
with the word “sucks” printed across it and offered visitors the 
opportunity to access (and contribute to) complaints about Bally’s 
business.359  Bally sued for trademark infringement and dilution 
based on Faber’s incorporation of its mark within his domain name 
and within the content offered on the website itself.  Faber asserted 
a First Amendment right to express himself using plaintiff’s 
mark.360   
In ruling on Bally’s causes of action, the court first 
explained on the trademark infringement claim that given the 
clearly critical nature of the content on defendant’s website, there 
was little likelihood of consumer confusion because “no 
reasonably prudent Internet user would believe that a site 
emblazoned with ‘Bally Sucks’ would be sponsored by or 
affiliated with Bally.”361  Turning to Bally’s claim that defendant’s 
use of the phrase “Bally sucks” constituted dilution actionable 
under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act,362 the court refused to 
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interpret the Act to allow plaintiff to enjoin critical use of its mark, 
explaining that trademark owners may not invoke dilution law to 
“quash unauthorized use of their mark by a person expressing a 
point of view.”363   
Similarly, courts weighing trademark owners’ intellectual 
property rights and Internet users’ free speech rights in the context 
of claims brought under the Anticybersquatting Consumer 
Protection Act have recognized that domain names can constitute 
speech protected under the First Amendment.  Consider, for 
example, the Lucentsucks case, in which Lucent Technologies 
brought an action under the Anticybersquatting Consumer 
Protection Act challenging the domain name 
LUCENTSUCKS.COM.364  While holding that the trademark owner 
failed to satisfy certain jurisdictional prerequisites, the court 
explained that Lucent “could not make out a violation of trademark 
rights [based on the registration and use of the domain name 
LUCENTSUCKS.COM] without infringing defendant’s free speech 
rights,” and noted that “a successful showing that 
LUCENTSUCKS.COM is effective parody and/or a site for critical 
commentary would seriously undermine the required elements for 
the cause of action at issue in this case.”365  Other courts 
construing the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act in 
cases where defendants asserted First Amendment rights have 
reasoned that in order to secure protection under the First 
Amendment, defendant’s domain name itself – and not merely the 
speech available on the web site at issue – must be used for 
                                                                                                                                 
plaintiff’s mark, it would not look to the diverse components and 
features of defendant’s website, but would focus specifically on the 
narrow context of defendant’s use of plaintiff’s trademark.   Within this 
specific context, the court held that defendant’s use of plaintiff’s mark 
was noncommercial and fell within the noncommercial use exception to 
the FTDA because such use was limited to defendant’s non-commercial 
expressive criticism of the Bally health club business. Id. at 1164. 
363 Id. 
364 Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Lucentsucks.com, 95 F. Supp. 2d 528, 
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expressive and not misleading purposes.366   
Bally and similar cases367 therefore establish that domain 
names, like other concise expressive phrases, can constitute speech 
protected by the First Amendment.  It is well-established as a 
matter of First Amendment jurisprudence that brief phrases and 
slogans used for expressive purposes – such as “Live Free or 
Die,”368 “Fuck the Draft,”369 etc. – can constitute expressive 
speech for purposes of First Amendment protection.  Indeed, such 
phrases and slogans may be all the more potent forms of 
expression because of their concentrated nature.  It is also well-
established that the expressive use of another’s trademark within 
the context of such brief phrases constitutes protected speech as 
against trademark owner’s claims of infringement or dilution.370  
Notably, many trademark cases involve successful First 
Amendment defenses for the use of concise terms or expressions 
analogous to domain names, such as those discussed above 
involving protection for the song title “Barbie Girl” and the article 
title “L.L. Beam’s Back to School Sex Catalog.”371   
The protection accorded to titles of expressive works has 
received nuanced treatment under the United States’ free speech 
jurisprudence that is illuminative for the treatment of domain 
names, which serve roles analogous to titles.  In interpreting the 
First Amendment as against conflicting claims by trademark 
owners, courts have recognized that titles of expressive works, like 
domain names, often serve the dual function of being expressive 
themselves and serving the purpose of commercial promotion.372  
Courts have held that the commercial component of such speech, 
however, does not reduce the protection accorded them under the 
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First Amendment.373   
The Second Circuit’s decision in the case of Rogers v. 
Grimaldi374 helps to illuminate the hybrid nature of titles, and, by 
analogy, of domain names.  In that case, legendary dancer Ginger 
Rogers claimed that Italian filmmaker Federico Fellini’s use of the 
title “Ginger and Fred” created a likelihood of confusion as to 
Ginger Rogers’ affiliation with the film, diluted the distinctive 
character of her name, and thus constituted actionable trademark 
infringement and dilution.375  Fellini asserted a First Amendment 
defense, claiming that his use of this film title served expressive 
purposes that outweighed any possible likelihood of confusion.376  
In rejecting Rogers’ trademark claims, the Second Circuit found 
that titles of expressive works are of a “hybrid nature,” in that they 
can “combine artistic expression and commercial promotion.”377  
The court explained that “although First Amendment concerns do 
not insulate titles from Lanham Act claims, [First Amendment] 
concerns must nonetheless inform our consideration of the scope 
of the Lanham Act as applied to claims involving such titles.”378  
Concomitantly, the court held that consumers of such expressive 
works have dual interests: “an interest in not being misled and an 
interest in enjoying the results of such expression.  For all these 
reasons, the expressive element of titles requires substantial 
protection under the First Amendment.”379  Following the Second 
Circuit’s analysis in Rogers v. Grimaldi, other courts, such as the 
Mattel court,380 have recognized the important expressive role 
served by titles, and have held that the First Amendment protects 
defendants’ expressive use of trademarks within the title of 
defendants’ work. 
Like titles, domain names can serve both expressive and 
                                                          
373 See text accompanying note 377. 
374 875 F.2d 994 (2nd Cir. 1989). 
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380 See 28 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (C.D. Cal. 1998). 
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commercial promotion purposes that advance both the domain 
name holders’ interest in free expression as well as Internet users’ 
interests in enjoying the results of such expression.  When a 
domain name incorporates another’s trademark solely for the 
purpose of (misleading) commercial promotion, such use is 
properly held to be unprotected by the First Amendment.   Yet 
when a domain name incorporates another’s trademark for an 
expressive purpose, as in the Bally and Lucent cases discussed 
above, such use is properly held to be protected by the First 
Amendment.  The case of Planned Parenthood v. Bucci381 is 
illustrative of the first type of use of another’s trademark within a 
domain name – use for the purpose of misleading promotion -- 
which does not merit protection under the First Amendment.  In 
that case, an individual opposed to contraceptive and abortion 
rights was the first to register the domain name 
PLANNEDPARENTHOOD.COM.  Upon visiting the home page of this 
PLANNEDPARENTHOOD.COM site, visitors were greeted with the 
message “Welcome to Planned Parenthood’s Home Page.”382  In 
ruling on Planned Parenthood Foundation of America’s trademark 
infringement cause of action challenging defendant’s use of this 
domain name, the court held that such use of plaintiff’s trademark 
as defendant’s domain name was not expressive, but was instead 
for the purpose of trading on plaintiff’s mark to misleadingly 
identify the web page at issue as originating from Planned 
Parenthood.  The court explained that defendant’s use of the 
domain name PLANNEDPARENTHOOD.COM was unprotected by the 
First Amendment because it “had no [expressive] implications, and 
was being used to attract consumers by misleading them as to the 
website’s source or content.”383  If the defendant in Planned 
Parenthood had chosen a domain name that was expressive, but 
not misleading as to source, such as CHOOSELIFE.COM, 
STOPABORTION.COM, ABORTIONKILLS.COM, or even 
PLANNEDPARENTHOODKILLS.COM, he would have had a far stronger 
argument that such a domain name itself was intended to 
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communicate a message or idea and was therefore protected by the 
First Amendment.384   
In contrast to the Planned Parenthood case, the Bally case 
discussed above exemplifies defendant’s use of plaintiff’s 
trademark – viz., “Bally sucks” as part of defendant’s domain 
name -- in a manner that is protected by the First Amendment.385  
Because defendant’s use of this domain name served an expressive 
purpose, and because no reasonably prudent person could be 
confused by defendant’s use of “Bally sucks” within his domain 
name, his use of plaintiff’s mark in the context of his domain name 
constituted speech protected by the First Amendment. 
In short, domain names – despite their concise nature – are 
protectible speech under the First Amendment.  The use of 
another’s trademark within a domain name constitutes speech 
protected by the First Amendment where such use is for expressive 
purposes and is not confusing or dilutive of another’s mark.  The 
First Amendment plays a significant role in limiting trademark 
owners’ monopoly over the words and symbols that make up their 
marks and in protecting speech that incorporates others’ 
trademarks for expressive purposes.  In the face of trademark 
owners’ attempts to wield their rights under trademark 
infringement, dilution, and now anticybersquatting law to silence 
bona fide critical and other expressive uses of their marks, the First 
Amendment imposes important protection against such 
overreaching. 
No similar checks exist on ICANN decision-making or on 
                                                          
384 See National A-1 Advertising, Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc.,  
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analogous ICANN policies.  Neither ICANN’s foundational 
documents, nor its Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy, accord any 
special weight to freedom of expression.  Because of the public 
ordering role ICANN serves in regulating speech within this 
important expressive forum, ICANN must be called upon to 
incorporate special protections for freedom of expression within its 
foundational documents and to revise its Uniform Dispute 
Resolution Policy to ensure that it restricts the least amount of 
speech possible while protecting trademark owners against the 
confusing or dilutive use of their marks. 
 First, the Policy should be revised to incorporate a more 
careful assessment of the commercial nature of the expression 
available on challenged websites.  In many disputes under the 
Policy involving a domain name holder’s critical use of another’s 
mark – such as the disputes involving BURLINGTON-
MURDERFACTORY.COM386 and LAKAIXA.COM387 – the mere presence 
of some commercial content on the challenged website effectively 
defeated the domain name holder’s claim that he or she enjoyed 
“rights or legitimate interests” in the domain name, and constituted 
grounds for removal of the domain name.  In order to establish 
rights or legitimate interests in a domain name, the Policy requires 
that the domain name holder is “making a legitimate 
noncommercial or fair use of the domain name, without intent for 
commercial gain to misleadingly divert consumers or to tarnish the 
trademark or service mark at issue.”388  Thus, even if the use of the 
domain name could be considered “fair use” – whatever that is 
held to mean in this context -- a showing that the domain name 
holder has the intent “for commercial gain . . . to tarnish the [mark] 
at issue” is fatal to the domain name holder’s ability to establish 
her rights and legitimate interests in the mark.  Because many 
websites critical of trademark owners can be said to “tarnish the 
mark at issue” and because many such websites include or link to 
some commercial content on their site, the Policy – as written and 
as applied – is insufficiently protective of domain name holders’ 
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right to engage in critical speech.   
In particular, holding that the inclusion of some 
commercial content (such as an advertisement for unrelated goods 
or services) renders a domain name holder’s critical speech 
unprotected burdens more speech than is necessary to advance 
ICANN’s interests.  As we have seen, free speech protection for 
artistic, literary, and editorial works such as newspapers or 
periodicals is rendered no less strong by the economic motive of 
the speaker/publisher or the presence of advertisements contained 
within such expressive works.389  Similarly, the mere presence of 
an advertisement, commercial content, or economic motive should 
not render a domain name holder’s critical use of another’s 
trademark unprotected under the Policy.  Despite the fact that such 
advertisements provide revenue to the speaker involved, such 
advertisements do not render the expressive content any less 
expressive and should not render such content any less protected.   
Accordingly, the presence of (or link to) commercial content on a 
website should not reduce the protection accorded to a domain 
name holder under the Policy.  Rather, the appropriate inquiry 
regarding domain name holders’ rights and legitimate interests 
should be into whether the domain name holder is using the mark 
at issue – in the context of the domain name and in the context of 
the website generally – (1) for the purpose of confusing and 
misleading consumers as to source or diluting the mark, or (2) for 
the purpose of expressing her views, ideas or opinions, including 
in a manner that is critical of the mark.  If it is established that the 
domain name holder is using the mark for expressive purposes – 
as, for example, in the BURLINGTONMURDERFACTORY.COM case390 
– such use should be protected under the Policy, notwithstanding 
the presence of any commercial content on the website.  Just as the 
commercial nature of or content contained within the magazine in 
the L.L. Bean case391 did not mitigate the level of protection 
available for the publishers with respect to the critical use of L.L. 
Bean’s mark, so too the presence of commercial content in 
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conjunction with an expressive use of a trademark should not 
reduce the free speech protections accorded to such use under the 
Policy.392 
Second, the Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy should be 
revised to provide meaningful sanctions for the misuse of this 
process by trademark owners.  The UDRP, by its terms, was 
intended to apply only to those disputes involving bad faith 
cybersquatting in which domain name holders did not enjoy any 
rights or legitimate interests in the domain name at issue.393  As 
shown above, however, trademark owners have extended the 
UDRP well beyond this scope and have misused the process by 
bringing UDRP actions against domain name holders in cases in 
which domain name holders enjoyed rights and legitimate interests 
in their domain names.  The UDRP attempts to discourage such 
bad faith complaints by empowering UDRP panelists to label such 
conduct “reverse domain name hijacking.”394  However, the Policy 
fails to attach any sanction whatsoever to such conduct and 
therefore fails to disincent such conduct.  In order to meaningfully 
discourage bringing such bad faith complaints, the Policy should 
be revised to attach meaningful monetary or legal consequences – 
such as paying the domain name holders’ fees (if any)395 – to such 
acts of domain name “hijacking.”   
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In short, in revising its domain name policies to accord 
meaningful protection for the fundamental right of freedom of 
expression, ICANN should extend greater protections to Internet 




Over the past five years, ICANN has engaged in an 
unprecedented experiment in global democratic decision-making 
affecting the rights of Internet users worldwide.  When it ceded 
control over key elements of the Internet’s infrastructure to 
ICANN, the United States was correct to insist that ICANN 
commit to embodying the procedural normative ideals of liberal 
democracy by incorporating representative decision-making 
structures over an extended sphere and by facilitating deliberation 
within its decision-making.  ICANN should be held to these 
normative commitments and should not be permitted to revise its 
governance structure to retreat from these commitments. 
Because it has become clear over the past five years that 
ICANN’s decision-making affects speech within the most 
powerful forum for expression ever created, however, it is not 
sufficient for ICANN to embody the procedural norms of liberal 
democracy.  Rather, ICANN’s governance structure must be 
revised to accord meaningful protections for the substantive norms 
of liberal democracy – most importantly, protections for freedom 
of expression.  Freedom of expression – whether justified on the 
foundationalist grounds that it is intrinsically valuable or on the 
instrumentalist grounds that it is necessary to a well-functioning 
democratic system – is an essential component of liberal 
democracies.  ICANN’s governance structure should therefore be 
revised to incorporate meaningful protections for freedom of 
expression.  In particular, ICANN should revise its speech-
regarding policies to accord meaningful protection for Internet 
users’ right to engage in anonymous speech and their right to 
engage in critical speech.  
 
 
